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NOTES
Administrative Law-Private Search and Seizure
In Knoll Associates, Inc. v. FTC,' the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that the fourth amendment precludes admission, in a Federal
Trade Commission proceeding, of records stolen by a private individual.
In 1962 the Commission filed a complaint charging Knoll, a furniture manufacturer, with price discrimination in violation of section 2 (a)
of the Clayton Act.2 At the hearing, Knoll objected to the introduction
of certain company records stolen by a former employee, Herbert Prosser.
The objection was overruled3 and a cease and desist order subsequently
issued. The court of appeals reversed and remanded to the Commis4
sion with instructions to disregard the evidence in question.
The court of appeals decided that the undisputed evidence showed
Prosser had stolen the records to aid the FTC and that therefore the
records were inadmissible under Gambino v. United States." In that
case, evidence unconstitutionally seized by state police and given to federal officials was held inadmissible in the ensuing federal trial on the
ground that the state police had procured the evidence for the purpose
of aiding the United States.
There is some question whether Gambino is proper authority for
the exclusion of records stolen by a private individual. Gambino was
decided after Weeks v. United States,' but before Elkins v. United
States.7 Weeks made the exclusionary rule applicable in federal trials
to evidence seized in violation of the fourth amendment by federal offi'397 F.2d 350 (7th Cir. 1968).

'15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1964), formerly ch. 323, § 2, 38 Stat. 730 (1914).
'Knoll Assoc., Inc., [1963-65 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 16,881, at
21,911 (FTC 1964).
' 397 F.2d at 537. The court thus applied the fourth amendment exclusionary
rule to an administrative proceeding. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania,
380 U.S. 693 (1965), held that the exclusionary rule was applicable to a forfeiture
proceeding because the proceeding's punitive characteristics made it quasi-criminal,
thus justifying the use of constitutional safeguards. Arguably, FTC proceedings
are sufficiently criminal to warrant application of the exclusionary rule. Jones v.
Securities and Exch. Comm'n, 298 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1936), notes that the ever
expanding administrative agencies cannot be permitted to encroach on the fundamental rights of individuals. These two cases would seem to support, if not
require, administrative application of the exclusionary rule.
275 U.S. 310 (1927).
6232 U.S. 383 (1914).
'364 U.S. 206 (1960).
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cials. It did not apply to the fruits of state officials' unconstitutional
activity. As a result, state officers often violated the fourth amendment,
giving the resultant evidence to their federal counterparts for use in a
federal prosecution.' To counter this practice,9 the Supreme Court, in
Gambino, extended the exclusionary rule in federal trials to encompass
evidence unconstitutionally obtained through state illegality whenever that
illegality had been perpetrated for the purpose of aiding the United States.
Elkins ended the need for the Gambino rule, for the Court held that all
evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment by state or federal officials was inadmissible in a federal trial.1"
Thus, the Gambino exclusionary rule was merely an interim device
designed to curb the "silver platter" practice. Formulated to control
state officials, its application was limited to their activity and it has now
been superseded. It would seem that Gambino's test of whether an illegal
act was committed for the purpose of aiding the United States is irrelevant when private conduct is in issue.
The law of search and seizure as related to the acts of private individuals appears more properly controlled by Burdeau v. McDowell."
In that case, private detectives stole records later turned over to the
United States for use in a criminal prosecution. The Court flatly stated
that the fourth amendment did not apply to individual conduct and held
that since no connection was shown between the Government and the
perpetrators of the illegality, the records were admissible. Thus, the decision seems to be that private illegality will be excluded only when the
Government is somehow involved in the wrongdoing.
In Knoll, the court of appeals treated Burdeau in a summary fashion.
The court felt that Prosser's calls to the FTC and his subsequent testimony at the hearing clearly showed governmental involvement in the
illegality. This is an arguable finding. In every case in which the Government uses evidence obtained by private individuals there will be involvement of the type noted by the Knoll Court, if only to enable the
evidence to change hands. Burdeau would logically seem to require gov'This practice later became known as the "silver platter" doctrine. Lustig v.
United States, 338 U.S. 74, 79 (1949).
'An earlier case, Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28 (1927), attempted
to curtail this same practice by excluding the evidence when state and federal
officials had acted jointly.
superseded Elkins in holding that the
10 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961),
exclusionary rule prohibited the use in state oir federal court of evidence seized
in violation of the fourth amendment by state or federal officials.
11256

U.S. 465 (1921).
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ernmental involvement in the planning or execution of the illegality,
rather than mere contact with the donor of the evidence, in order to
justify exclusion. Under this interpretation of Burdeau's requirement
of governmental action, and on the facts of Knoll, the stolen records would
be admissible as being the fruits of private illegality. When Prosser
first contacted the FTC lawyers, he told them he had been getting a
"raw deal [from Knoll]" and that he had "enough papers to hang
Knoll.""2 This seems to indicate that Prosser had decided to steal, and
possibly had already stolen, the papers before he contacted the Commission and leads to the conclusion that the Government was not "involved"
in any meaningful sense of the word.
Why should the Seventh Circuit use such an indiscriminate test for
Governmental involvement? This mistreatment of Burdeau may have
been caused by a feeling on the part of the court that the case is no
longer good law. Whether this is so is debatable. It has been urged
that Elkins v. United States has overruled Burdeau in enunciating a
general rule that federal courts may not admit evidence obtained by
state police during a search, which if conducted by federal officers, would
have been illegal.13 This view assumes that "private individuals" may be
substituted for "state police" in the above formula. However, it may be
erroneous to assume that state action and individual action are constitutionally equivalent, especially since Wolf v. Colorado'4 made it clear
that at least the core of the fourth amendment controls state police
activity.' This assumption would erase all distinction between governmental and non-governmental action, the distinction upon which Burdeau
is based.
This same distinction has become blurred in other areas,'" and it
has been said that this blurring process will lead to the demise of
12397 F.2d at 532.
'*See
Williams v. United States, 282 F.2d 940, 941 (6th Cir. 1960)
(assumes this in dictum); Sackler v. Sackler, 15 N.Y.2d 40, 45, 203 N.E.2d
481, 484, 255 N.Y.S.2d 83, 87 (1964) (dissenting opinion); contra, People v. Horman, 22 N.Y.2d 378, 239 N.E.2d 625, 292 N.Y.S.2d 874 (1968).
14338 U.S. 25 (1949).
15 Note, Mapp v. Ohio and Exclusion of Evidence Illegally Obtained by Private
Parties,72 YALE L.J. 1062, 1064 n.18 (1963). Although Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643 (1961), overruled Wolf, this aspect of the case should still be valid. See
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 213 (1960); Irvine v. California, 347
U.S. 128, 132 (1954); Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117, 119 (1951).
18 Notably in the civil rights area.
United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745,
755-56 (1966); Griffin v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 130 (1964); Peterson v. City of
Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365
U.S. 715 (1961); Pennsylvania v. Board of Trusts, 353 U.S. 230 (1957).
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7
However, the breakdown of the distinction is not a reason
Burdeau.1
to overrule Burdeau, but merely a means to that end. By using this
breakdown in other areas as authority, the Court could remove its selfimposed governmental action barrier and exclude the fruits of private
illegality. It should not do so unless there is a valid reason.
A valid reason for overruling Burdeau may lie in the emergent "right
of privacy" recently articulated by the Supreme Court.:. This right of
privacy, embodied in the fourth and fifth amendments, among others,
may be so strong as to compel the exclusion of the fruits of its invasion
even when the invader is a private citizen. Under this theory it would
not matter who committed the violation-whenever the government
sought to utilize its fruits the exclusionary rule would apply. This reasoning does not deny continued validity to the governmental action requirement, but instead finds such action in the government's attempted
use of the evidence. This redefining of "governmental action" hinges
on a private individual's illegal searches and seizures being held violative
of the emergent right of privacy. The Court may be more willing to
find such private illegality a violation of this right of privacy than it
has been to find it an unadorned fourth amendment violation. As the
right of privacy expands, the chances for Burdeau's demise become more
real.
However, Linkletter v. Walker 9 may indicate that the right of privacy is not as vigorous as might have been assumed. There the Court
refused to give retroactive effect to Mapp v. Ohio20 because, it reiterated,
the policy of the exclusionary rule is to deter police illegality and no
deterrence would be brought about by release of those already imprisoned.
Thus, the espousal of a pure deterrence rational seems to imply that the
right of privacy is a concept of limited usefulness, for an ever expanding constitutional right of privacy would seemingly have demanded retroactivity for Mapp in order that the transgressed privacy of those
imprisoned be vindicated.
Thus, it would appear that Burdeau has continued validity, at least
until the extent of the right of privacy is more fully articulated." In
" Comment, The Exclusion of Evidence Wrongfuly Obtained by Private Individuals, 1966 UTAH L. REv. 271, 274.
8
See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) ; Griswold v. ConnectiMapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
cut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965);
10381 U.S. 618, 636 (1965).
20367 U.S. 643 (1961).
" See United States v. American Rad. & Stand. Sanit. Corp., 278 F. Supp.
241 (W.D. Pa. 1967).
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the final analysis, the Knoll court seemed to sense this, as shown by its
attempt to distinguish Burdeau; in reality it based its decision not on
Ganbino but on the idea that judicial integrity and the concept of an
ordered society would be jeopardized were the courts to sanction
governmental illegality by permitting the use of unconstitutionally obtained evidence.2" Though disfavoring Burdeau, the court of appeals seemed to realize that there is no present ground for overruling
that case. By distinguishing rather than disturbing, the court has avoided
direct confrontation with a Supreme Court precedent and, at the same
time, has undermined that precedent, for to distinguish a case which
seems clearly controlling does little to strengthen it as precedent.
W. LUNSFORD LONG

Civil Procedure-Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(d)Disposition of Cases by the Court of Appeals after Granting
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict
In the recent case of Neely v. Martin K. Eby Construction Co.,1 the
Supreme Court attempted to clarify the procedure involved in using the
judgment notwithstanding the verdict2 at the appellate level in the federal system3 under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(d).4 Neely was
a diversity action in which the jury awarded plaintiff damages in her
wrongful death action against defendant. After the verdict was returned,
defendant moved under Rule 50(b) for judgment n.o.v., or in the alternative, for a new trial. The trial judge denied both motions and ordered
judgment entered for plaintiff on the verdict. On appeal, the court of
appeals ruled that the evidence was legally insufficient to go to the jury
on the issue of negligence and ordered judgment n.o.v. for defendant.
Then, instead of remanding the case to the trial court for new trial
" Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 223 (1960), notes that the courts
ought not to be a party to illegality by permitting the Government to use evidence

in violation of the Constitution.

1386 U.S. 317 (1967). This case has also been noted in The Supreme Court,
1966 Term, 81 HARv. L. REv. 69, 218 (1967).
'Hereinafter referred to as judgment n.o.v.
' For a general treatment of the practice and procedure in the federal system
under Federal Rule 50, see F. JAmES, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 7.22 (1965); 5 J.
50.01-.17 (2d ed. P. Kurland recomp. 1966) [hereMOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
inafter cited as MOORE]; Annot., 69 A.L.R.2d 449 (1960).
' FED. R. Civ. P. 50(d). See note 22 infra.
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considerations, the court of appeals ordered the case dismissed.5 The
Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals, saying that
it was within the power of the court of appeals to order judgment n.o.v.
and to dismiss the case without giving the verdict winner an opportunity
to move for a new trial in the trial court.
Prior to the decision in Neely, the Supreme Court had always limited
the use of the judgment n.o.v. in the federal system because of its emphasis on the seventh amendment right to jury trial. So great was the
Court's reluctance to allow any infringement upon this right that when
the judgment n.o.v. device was first brought before the Court, it was
ruled unconstitutional in the federal system.' It was not until twentytwo years later that the Court relented and held the device constitutional
in a new form,7 which was incorporated into Rule 50 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938. The Court's grudging acceptance of
the judgment n.o.v. continued in later cases in which the Court laid
down a definite procedure to be followed at the trial court level if a
8
litigant wished to avail himself of the device.
It was only natural that when the Court first turned its attention to
appellate use of the judgment n.o.v., it displayed an even greater reluctance toward allowing a court to deprive a verdict winner of his verdict.'
The Court actually had two problems to face in this area. The first
concerned the conditions under which an appellate court could grant judgment n.o.v., while the second problem concerned the proper disposition
of the case by the appellate court once it had decided a judgment n.o.v.
was warranted. Concerning the former problem, the Court made it clear
from the beginning that the court of appeals has the power to grant
judgment n.o.v. only if a motion to that effect is first made at the trial
344 F.2d 482 (10th Cir. 1965).
' Slocum v. New York Life Ins. Co., 228 U.S. 364 (1913). For a more
comprehensive treatment of this subject, see 5 MooRE 50.07.
Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654 (1935).
8 For example, Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Duncan, 311 U.S. 243 (1940),
established the rule that the trial court should also rule on any new trial motion
presented if the court decides to grant judgment n.o.v. This rule has been codified
in FED. R. Civ. P. 50(c) (1). Another example of the importance of following
the proper procedure in the trial court is that if the verdict loser fails to move
for a directed verdict at the close of all the evidence, the trial court is powerless
to grant judgment n.o.v. See 5 Moopm 50.08. The Court also stressed that the
trial judge could, in his discretion, order a new trial, even though a judgment
n.o.v, was warranted, where it was likely that the verdict winner could cure his
defect in proof in a new trial. Cone v. West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co., 330 U.S.
212, 215-16, 218 (1947). treatment of this development, see 5 MooRE 50.12.
For a comprehensive
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court level. 10 As long as the verdict loser moves properly in the trial
court for judgment n.o.v., it is well settled" that the court of appeals
can review the sufficiency of the evidence and grant judgment n.o.v.' 2
In Neely, this issue of appellate power to grant judgment n.o.v. was not
presented because the verdict loser had followed the correct procedure
in the trial court.' 3
Neely does, however, focus on the second problem concerning appellate use of the judgment n.o.v.-the proper disposition of the case once
the court of appeals decides a judgment n.o.v. is warranted. Unfortunately, this problem has not received much attention from the Court in
the past, although it has arisen many times in the lower courts. 14 When
faced with this situation, appellate courts have frequently remanded the
case to the trial court without directions,'5 giving the verdict winner
an opportunity to invoke the discretion of the trial judge to grant a
new trial. Yet other appellate courts have done exactly what the court
of appeals did in Neely by granting judgment n.o.v. and ordering the
trial court to dismiss the action,' thus depriving the verdict winner of
an opportunity to invoke the discretion of the trial court. Despite earlier
dictum,' 7 it was not until Neely' s that the Supreme Court specifically

addressed itself to this problem of disposition.'"
" Two leading cases have established this proposition. In Cone v. West
Virginia Pulp & Paper Co., 330 U.S. 212 (1947), the verdict loser failed altogether to move for judgment n.o.v. at the trial court level. Yet on appeal, the
court of appeals granted judgment n.o.v. The Supreme Court reversed, declaring
it fundamentally unfair for an appellate court to deprive the verdict winner of
his verdict until the trial court had first addressed itself to the question. Later,
in Johnson v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 344 U.S. 48 (1952), the Court again
reversed the court of appeal's entry of judgment n.o.v. for the verdict loser
where the verdict loser had moved only to "set aside" the verdict at the trial
court level.
" Some commentators, however, have criticized appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence. E.g., C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 95, at 368 (1963).
"E.g., Neely v. Martin K. Eby Constr. Co., 386 U.S. 317, 322 (1967). Cf.
28 U.S.C. § 2106 (1964).
13 386 U.S. at 325.
,For a summary of the cases in this area see 5 MOORE
50.15.
"E.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Barkdoll, 353 F.2d 101 (8th Cir. 1955).
"E.g., United States v. Fenix & Scisson, Inc., 360 F.2d 260 (10th Cir. 1966);
Kaminski v. Chicago, R. & I.R.R., 200 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1952).
Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Duncan, 311 U.S. 243, 253-54 (1940) (dictum).
When the Court granted certiorari in this case, it also granted certiorari in
another case, Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 382 U.S. 914 (1965), and
posed similar questions to the parties. However, in Utah Pie Co. v. Continental
Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685 (1967), the Supreme Court reversed the decision of
the court of appeals and consequently did not reach the questions presented in
the writ of certiorari.
"9Several writers, however, have anticipated this problem. See Kaplan, Annd-
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Since the judgment n.o.v. device was first incorporated into Federal
Rule 50 in 1938, the wording of the rule has undergone change to
clarify and codify the judicial tightrope that the Court had previously
laid down for litigants.2" When Rule 50 was amended in 1963, subdivision (d) was proposed 2 ' to handle the cases like Neely where the
trial court denies the verdict loser's motions for judgment n.o.v. and
new trial. The wording of Rule 50(d)2 reflects the developments in the
law until 1963 as laid down by the Supreme Court. For example, the
Rule takes for granted that the appellate court has the power to review
the sufficiency of the evidence and to reverse the trial court if necessary3 Yet the Rule does not explicitly address itself to the ultimate
power of the court of appeals in disposing of a case once the court
decides a judgment n.o.v. is warranted. The Advisory Committee's Note
to Rule 50 admits this omission and gives this explanation:
Subdivision (d) does not attempt a regulation of all aspects of the
procedure where the motion for judgment n.o.v. and any accompanying
motion for a new trial are denied [at the trial court level], since the
problems have not been fully canvassed in the decisions and the procedure is in some respects still in a formative stage. 24
In light of the Court's earlier reluctance in allowing appellate termination of a verdict winner's case,25 the Neely holding seems to represent a
significant departure from the attitude of the Court in the previous cases.
To reach such a decision, the Court surprisingly relied almost exclusively
on an interpretation of Rule 50. Justice White, writing for a majority
ments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 1961-1963 (II), 77 HARV. L. REV.
801, 819-20 (1964); Comment, Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict-Rule
50(b), 51 Nw. U.L. REv. 397, 400-02 (1956); Note, Rule 50(b): Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, 58 CoLum. L. REv. 517, 524-25 (1958).
20 Three of the leading cases in this area were Johnson v. New York, N.H. &
H.R.R., 344 U.S. 48 (1952); Cone v. West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co., 330 U.S.
212 (1947); Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Duncan, 311 U.S. 243 (1940).
2131 F.R.D. 643 (1962).
22
FED. R. Civ. P. 50(d):
If the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is denied, the
party who prevailed on that motion may, as appellee, assert grounds entitling him to a new trial in the event the appellate court concludes that the
trial court erred in denying the motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict. If the appellate court reverses the judgment, nothing in this rule
precludes it from determining that the appellee is entitled to a new trial,
or from directing the trial court to determine whether a new trial shall
be granted.
Id.
2" "If the appellate court reverses the judgment ...
2FED. R. Civ. P. 50, Advisory Comm. Note, 31 F.R.D. 646 (1962).
" See cases cited note 20 supra.
"
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of six justices,2" rejected the idea of an automatic remand by the appellate court upon reversal of the trial court's rulings under Rule 50(d),
saying such a rule would not serve Rule 50's purpose of speeding litigation and avoiding unnecessary retrials. The Court said that any right
to a new trial for the verdict winner lay in the hands of the court of
appeals: "Jurisdiction over the case then passed to the Court of Appeals
and petitioner's right to seek a new trial after her jury verdict was
set aside became dependent upon the disposition by the Court of Appeals
under Rule 50(d). '"2 Looking at the wording in Rule 50(d), the Court
found nothing in it expressly denying to the court of appeals the power
of reversal and dismissal, and inferred from this an intent to allow
such power.29
Despite the simplicity of this approach, Justice Black in his dissent
argued that Rule 50(d) must be interpreted in the restrictive light in
which it evolved,8" and if viewed in this manner, the failure of the Rule
expressly to grant the power of reversal and dismissal must mean an
intent to deny such power to the court of appeals.8" Whereas the majority interpreted Rule 50(d) to be permissive in the sense that the court
of appeals may remand or dismiss a case after entering judgment n.o.v.,
2 The Court addressed itself solely to the procedural problem involved and
did not review the issue of the sufficiency of the evidence, saying the writ of
certiorari did not cover this question. Justices Douglas and Fortas entered an
opinion concurring in the construction of Rule 50, but thought the evidence was
sufficient to go to the jury. Justice Black dissented on the grounds that the
evidence was sufficient to go to the jury, and that he disagreed with the construction of Rule 50. 326.
27386 U.S. at
2

8Id. at 324.

" Id. The Court also rejected the applicability of FED. R. Civ. P. 50(c) (2),
which provides: "The party whose verdict has been set aside on motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict may serve a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59 not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment notwithstanding the verdict." The Court said this provision was applicable only in those
cases where the trial court had granted the motion for judgment n.o.v., whereas
in this case, the trial court had denied the motion. justice Black, however, argued
in his dissent that Rule 50(c)(2) should apply. Utilizing the logic of the
majority in their interpretation of Rule 50(d), Justice Black argued that nothing
in Rule 50(c)(2) expressly indicates that a verdict winner loses his right to
move for a new trial in the trial court if that court's entry of judgment n.o.v.
against him is on the direction of an appellate court rather than on its own
initiative. 386 U.S. at 340.
"One writer has described the Supreme Court's treatment of Rule 50 as
follows: "At the hands of the present Supreme Court, with its great-perhaps
exaggerated-reverence for the supposed benefits of jury trial, this rule has been
narrowly interpreted so that he who would have its benefit must indeed walk a
CIVIL
tightrope." F. JAMES,
21386 U.S. at 340-41.

PROCEDURE

§ 7.22 at 334 (1965)

(footnote omitted).
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Justice Black pointed out that the rule is really permissive toward the
verdict winner, not toward the court of appeals. It says that the verdict
winner "may, as appellee, assert" his grounds for a newtrial to the court
of appeals. 2 Nowhere does it say he must do so to protect his right to
a new trial. Therefore, Justice Black concluded that the case could not
be dismissed until the verdict winner had been given an opportunity to
move in the trial court for a new trial.
This conflict between Justice Black and the majority on the proper
interpretation of Rule 50, especially Rule 50(d), reveals what should
have been apparent from the beginning-the Rule simply does not explicitly answer the disposition problem." Whatever the basis of the
Court's opinion in Neely, however, its effort to deal with this question
requires interpretation. The most obvious interpretation of the case is
a literal one; any right to a new trial for the verdict winner now lies
within the discretion of the court of appeals. In this light, Neely represents a radical departure from the Court's previously displayed reluctant
attitude3 4 and deals the verdict winner in the federal system a damaging
blow. The Court is now willing for any appellate court not only to
review the sufficiency of the evidence, but also to terminate the case.
This literal interpretation of Neely raises the fundamental question
of whether the court of appeals is actually the proper forum in which
the verdict winner should have to seek his new trial. A long line of
state and federal cases require that the trial court, not an appellate court,
decide a new trial issue.3 5 Cone v. West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co.s" is
illustrative:
Determination of whether a new trial should be granted or a judgment
entered under Rule 50(b) calls for the judgment in the first instance
of the judge who saw and heard the witnesses and has the feel of the
case which no appellate printed transcript can impart....
. . [A] litigant should not have his right to a new trial foreclosed
without 3having
had the benefit of the trial court's judgment on the
7
question.
*

See note 22 supra.
a, See cases cited note 20 supra.
'5 "But the grant or denial of a new trial is primarily addressed to the sound
discretion of the trial court, which normally has a feel for the case that an
appellate court usually does not have.. . ." 6A MOORE 59.05, at 3735 (footnote
omitted). This point has been recently re-emphasized in Iacurci v. Lummus Co.,
See note 44 infra and accompanying text.
387 "330
U.S. 86
212 (1947),
U.S.(1967).
'*

"See note 24 supra and accompanying text.

I"d, ; t 216-17,
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Although the facts differed in Neely and Cone in that Cone dealt with
the power of the court of appeals to grant judgment n.o.v. where the
verdict loser failed to make the proper motion in the trial court,8 8 the
Court did indicate in dictum that the court of appeals would have been
powerless to dismiss the case even if the verdict loser had moved properly
in the trial court for judgment n.o.v.3 The Court rejected a suggestion,
adopted now in Neely, that the verdict winner should have to claim his
right to a new trial in the court of appeals.40
There is one crucial fact in Neely that indicates, when considered in
conjunction with some of the Court's language, another possible interpretation of the case more in line with precedent: at no time did Miss
Neely try to state to the court of appeals the grounds entitling her to a
new trial.4 This fact, plus the Court's statement in Neely that the court
of appeals should remand some cases,4 could be taken to mean that
the verdict winner must present his grounds for a new trial in his appellate brief or face dismissal. If he does state his grounds, however, or
if they readily appear in the record,43 then the trial court may still be
the proper forum to decide most questions.
It is arguable that one recent Supreme Court case supports this analysis. In Jacurci v. Lummus Co.,4 4 the procedural setting was similar to
that in Neely. After a special verdict by the jury for plaintiff, defendant
moved for judgment n.o.v. and a new trial. The trial judge denied both
motions. On appeal, the court of appeals reversed the trial court, ordering judgment n.o.v. and a dismissal of the case. Contrary to the result
in Neely, however, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals,
saying Jacurci was one of those cases which should be remanded to the
trial court for consideration of a new trial.45 In a tone distinctly pre8 See

330
"Id.

note 10 supra.

U.S. at Black
218. emphasized this point in his dissent. See 386 U.S. at 341.
Justice
Implicit in this course of action was an assumption that the case would
be remanded to the trial court for consideration of the new trial issue should
the court of appeals reverse. Reply Brief for Petitioner at 12-13, Neely v. Martin
K. Eby Constr. Co., 386 U.S. 317 (1967).
386 U.S. at 325, 329.
The Court said that it was incumbent upon the court of appeals to consider
the new trial question in light of its own experience with the case although the
verdict winner never presented grounds for a new trial in her appellate brief.
Id. at 329-30.
"387 U.S. 86 (1967).
"'The Court did not, however, go so far as to say that every time possible
grounds for a new trial were evident on appeal the verdict winner automatically
would be entitled to a remand to the trial court. Instead, the Court limited the
decision to the particular facts involved.
41
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Neely, the Court said that the trial judge was in the best position to
rule on the issue of a new trial.46 Justice Harlan vigorously dissented,
adopting the literal interpretation of Neely, and stated that the decision
placed the possibility of remand within the informed discretion of the
court of appeals." Finding no manifest abuse of this discretion, Justice
Harlan saw no reason to reverse.
Only later cases can clarify the true meaning of Neely and Iacurci.
At this point, however, several observations can be made. First, Neely
has at least effectively changed the wording of Rule 50(d) from a permissive indication to the verdict winner that he may, as appellee, assert
his grounds for a new trial in his appellate brief, to a strong warning
that he had better do so or risk dismissal. Secondly, if the Court meant
in Neely to give the power of dismissal to the court of appeals only
when no new trial grounds were presented or were evident from the
record, then the choice of words in Neely leaves this point in need of
clarification. Thirdly, whatever the rule in Neely may be, its application
to the particular facts in the case seems unfortunate, because the record
revealed no independent consideration by the court of appeals of possible
grounds for a new trial for the verdict winner.4 8
One possibly critical effect of Neely will be its interpretation by
the courts of appeal. It seems likely that most appellate courts
facing a heavy backlog of cases will construe Neely literally, as did
Justice Harlan in Iacurci, to vest ultimate disposition of a case in their
hands. 49 Thus, until the Court clarifies its meaning, the prudent practitioner also should take Neely literally. To do so leaves two courses of
action open to the verdict winner who finds himself in Neely's position.
First, he can do exactly what the Court suggests: state his grounds for
a new trial in his appellate brief. In light of the uncertain value of this
alternative, a second and perhaps wiser course of action would be for
the verdict winner to ask the trial judge for a conditional grant of a
"0387 U.S. at 88.
'7Id. at 88-89.
"The Court assumed that the court of appeals had not ignored its duty in
this area, though it did say it would have been better if the court of ap-

peals had included this consideration in the record. 386 U.S. at 330. Also,

Justice Black raised the point in his dissent that since the Court held for the
first time that the verdict winner had to raise his grounds for a new trial in
his appellate brief or risk dismissal, it would have been fairer to have given
Neely a chance to go back to the court of appeals and present her grounds.
386 U.S. at 342-43.
"E.g., O'Hare v. Merck & Co., 381 F.2d 286 (8th Cir. 1967); Prudential
Ins. Co. of America v. Schreffler, 376 F.2d 397 (5th Cir. 1967).
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new trial before going to the appellate court." This procedure is awkward, however, since the verdict winner must argue on the one hand
that the verdict be upheld and a new trial be denied the verdict loser, yet
must also show errors committed entitling himself to a new trial should
the appellate court reverse. Assuming a literal interpretation of Neely,
this complex procedure may be the only way left to insure that the verdict winner will receive the benefit of the trial court's discretion in new
trial considerations.
In addition to possible judicial errors committed at trial, it is also
possible for a trial judge to grant a new trial as a matter of grace when
there is a good reason why the verdict winner should be given another
chance to prove his case. For this reason, it is common for a verdict
winner to argue to the trial judge in response to the verdict loser's motion
for judgment n.o.v. and new trial that the verdict ought to be upheld
and the new trial denied the verdict loser; but that if the trial judge is
contemplating giving a judgment n.o.v., then the verdict winner at least
deserves a new trial to cure his defect. As in the case of prejudicial
error, a verdict winner who wants to make certain that the trial judge
has an opportunity to rule on this question must also argue these grounds
to the trial judge for a conditional grant of a new trial before going to
the court of appeals. Yet it is even more awkward than in the
case of prejudical error for the verdict winner to argue conditionally
for a new trial to cure a possible defect in his proof before any court
has said there was a defect. Of course, the verdict winner could make
his argument to the court of appeals, but there would seem to be a
fundamental difference between asking an appellate court staring at a
cold transcript for a new trial as a matter of grace and making this
request to the judge who saw and heard the case and who thought the
verdict should stand in the first place.
Clarification of the meaning of Neely and Iacurci is needed. As the
history of drafting, amending, and interpreting Rule 50 indicates, this
will be a difficult task because many conflicting considerations are involved in attempting to formulate precisely a rule of practice in this
critical context. But it is suggested that this clarification should be made
with two points in mind. First, it is probably not possible for a litigant
to make a meaningful argument for a new trial when he is a verdict
winner at the time of framing and presenting this argument. Secondly,
the new trial argument becomes even more tenuous at the appellate level
o See sources cited in note 19 supra for a discussion of this alternative,
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than at the trial court level. Allowing the verdict winner the right to
argue conditionally for a new trial either at the trial court level or the
appellate level seems to ignore the practicalities of advocacy, and indeed
of human nature. Only a verdict winner who has been deprived of his
verdict can argue meaningfully for a new trial, and he should have the
right to argue his case to the trial judge who saw and heard the case.
RALEIGH

A.

SHOEMAKER

Constitutional Law-Public School Authorities Regulating
the Style of a Student's Hair
The availability of public education is often subject to compliance
with school regulations governing student appearance and conduct.
Courts have jurisdiction by way of mandamus or otherwise to review the
legality of such regulations and may order reinstatement or enrollment
when the exclusion is made pursuant to regulations that are unreasonable, arbitrary, or discriminatory, or when the exclusion infringes upon
some constitutional right.' Following this standard, courts have upheld
3
2
expulsion for using cosmetics, wearing objectionable clothing, smoking,
serving liquor to other students,4 marriage,5 creating school bus disturbances,0 and even writing a letter to a newspaper in which the student
' 7
was "fanatical in his [favorable] views as to atheism.
In Ferrellv. DallasIndependent School District,8 a public high school
principal refused to enroll three students-members of a musical group
known as "Sounds Unlimited"-because the length and style of their
hair could "cause commotion, trouble, distraction, and a disturbance in
school."'" The students claimed that the regulations prescribing appearance constituted an arbitrary and unreasonable violation of their consti'The Legal Status of the Public School Pupil, 26 N.E.A.

RESEARCH BuLL.

28 (1948).
Pugsley v. Sellmeyer, 158 Ark. 247, 250 S.W. 538 (1923).
'Tanton v. McKenney, 226 Mich. 245, 197 N.W. 510 (1924).
'State v. Clapp, 81 Mont. 200, 263 P. 433, cert. denied, 277 U.S. 591 (1928).
' State v. Board of Educ., 202 Tenn. 29, 302 S.W.2d 57 (1957).
'In re Neal, 164 N.Y.S.2d 549 (Child. Ct. 1957).
Robinson v. University of Miami, 100 So. 2d 442 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1958).
'392 F.2d 697 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 37 U.S.L.W. 3127 (U.S. Oct. 15,
1968).
OId. at 698.
'Old.at 699.
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tutional rights to freedom of expression and privacy. The federal district
court denied their petition for injunctive relief,' holding that the school
authorities had acted with reasonable discretion.' 2 The Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, with Judge Tuttle dissenting. 8
While the decision has many implications concerning curtailment of

14
the right to privacy where the mere likelihood of school disorder exists,

the court in Ferrell hardly touched the issue.' 5 The court declared that
even assuming that haircuts are a constitutionally protected mode of
expression under the first amendment, such a right was subordinate to
the state's interest in operating an efficient school system."6 A similar
contention by Mayor Hague thirty years earlier, however, was refuted
by the Supreme Court, which said:
"Ferrell v. Dallas Indep. School Dist., 261 F. Supp. 545 (N.D. Tex. 1966).
The district court accepted jurisdiction on the basis of the constitutional issues
involved, citing Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 493 (1954).
12261 F. Supp. 545, 552 (N.D. Tex. 1966), reviewed in, A Student's Right to
Govern His Personal Appearance, 17 J. PuB. L. 151 (1968); 20 ALA. L. Rv.
104 (1967).
18392 F.2d 697 (5th Cir. 1968). An abundance of prior statutory and case
law in many states upholds the right to grant their school officials almost unlimited discretion in governing the behavior and appearance of students attending their public schools, limited only by the requirement of reasonableness. See
Langenbach, The Power of School Officials to Regulate Student Appearance, 3
HARv. LEG. COMM. 1 (1966); 1 PORTIA L.J. 258 (1966); Note, The Right to
Dress and Go to School, 37 U. COLO. L. REv. 492 (1965).
" The students claimed their hair was an important asset to the popularity
of their musical group, thus the school officials' action prevented them from
following their chosen occupation free from unreasonable governmental interference in violation of the liberty and property concepts of the fifth amendment.
The court recognized such a right, but rejected the claim that it was unreasonably infringed upon. 392 F.2d at 703.
" But see Davis v. Firment, 269 F. Supp. 524 (E.D. La. 1967); Leonard v.
School Comm., 349 Mass. 704, 212 N.E.2d 468 (1965); Marshall v. Oliver, Case
No. B-2932 (Cir. Ct. Richmond, Nov. 28, 1965) (unpublished opinion), appeal
denied, 207 Va. xcix, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 945 (1966) (college student denied
enrollment in a state college because of long hair). The issue of privacy was
presented to the court in Ferrell. See Brief for ACLU as Amicus Curiae at 6, 7
and Brief for Appellee at 18, 19, Ferrell v. Dallas Indep. School Dist., 392 F.2d
697 (5th Cir. 1968).
1 392 F.2d at 703. The court in Ferrell also considered the subordinate claim
that the school regulation was discriminatory under the Civil Rights Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 (1964), but dismissed such claims, citing Byrd v. Sexton,
277 F.2d 418 (8th Cir. 1960). In Byrd a black student claimed the imposition
of an enrollment fee to attend public high school was discrimination under the
Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 (1964). Since the issue of race was
not involved, the court refused to extend the statutes, holding any invasion of
the student's right to attend the school without paying the fee was an invasion
of a personal, not a civil right.
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[U] ncontrolled official supression of the privilege [freedom of speech]
duty to maintain order in conneccannot be made a substitute for the 17
tion with the exercise of that right.
When the court assumes that a student's hairstyle is protected under
the first amendment,' it becomes susceptible to the attack of the
dissenting opinion,"9 namely that the state had failed to demonstrate that
the petitioners' hairstyle clearly and seriously impeded the educational
process enough to justify such invasion of the first amendment right."0 A
possible justification for the majority position can be found in the opinion
of United States v. O'Brien,2 where the Supreme Court dismissed the
idea that all types of symbolic conduct are protected speech under the
first amendment, and rejected the claim that burning a draft card before
a public audience is protected symbolic speech.' Moreover, if a student's
right to wear long hair were protected by first amendment freedom of
expression, it is unclear whether a student has even a qualified right
to compel the state to supply a platform-the school-for him to exercise that right.'
Perhaps the court's analysis and treatment of first amendment protection in Ferrell developed from positions it had taken in previous cases
dealing with overtly symbolic speech. But the procedure adopted in
Ferrell, in justifying infringement on the first amendment right, differs
significantly from the procedure used in its previous decisions.
For instance, in Blackwell v. Board of Educatio 24 and Burnside v.
17Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 516 (1939). See also Terminiello v. Chicago,
337 U.S. 1 (1949).
"0392 F.2d at 702. In Davis v. Firment, 269 F. Supp. 524, 527 (E.D. La.
1967), the district court, when faced with the same factual situation, did not
accept hair style as protected under the first amendment. Hair style, in order to
be a symbol of speech, must express something, but "what does it express?
Nothing." Id. at 527. See note 36 infra and accompanying text.
10 392 F.2d at 705.
0"[T]he constitutional rights of an individual cannot be denied him because
his exercise of them produces violent reaction by those who would deprive him
of the very right he seeks to assert." Id. at 705. The disruptive reactions of
fellow students "should be prohibited, not the expression of individuality by the
suspended students." Id. at 706.
-1391 U.S. 367 (1968).
Id. at 376.
22See Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 30, 43 (1966) (involving the arrest of
students for staging a protest picket on public jail property). In Cox v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 536 (1965), civil rights picketing was held to be symbolic speech protected under the first amendment, but the Supreme Court in Adderty held that
the state had "the right to control the use of its own property for its own lawful
non-discriminatory purpose," regardless of the first amendment rights of the protestors. 385 U.S. at 43.
2'363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966).
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Byars, 5 this same court used different reasoning in cases involving high
school students who wore freedom buttons inscribed with civil rights
slogans. Granting that such buttons were overtly symbolic speech, the
court seemed to require proof of disruption in fact to justify infringement upon first amendment rights." Thus, in Blackwell, after analyzing
various sorts of empirical data, the court found actual disruption and
upheld the school officials' actions barring the buttons." But in Burnside, the court held that school officials had failed to demonstrate sufficient actual disturbance to justify similar restrictions.2 Both decisions
stress that the educational process involves the grant of considerable
discretionary power to teachers and administrators.2
Together these
companion cases seem to imply that discretionary power necessary to the
orderly functioning of the public schools cannot infringe upon rights of
free expression unless a connection between the prohibited conduct and
disruption in fact can be clearly demonstrated. Furthermore, in Blackwell, the degree of restriction was reasonable-controversial and disruptive buttons can be worn outside school hours. In sum, a reasonable
exercise of discretion, resulting in regulations calculated to remedy a
demonstrated problem, was upheld.
Yet in Ferrell,the court apparently abandoned the procedure followed
in Blackwell and adopted the procedure of the district court in Tinker v.
Des Moines Independent School District,° which held that actions of
school officials "should not be limited to those instances where there is
material or substantial interference with school discipline."3'- The regulation was promulgated by the schools and upheld by the court in Ferrell,
" 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966).
Id.at 749.
27 363 F.2d at 754.
2

28

363 F.2d at 748.

"9See also Waugh v. Trustees of Univ. of Miss., 237 U.S. 589 (1915) (upholding the right of college administrators to prohibit fraternities); Barker v.
Hardway, 283 F. Supp. 228 (S.D.W. Va. 1968) (upholding the suspension of
students involved in a demonstration for student power); Zanders v. Board of
Education, 281 F. Supp. 747 (W.D. La. 1968) (upholding the suspension of
students involved in a sit-in demonstration in an administration building); Byrd
v. Gary, 184 F. Supp. 388 (E.D.S.C. 1960) (upholding the suspension of high
school students attempting to organize a milk boycott).
"0258 F. Supp. 971 (S.D. Iowa 1966), aff'd, 383 F.2d 988 (8th Cir. 1967),
cert. granted, 390 U.S. 942 (1968). In Tinker the district court upheld a principal's
rule prohibiting students from wearing black arm bands in school. The court
recognized that the arm bands were a known symbol of protest against the
Viet 1Nam war, a symbolic form of expression protected under the first amendment.
" Id. at 973 (emphasis added).
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though disturbance was only "reasonably anticipated,"3 2 not present in
33
fact.
Some courts have concentrated not on the right of free speech, but
on the right of privacy. Thus, they have refused to circumvent the more
apparent, if not appropriate, issue when approaching similar haircut
rules. 3 ' Traditionally, the right of privacy has been dominated by the
common law concept of a man's home as his castle," and admittedly
hairstyle does not fall clearly within such a circumscribed theory. In
3 6 a federal district court reasoned that a student's
Davis v. Firment,
right of privacy to have his hairstyle left alone neither came from specific
constitutional provisions 37 nor was so sacred or fundamental s as the
right to marital privacy affirmed in Griswold v. Connecticut.39 But other
recent Court decisions emphasize that the concept of privacy is not con40
fined to the place, but rather to the person. In Katz v. United States,
the Supreme Court held that the fourth amendment freedom from unreasonable governmental interference "protected people, not places."'" Similarly, the Court, in Terry v. Ohio,42 reasoned that the right of personal
security "belongs as much to the citizen in the streets of our cities as
2Id. at 973.
" In Ferrell the petitioners had been refused enrollment; thus the school
officials did not know from empirical observation that the students' hair style
would be a source of disruption in fact, but based their opinion on past experiences with different students.
,See note 18 supra.

But see Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886) (the Court described the fourth and fifth amendments as protection against all governmental
invasions "of the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life").
" 269 F. Supp. 524 (E.D. La. 1967).
87Id. at 529. The court felt that Justice Douglas's majority opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), was based on "penumbras" of the
first, third, fourth, and fifth amendments which enabled citizens to create certain
zones of privacy that government could not force the citizen to surrender to
his detriment.
" Id. at 529. The court infers that Justice Goldberg's concurring opinion in
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965), meant that although the
right of marital privacy is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution, the ninth

amendment reminds us that there are other fundamental rights implicit in the

fourteenth amendment's meaning of liberty, the right to marital privacy being
such a fundamental right.
" 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding Connecticut's anti-contraceptive statute unconstitutional because its enforcement would violate the individual's right to privacy).
, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (use of an electronic listening device to record a conversation in a public telephone booth).
"Id. at 351.
"392 U.S. 1 (1968) (right of a police officer to "stop and frisk" on reasonable suspicion). See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
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to the homeowner closeted in his study to dispose of his secret affairs." 48
In applying this reasoning, a student should be entitled to a certain modicum of privacy, notwithstanding his presence in a public institution.
Dictating the proper hairstyle to be worn in public school could be
unreasonably "intruding upon the sanctity of the person," 44 for unlike
freedom buttons or armbands, official proscription of long hair during
school hours affects the student in his home. Hair is obviously too much
a natural and fundamental characteristic of the person to be put on and
off, according to school schedule. Although the official intrusion upon
the student's privacy is not as blatant or as confined to the home as the
intrusion upon marital privacy in Griswold,45 a student should have a
right to be free from unreasonable governmental interference with his
person at any hour or place.46 Just as unreasonable restraints on the
street corner may be reasonable restraints in the class room,4 7 even reasonable restraints on the street corner or class room could well be unreasonable restraints when affecting the student not only at school, but also
48
at home.
Besides possibly infringing on the individual student's right to be
left alone, banning long hair in public schools could "unreasonably interfere with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing
and education of children under their control." 4 But in Leonard v.
School Committee, ° the Massachusetts court upheld the suspension of
a student musician with long hair, finding neither an abuse of discretion nor an unreasonable invasion of family privacy by school officials. 51
Thus, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit indicates adherence
to the policy of other courts in readily allowing school officials to
promulgate ad hoc rules. Apparently, these school regulations will be
' 392 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1968).
"Id. at 17.
"381 U.S. 510 (1965).
"See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
392 F.2d at 704-05 (concurring opinion).
48 Compare Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), with Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 510 (1965).
,Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925).
349 Mass. 704, 212 N.E.2d 468 (1965), noted in 1 PORTIA L.J. 258 (1966).
The court in Leonard reasoned that rules governing the appearance of students were subject to limited court review, and that rules adopted by authorized
school officials would be presumed to be based on reasonable deliberation, unless
convinced there could be no reasonable connection with the rule and the successful
operation of the school. "[J]ust as with any unusual, immodest or exaggerated
mode of dress . . . conspicuous haircuts could result in the distraction of other

students." Id. at 710, 212 N.E.2d at 472.
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upheld as a reasonable exercise of official discretion, though perhaps
infringing on the student's constitutional right of privacy. In balancing
the "gravity of the 'evil' ,52 with the restraint on the right of privacy
and possible first amendment intrusions, courts will uphold, as a reasonable exercise of official discretion, school regulations intended to avert
potential sources of harm. The source of harm need not in fact be
realized in the particular case for the regulation to be upheld. The
court in Ferrell may have adopted this position to discourage students from testing these ad hoc rules at school, and subsequently
in court, and to insure an efficient education for a majority of
students, though curtailing a right of others. Adherence to such a policy
will build fences amounting to a corral for the "mustangs and mavericks ' 5 3 wishing to attend public school.
JoHN E. BUGG

Criminal Law-The Rehabilitative Ideal Activated by the
Sentencing Process
INTRODUCTION

All too often the concept of rehabilitation within the criminal process
is embraced by the academic community, but spurned by the black robes
of the judiciary. Archaic myths and prejudices, interwoven into the purposes and goals of the criminal law, have resulted in an "antiquated criminal code, which is riveted together by outworn tradition like the iron cuff
about the ankle of a chain gang prisoner," 1 and beyond which the judiciary, historically, has failed to see.
In the case of People v. Jones,' an Illinois Appellate Court clearly recognized the rehabilitative ideal within the criminal system and applied it
to a twenty year old high school boy. The defendant had been convicted
of involuntary manslaughter and sentenced to the state penitentiary for
not less than six nor more than ten years.3 The trial court found that the
12 392 F.2d at 702.
"' Pollit, Free Speech for Mustangs and Mavericks, 46 N.C.L. REv. 39, 54
(1967).
1 Note, Indeterminate Sentence Laws-The Adolescence of Peno-Correctional
(1937).
Legislation, 50 HARV. L. REv. 677, 686 (1968).
App. 2d -, 235 N.E.2d 379
Ill.
2
'ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-3(c) (1) (Smith-Hurd 1964) reads as follows:
"A person convicted of involuntary manslaughter shall be imprisoned in the
penitentiary from one to ten years."
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accidental death of the defendant's friend had occurred while these two
and others were engaged in boyish horseplay involving a revolver that
discharged, critically wounding the deceased. Defendant cooperated fully
with the arresting officers. An aggravation and mitigation hearing4 by
the trial court disclosed that the defendant was a lifelong resident of
Chicago, single, a high school student, of the Baptist faith, and had no
previous criminal convictions, although he had been arrested on several
misdemeanor charges. The defendant appealed, contending that the sentence, although within the statutory limits, was excessive. In considering
all the relevant factors, the appellate court said,
This is not the picture of a person beyond the reach of the rehabilitative processes. The judge's explanation that: "We have had too many
of these accidents" evidences a failure to give proper weight to the
individual circumstances of the defendant. We feel that setting the
minimum sentence at six years and the maximum at ten years is not
in the best interest of either the community or the defendant.5
The judgment was accordingly modified to a minimum sentence of three
years and affirmed as modified.
In any other jurisdiction the Jones case might well have been a landmark decision. In Illinois it is simply another stage in the long trend of
cases 6 that clearly pay more than lip service to the goal of rehabilitation
of the individual offender.
THE

REHABILITATIVE IDEAL

This nation's penal system of justice and correction has developed
more from accretion than from any dynamic process or innovation. New
ideas were tacked onto the pre-existing structure with no effort to relate
the old to the new or to eliminate incompatible elements. Thus, the evolving system became a paradoxical and inconsistent phenomenon working
"inways that are unintended toward goals that are neither simple nor
'ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 1-7(g) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1967) reads as follows:
For the purpose of determining sentence to be imposed, the court shall,
after conviction, consider the evidence, if any, received upon the trial and
shall also hear and receive evidence, if any, as to the moral character, life,
family, occupation and criminal record of the offender and may consider
such evidence in aggravation or mitigation of the offense.
'- Ill. App. 2d at -, 235 N.E.2d at 381.
'See People v. Tice, 89 Ill. App. 2d 313, 231 N.E.2d 607 (1967); People v.
Nelson, 87 Il. App. 2d 159, 231 N.E.2d 115 (1967) ; People v. Lillie, 79 Ill. App,
2d 174, 223 N.E.2d 716 (1967) ; People v. Lannes, 78 Ill. App. 2d 45, 223 N.E.2d
440 (1966); People v. Carroll, 76 Ill. App. 2d 9, 221 N.E.2d 528 (1966); People
v. Brown, 60 Ill.
App. 2d 447, 208 N.E.2d 629 (1965); People v. Evrard, 55 Ill,
App. 2d 270, 204 N.E.2d 777 (1965).
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precise. ' 7 Though many of the non-utilitarian concepts, which were once
historically significant, have given way to modern methods and new ideas,
their presence, even within the shadows, tends to distort and confuse the
overall goals of the criminal process. Concepts of vindication, retribution, and penitence have been superseded by concepts of neutralization, reformation, and re-socialization ;8 but the lingering presence of the
former has significantly allied with concepts of deterrence and prevention
to weaken the latter. "It is far simpler to receive without challenge the
traditional philosophies and to employ well-established techniques. When
called upon, one may speak piously of the protection of society or individualized rehabilitation, but these are bones without flesh." 9 Inevitably,
a balance is struck among the competing social interests on scales which
our criminal system calls justice.
As the criminal process has evolved, two major social goals have become predominant: the protection of society and the preservation of human dignity via the rehabilitative ideal.' 0 Since the innovation of probation over a century ago," modern correctional attitudes and ideas have
slowly generated change in the philosophy of penology, introducing such
concepts as the indeterminate sentence, parole, half-way houses, workrelease, and furloughs. 2 In the years after the first world war the social
sciences began applying behavioral disciplines to areas of correction. These
behavioral science contributions were expressed in a new concept. "Inasmuch as there is no single cause of crime, there can be no single cure of
criminal behavior. Therefore, correctional treatment must be individualized and based on the diagnosis of the individualized problems and
needs."'1 Thus, the concept of rehabilitation focuses on the individual as
a quality control mechanism within a dynamic society to screen out defective elements, rechannel them to be properly remolded, and provide for
their re-entry into society.
Even after spanning the gaps in the concepts of criminal law to rec237 (1960).
See generally Mueller, Punishment, Correctionsand the Law, 45 NEB. L. REv.
58 (1966). See also P. TAPI'AN, CONTEMPORARY CORRECTION 3-13 (1951); P.
TAPPAN, supra note 7, at 241-59; Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 iLAw
& CONTEMP. PROB. 401 (1958).
0 P. TAPPAN, CONTEMPORARY CORuCTION 3 (1951).
'
10 Penegar, The Emerging "Right to Treatment "-Elaborating the Processes
of Decision in Sanctioning Systems of the Criminal Law, 44 DENv.L.J. 163, 224
(1967).
11See generally Alexander, Current Concepts in Correction, 30 FED. PROB. 3,
4 (1966).
12
Id. at 5.
10Id. at 4. See also Penegar, supra note 10, at 204.
8 P. TAPPAN, CRIME, JUSTICE, AND CORRECTION
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ognize rehabilitation as a dominant goal, however, there are problems
inherent within the concept itself. All too often "individualization in
practice reflects more clearly the differences in the judges than in the
convicted offenders."' 4 Another problem is that emphasis on individualization focuses attention on the individual and away from the offense.
There is always the danger to the individual "that he will be punished for
what he is believed to be, rather than for what he has done. The danger
to society is that the commands of the criminal law will be weaker."1 5l
The purposes and goals of the criminal process can be considered at
three levels: the legislative level of creation, the judicial level of imposition, and the administrative level of execution."0 While the legislature
must incorporate within the sentencing structure the values held by society and the goals of the system, it is the judiciary which functions in the
all-important role of individualizing the abstractions of the law to the
offender for societal good. It is the judiciary that bears the burden of
activationof the rehabilitative ideal to the individual offender. The trend
of recent decisions, however, indicates that the judiciary has largely failed
to fulfill its obligation in the implementation of the major goals of the
criminal process.'
GUIDELINES

In light of the many variables involved, perhaps the greatest need of
the trial court is for sentencing guidelines. Sentencing measures and
alternatives run the gauntlet from the suspended sentence, probation, and
fines, to long term imprisonment, sterilization or castration, and death.' 8
Within the criminal process there exist numerous mitigative devices,',
P4 TAPPAN, supra note 9, at 13.
P.
' Hart, supra note 8, at 407-08.
' Mueller, supra note 8, at 82. This note will discuss only the judicial level of
imposition.
17
Penegar, supra note 10, at 224.
18
See generally P. TAPPAN, supra note 7, at 422-26.
'9 Id. at 375. These devices are recognized:
(a) Police and prosecutor may discharge the accused after preliminary
hearing.
(b) The examining magistrate may discharge the accused after preliminary
hearing.
(c) The Grand Jury may refuse to indict.
(d) The prosecutor may decide to enter a nolle prosequi.
(e) The prosecutor or the court may agree to accept a plea to a lesser offense than that originally charged.
(f) The trial jury may bring in a verdict of not guilty or convict for a lessor crime.
(g) Discretion may be exercised in sentencing to apply a lenient sentence,
whether it is probation or brief imprisonment.
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the indeterminate sentence being the most crucial.' With the two major
goals of the criminal process clearly in mind, a trial court judge must
impose the harsh realities of a sentence, yet counterbalance the necessity
for the sentence to express adequately the community's view of the gravity
of the offense against the necessity of a sentence that will be favorable in
rehabilitating the defendant.' Other than from the statutory provisions,22
few trial courts have available any concrete guidance in the development
of criteria that, when applied to each offender, will best promote the goals
of the criminal law. Only in those states which allow appellate review of
legal but excessive sentences is there a higher authority to provide guidelines to the trial judge in this crucial role of individualizing -the criminal
process.
In the majority of jurisdictions, a sentence within the statutory limits
for a proven offense is normally within the discretion of the trial court
and not subject to appellate reviewY'3 To allow appellate review would be
to allow a higher court to pass judgment on a factual decision of the trial
court.24 It has been said that "an appellate judge could never get the true
picture of a defendant and his sentence proceeding from the mere reading
(h)
(i)

Sentence may be reduced in some jurisdictions through an appeal or
motion in mitigation of sentence.
The convicted and incarcerated offender may be released on parole at
some time short of the expiration of his maximum sentence.

(j) A pardon may be secured from the executive.

Within the statutory structure of indeterminate sentence laws, accompanied
by provisions for probation, is society's foral recognition of the rehabilitative
ideal within the criminal law. See generally Note, Statutory Structure For Sentencing Felons to Prison, 60 CoLUM. L. REv. 1134, 1144-54 (1960).
a'Hart, supra note 8, at 437.
2'There exists at least one minimum mandate that guides every sentencing judge.
The eighth amendment of the U.S. CONSTITUTION requires that punishment can
be neither cruel nor unumal. Several recent cases have more precisely defined the
meaning of these terms. In Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), the court
decided that classification as a criminal and punishment by prison sentence of a
person suffering from an illness-narcotic addiction-was cruel and unusual punishment. In Workman v. Commonwealth, 429 S.W.2d 374 (Ky. 1968), a state court
of appeals held that confinement of a juvenile, convicted of rape, to prison for life
without privilege of parole constituted cruel and unusual punishment. See also
Beard v. Lee, 396 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1968) ; Black v. United States, 269 F.2d 38
(9th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 938 (1960) ; Edwards v. United States, 206
F.2d 855 (10th Cir. 1953); Hemans v. United States, 163 F.2d 228 (6th Cir.
"

1947).

"=See, e.g., State v. Davis, 243 N.C. 754, 92 S.E.2d 177 (1956). See
Hall, Reduction of Criminal Sentence on Appeal, 37 CoLUM. L. REV. 521,
522 (1937) ; Mueller, Penology on Appeal: Appellate Review of Legal But Excessive Sentences, 15 VAND. L. REV. 671, 677 (1962); Note, Appellate Review of
Primary Sentencing Decisions: A Connecticut Case Study, 69 YALE L.J. 1453,
1452 (1960); Note, Statutory Stricture For Sentencing Felons to Prison, 60
CoLUM. L. REv. 1134, 1162 (1960).

' See generally Brewster, Appellate Review of Sentences, 40 F.R.D. 79 (1967).
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of a cold record, any more than he could learn how to milk a cow from
reading a book."'
Even so, fifteen American jurisdictions have either
specific statutes authorizing modification of legal but excessive sentences,
or precedents which have established such a procedure. 2 An examination
of appellate decisions from each of these jurisdictions, however, has failed
to reveal any clear guidelines for the judge involved in the sentencing process. Despite the importance and complexity of their decisions, the appellate courts have set few standards for the trial court to measure the appropriateness of its dispositive action. Appellate courts usually fail either to
articulate reasons for sentence reductions or to formalize criteria amenable
to rational analysis.
State Appellate Decisions
Many appellate courts have found it impossible to set guidelines and
27
standards, or have simply refused to do so. In Commonwealth v. Cater,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated: "This court has said time and
again that there are no fixed and immutable standards to be established
to guide trial courts in exercising their discretion." ' In State v. Dougla,29 the Arizona Supreme Court said that the trial judge "is to pass a
value judgment upon a human being for the society which he represents;
he is to sit as the conscience of the community. In the performance of this
duty, the trial judge is-to a certain extent-deprived of any set standards or legal guideposts.""0 Thus, the machinery of appellate review of
sentences has not been employed as a possible means of establishing any
general sentencing policy. Appellate courts all too often reverse excessive
legal sentences using, as sole criteria, phrases such as "after a careful
consideration of the facts," 1 or "when justice and right require," 2 or
"when the furtherance of justice requires." 83
In a few jurisdictions the trial court receives some minimum basic
guidance. A close scrutiny of several appellate decisions reveals certain
"
Id. at 88.
20 Mueller, supra note

23, at 677, 688; Note, Statutory Structures For Sentencing Felons to Prison, 60 CoLUM. L. REV. 1134, 1162-64 (1960). These jurisdictions include: Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Massachusetts, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Tennessee, and in the federal system, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.
2'396 Pa. 172, 152 A.2d 259 (1959).
2
8Id. at 179, 152 A.2d at 263.
2" 87 Ariz. 182, 349 P.2d 622, cert. denied, 363 U.S. 815 (1960).
20 Id. at 188, 349 P.2d at 625.
1 Williams v. State, 52 Okla. Crim. 336, 339, 5 P.2d 410, 411 (1931).
2 Commonwealth v. Hawk, 328 Pa. 417, 418, 196 A. 5, 6 (1938).
"'State v. Ramirez, 34 Idaho 623, 634, 203 Pac. 279, 283 (1921).
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purposes of the sentencing process and criteria for individualization s 4
In Davis v. State,35 the Florida Supreme Court said that "[r] esponsibility
should be the basis of punishment, and individualization the criterion of
its application; such is the formula of modern penal law." 8 In State ex
rel. Shock v. Barnett,7 the Washington Supreme Court said that "[i]t is
contemplated that, in fixing of punishment, the trial court must maintain
a due regard for the dignity of the law, the protection of society, the reformation of the offender, and other considerations."" In State v. Wilson,s3 the Idaho Supreme Court said,
Whether the appellant was a good risk or a poor risk for probation is
not in itself decisive of the issues and possible rehabilitation is not the
controlling consideration. In cases of crimes committed against society, the trial court must consider the protection of society, the dethe possibility of
terrence of the individual and the public generally,
40
rehabilitation and punishment for wrongdoings.
",From those jurisdictions allowing appellate review, the cases cited in the
text and those cited below are the better examples of appellate decisions which
shed some light on guidance for lower courts: State v. Phillips, 102 Ariz. 377, 430
P.2d 139 (1967); State v. Benn, 101 Ariz. 252, 418 P.2d 589 (1966); State v.
Stevens, 93 Ariz. 375, 381 P.2d 100 (1963) ; State v. Telavera, 76 Ariz. 183, 261
P.2d 997 (1953); Logan v. People, 138 Colo. 304, 332 P.2d 897 (1958); State v.
Lyman, 26 Conn. Supp. 70, 213 A.2d 73 (Sen. Rev. Div. 1965); State v. Tirella,
22 Conn. Supp. 25, 158 A.2d 602 (Sen. Rev. Div. 1959); State v. Gonski, 21 Conn.
Supp. 468, 159 A.2d 182 (Sen. Rev. Div. 1958) ; State v. O'Dell, 71 Idaho 64, 225
P.2d 1020 (1950); State v. Rinehart, 255 Iowa 1132, 125 N.W.2d 242 (1963);
State v. English, 242 Iowa 248, 46 N.W.2d 13 (1951) ; State v. Marcus, 240 Iowa
116, 34 N.W.2d 179 (1948) ; State v. De Stasio, 49 N.J. 247, 229 A.2d 636, cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 830 (1967); Dickson v. State, 336 P.2d 1113 (Okla. Crim. App.
1959); Williams v. State, 321 P.2d 990 (Okla. Crim. App. 1957), af'd, 358 U.S.
576, reh. denied, 359 U.S. 956 (1959); Larkey v. State, 95 Okla. Crim. 338,
245 P.2d 751 (Crim. App. 1952); Ex Parte Banks, 74 Okla. Crim. 1, 122 P.2d 181
(Crim. App. 1942); Tuel v. Gladden, 234 Ore. 1, 379 P.2d 553 (1963); Commonwealth v. Green, 396 Pa. 137, 151 A.2d 241 (1959).
" 123 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 1960). The defendant pleaded guilty to rape of an
eleven year old girl and received the maximum penalty, death. An appeal for
mercy was denied by the sentencing judge in light of the circumstances and brutal
nature of the crime. The decision was affirmed on appeal.
'Id. at 711.
42 Wash. 2d 929, 259 P.2d 404 (1953). Defendant was convicted of a felony
-taking indecent liberties with a minor female-and sentenced to the penitentiary.
request for probation and affirmed the judgment.
The court on appeal deniedata 406.
18Id. at 933, 259 P.2d
(1956). Defendant, an adult, was convicted of
P.2d
644
" 78 Idaho 385, 304
committing a "crime against nature" with a boy, fourteen years old. A pre-sentence report indicated that the defendant was an habitual, persistent homosexual
offender. The trial court refused to hear testimony as to state facilities for treating
the defendant, prescribing an active sentence. The decision was affirmed in light
of the nature of the crime and character of the offender.
'Old, at 388, 304 P,2d at 646,
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All of these decisions clearly evidence a rehabilitative goal recognized by
the appellate courts, but one which truly is "bones without flesh"4 for
lack of any appropriate guiding criteria for individualization. A decision
handed down by the Connecticut Sentence Review Division ' is one of the
first to attempt the heretofore indefineable:
The sentencing problem is not one that yields to exact analysis, although a proper sentence is desirably one that fits both the crime and
the individual. Such a sentence must of necessity take in many variables, including the gravity of the crime, both as to the particular circumstances of the offense charged, and the place of that crime in our
social order, the prior record of the defendant, the recidivistic factor
and the deterrent effect sought with reference to the commission of
that crime by others. 43
Over a period of four years prior to the decision in the Jones case, the
Illinois Appellate Courts have handed down at least seven 4 decisions,
which in view of the case analysis of all other jurisdictions, puts the state
years ahead in both recognition and application of the rehabilitative goals
of the criminal process. Appellate opinions have actually become working
4" the appellate
tools for trial court judges. In People v. Evrard,
court
said,
The court must strive to render a judgment which will adequately
punish the defendant for his misconduct, safeguard the public from
further offenses, and reform and rehabilitate the offender into a useful
member of society. In order to select an appropriate sentence, it is
"P. TAPPAN, .pra note 9, at 3.
2 State v. Kelii, 26 Conn. Supp. 215, 216 A.2d 849 (Sen. Rev. Div. 1965).
The
defendant was convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to not less than seven nor
more than fifteen years in prison. In a fit of rage he killed a man with whom his
wife was having an affair and who was mistreating the defendant's children under
the guise of discipline. The defendant's background included honorable service

and discharge from the coast guard and the national guard; an excellent employment record; no previous criminal record; no evidence of any recidivistic tendency; a reliable, cooperative, and even-tempered character; and evidence of strong
love toward his family, regardless of the constant infidelity of his wife. The appellate court reduced the minimum sentence to five years.
'Id.
at 218, 216 A.2d at 850.

"See note 6 supra.

"55 Ill. App. 2d 270, 204 N.E.2d 777 (1965). The defendant was convicted
of taking indecent liberties with a girl of 15 and sentenced to from one to three
years in prison. The defendant was 30 years of age, the father of two, and gainfully employed. He was intoxicated at the time of the incident. The appellate
court affirmed the conviction but remanded for re-evaluation of sentence, requiring
the trial court to hear all pertinent evidence as to the defendant's past history. The
court felt that the present record evidenced no recidivistic tendencies and that probation would be adequate.
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essential that the court be in possession of the fullest possible information concerning the defendant's life and characteristics.40
The court is thus required to consider evidence of the defendant's "moral
character, life, family, occupation and criminal record" 4 7 in aggravation
or mitigation of sentence. In People v. Nelson,4" the appellate court held
that where the record failed to show the education, family situation, background, or employment record of the defendant to any appreciable extent,
the sentence would be vacated and the cause remanded to the circuit court
for sentencing based upon the fullest information relevant to the defendant. In People v. Lillie,4 the appellate court said,
Advances in the fields of psychology, psychiatry and sociology have
contributed to a greater understanding of the motives underlying the
commission of criminal offenses, and the techniques and methods which
are of value in the rehabilitation of offenders. The hope of earlier release is a great incentive to a prisoner to participate in the educational
and rehabilitative programs provided in modern penal institutions. Excessive minimum sentences, imposed by the courts, may defeat the
effectiveness of the parole system by making mandatory the incarceration of a prisoner long after effective rehabilitation has been accomplished.50
Federal Appellate Decisions
It has long been a uniform policy of federal appellate courts not to
consider a sentence within the statutory limits. 51 The United States SuId. at 274-75, 204 N.E.2d at 779.
See note 4 supra.
87 Ill. App. 2d 159, 231 N.E.2d 115 (1967). Defendant was convicted of
armed robbery and sentenced to from four to ten years in prison. Scant evidence
at trial revealed only that the defendant was twenty-four years old, a photographer,
had been convicted previously of second degree burglary, and used obscene
and disrespectful language while in jail awaiting trial. The appellate court remanded for re-sentencing based on a fuller knowledge of the defendant's past history
and personal characteristics.
" 79 Ill. App. 2d 174, 223 N.E.2d 716 (1967). Defendant, age twenty-three,
pleaded guilty to burglary in 1964 and was placed on probation. Thereafter probation was revoked and a sentence of from twelve to eighteen years in prison imposed. The defendant had previously been convicted of burglary and larceny, but
he had made restitution. Revocation of probation was brought on by charges of
disorderly conduct, reckless driving, and illicit sexual activity with minor females.
The appellate court reduced the minimum sentence to five years.
50
Id. at 179, 223 N.E.2d at 719.
Weigel, Appellate Revision of Sentences: To Make the Punishment Fit the
Crite, 20 STAx. L. REv. 405, 411 (1968); Note, Appellate Review of Sentencing
Procedure, 74 YALE LJ. 379, 380 (1964). The leading case cited for this
rule is Gurera v. United States, 40 F.2d 338 (8th Cir. 1930). The only exception
is the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, which held a legal 3-year sentence
imposed by a district court excessive and remanded by exercising "its supervisory
'
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preme Court itself refused to "enter the domain of penology, and more
particularly that tantalizing aspect of it, the proper apportionment of
punishment,"5 stating that "[t]his court has no such power.' 53 Although
appellate review of criminal sentences in the federal courts has been proposed in Congress, the Judicial Conference of the United States has refused to recommend the adoption of such a procedure. 4 However, the
federal judiciary and Congress have not failed to envision a need for the
evaluation of sentence disparities and the promulgation of sentencing criteria.
Federal Institutes

In August of 1958, a statute was enacted to authorize the establishment
of joint councils and institutes on sentencing under the auspices of the
Judicial Conference of the United States. 5 The purposes of the institutes
were for study, discussion, and formulation of objectives, policies, standards, and criteria for sentencing in federal courts. Since the pilot institute, there have been fifteen additional sentencing institutes bringing together not only distinguished jurists, but also penologists and educators
as well." Out of these institutes have come enlightened ideas toward criteria for sentencing standards. Many of the policies and standards of one
circuit have been accepted by other circuits. 7 In November of 1960, the
control of the district court, in aid to its appellate jurisdiction." United States v.
Wiley,
278 v.F.2d
500, States,
503 (7th
1960).
"=Gore
United
357Cir.
U.S. 386, 393 (1958).
IId.
Note, Appellate Review of Primary Sentencing Decisions: A Connecticut
Case Study, 69 YALE L.J. 1453, 1453 & n.3 (1960).

"28 U.S.C. § 334 (1964). The Institutes are called at the request of the Attorney General or the Chief Judge of each circuit.

" Youngdahl, Development and Accomplishments of Sentencing Institutes In
Federal Judicial System, 45 NEE. L. REV. 513, 514-15 (1960).
"'The ninth circuit in 1960 accepted "Policies and Standards for Sentencing"
set by the District of Columbia Circuit Sentencing Institute of 1960. These standards are set out in Appendix E of Sentencing Institutes, the Circuit Conference
of the Ninth Judicial Circuit, 27 F.R.D. 293, 389-91 (1960) and read as follows:
1. The purpose of a sentence combines community protection, correction,
rehabilitation, deterrence and punishment. The sentencing judge must
determine the proportionate worth, value and requirement of each of
these elements in imposing sentence in each case.
2. The prime consideration in proper sentencing is the public welfare.
Two major problems in sentencing are:
(a) to what extent and for what time does the community welfare require protection from this offender, or others, with respect to this
offense; and
(b) in the light of the answer to the first problem, what sentence will
permit this offender to take his place in society as a useful citizen
at the earliest time consistent with protection of the public.
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3. A proper sentence is a composite of many factors, including the nature
of the offense, the circumstances--extenuating or aggravating--of the
offense, the prior criminal record, if any, of the offender, the age of the
offender, all with reference to education, home life, sobriety, and social
adjustment, the emotional and mental condition of the offender, the
prospects for the rehabilitation of the offender, the possibility that the
sentence may serve as a deterrent to crime by this offender, or by others,
and the current community need, if any, for such a deterrent in respect
to the particular type of offense involved.
4. The protection of the community from confirmed and habitual criminals not reasonably susceptible of rehabilitation as useful citizens requires the incarceration of such offenders, for maximum periods. The
protection of the community also requires that, to the extent a given
sentence may be expected to serve as an effective deterrent to the commission of similar offences by others, this element should be given great
weight in the determination of the proper sentence. The public welfare
also requires, in general, the maximum use of probation and institutionalized training in respect to offenders who are not confirmed criminals and who manifest capacity for probable return to the community
as useful citizens.
5. There is little, if any, disparity in the sentences imposed by individual
judges in this circuit for violations of the same statute when all elements
of the offence and the offender are considered, as outlined in paragraph
3, supra. Despite seeming differences in specific cases, careful evaluation of the cases discloses that the variables in each case, including the
defendant's prior criminal record, his background, educational and social status, his marital status, the number of his dependants, the condition of his health, the prospect of rehabilitation and various other
elements, readily explain apparent differences in so-called similar cases.
6. Sentences which are merely mathematically identical for violations of
the same statute are improper, unfair, and undesirable. Indeed, mathematically identical sentences may be themselves disparate. Each defendant's case must be considered upon its highly individualized basis and
a sentence imposed which is tailored to fit that case. Sentencing judges
must in all instances consider all of the factors in each case, giving appropriate weight to each factor, and impose a sentence which is just to
the defendant and just to the community.
7. The public need for sentences which serve as deterrents to crime may
vary from time to time and by type and frequency of offence.
8. A sentencing judge must determine in each case the deterrent effect
which the sentence in that case may have upon the offender. The deterrent effect of a sentence upon the other potential offenders with respect to the possible commission of similar crimes and in respect to the
commission of crime generally is subject to different and varying viewpoints. It is clear, however, that the most effective deterrent is certainty
and swiftness of punishment.
9. The use of the facilities provided by the Youth Correction Act in proper cases appears to be most effective in the guidance, training and supervision of youthful offenders and their restoration to useful life in the
community.
10. It is proper, and often desirable, that a sentencing judge explain to an
offender in open court the purposes and meaning of a sentence about to
be imposed, especially when probation is granted.
11. Equal justice in sentencing is achieved by an experienced objective consideration by the sentencing judge of all of the individual factors in
each case weighed in relation to the sentences imposed by other experienced and objective judges in cases which are similar in respect to the

188
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judges of the U.S. District Court of the Eastern District of Michigan
instituted new procedures for sentencing.5 8 These procedures require that
prior to sentencing all trial judges must discuss proposed sentences with
other members of the court in an informal panel meeting. Prior to the
meeting, each judge on the Council receives a pre-sentence report and fills
out his recommendations on a chart. Awareness by the sentencing judge
that his thought processes will be exposed to the critical gaze of colleagues
should encourage more objective and principled attitudes towards sentencing. The Council has tended to create consensus among the judges as
to the relevance and weight of factors in sentencing."0 The President's
Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice endorses sentencing institutes and conferences and urges each state to instigate such programs on their own initiative. 0
Pre-Sentence Reports
Perhaps the most helpful tool ever devised for a sentencing judge is
the pre-sentence investigation report. Such a report is required in every
federal case, "unless the court directs otherwise." 1 The federal pre-sentence report contains the defendant's prior criminal record, information
concerning his character, financial condition and the circumstances affec2
ting his behavior, and such other information as the court may requirer.
In 1960 of all persons convicted of federal offenses, eighty-six percent
were investigated and pre-sentence reports were prepared on their backgrounds. Of these eighty-six percent, forty-two percent received proba63
tion.
The report of a pre-sentence investigation is made mandatory in some
circumstances by statutes in at least thirteen states." Even where no such
statutory authority exists, the majority of courts, at least in felony cases,
nature of the violation of law and background of the individual defendant. Toward a More Enlightened
Levin,
Sentencing Procedure, 45 NEB. L. REv.
499, 499-504 (1966).
9 1d. at 505.
68

60

PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION or

JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY

145 (1967).

"1 FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(1), (as amended 1966).
Id. at 32 (c) (2) (as amended 1966).
Se M. PAI SEN AND S. KADISH, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 168
(1962).
6' Note, Statutory Structure For Senteming Felons to Prison, 60 COLUM. L.
REv. 1134, 1135 & n.4 (1960). The states include: California, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, New
York, Rhode Island, Virginia, and New Jersey.

'2
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may require such a report.

5

189

The purpose of the investigation is to glean,

from the defendant's past and present circumstances, information that
might indicate a potential for rehabilitation or show a definite propensity
toward crime. Many reports include an analytical summary of the subject's history and problems, with a recommendation to the court as to
his disposition.!6 The President's Commission on (Law Enforcement and
Administration of Justice recommends that all courts require a pre-sentence report for all offenders.6
Model Codes
Even absent beneficial appellate guidelines, there are other available

institutions that offer sound sentencing guides. The American Law Institute has proposed a Model Penal Code8 8 which includes the following:

a statement of the purposes of punishment and treatment, 9 a statement
of criteria for withholding a prison sentence and placing an offender on
probation,70 a statement setting forth criteria for imposition of extended
" Note, Employment of Social Investigation Reports In Criminal and Juvenile
Proceedings, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 702, 703 (1958); Note, Statutory Structure For
Sentencing Felons to Prison, 60 COLUM. L. REv. 1134, 1134 n.5 (1960).
00 See generally 2 THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S SURVEY OF RELEASE PROCEDURES
156 6 T(1939) ; P. TAPPAN, supra note 7, at 556-57 & n.50.
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 60, at 144.
o' MODEL PENAL CODE (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1961).
60

1d. § 1.02(2).

The general purpose of the provisions governing the sentencing and
treatment of offenders are:
(a) to prevent the commission of offenses;
(b) to promote correction and rehabilitation of offenders;
(c) to safeguard offenders against excessive, disproportionate or arbitrary
punishment;
(d) to give fair warning of the nature of the sentences that may be imposed
on conviction of the offense;
(e) to differentiate among offenders with a view to a just individualization in their treatment;
(f) to define, coordinate and harmonize the powers, duties and functions of
the courts and of administrative officers and agencies responsible for
dealing with offenders;
(g) to advance the use of generally accepted scientific methods and knowledge in the sentencing and treatment of the offenders;
(h) to integrate responsibility for the administration of the correctional
system in a State Department of Correction.
70 Id.
§ 7.01.
(1) The Court shall deal with a person who has been convicted of a crime
without imposing sentence of imprisonment unless, having regard to the
nature and circumstances of the crime and the history, character and condition of the defendant, it is of the opinion that his imprisonment is necessary for protection of the public because:
(a) there is undue risk that during the period of a suspended sentence or
probation the defendant will commit another crime; or
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terms of imprisonment for felons,"' a statement setting forth criteria for
(b) the defendant is in need of correctional treatment that can be provided
most effectively by his commitment to an institution; or
(c) a lesser sentence will depreciate the seriousness of the defendant's crime.
(2) The following grounds, while not controlling the discretion of the
Court, shall be accorded weight in favor of withholding sentence of imprisonment:
(a) the defendant's criminal conduct neither caused nor threatened serious
harm;
(b) the defendant did not contemplate that his criminal conduct would cause
or threaten serious harm;
(c) the defendant acted under a strong provocation;
(d) there were substantial grounds tending to excuse the defendant's criminal conduct, though failing to establish a defense;
(e) the victim of the defendant's criminal conduct induced or facilitated its
commission;
(f) the defendant has compensated or will compensate the victim of his
criminal conduct for the damage or injury that he sustained;
(g) the defendant has no history of prior delinquency or criminal activity
or has led a law-abiding life for a substantial period of time before the
commission of the present crime;
(h) the defendant's criminal conduct was the result of circumstances unlikely to recur;
(i) the character and attitudes of the defendant indicate that he is unlikely
to commit another crime;
(j) the defendant is particularly likely to respond affirmatively to probationary treatment;
(k) the imprisonment of the defendant would entail excessive hardship to
himself or his dependents.
-*Id. § 7.03.
The Court may sentence a person who has been convicted of a felony to
an extended term of imprisonment if it finds one or more of the grounds
specified in this Section. The finding of the Court shall be incorporated in
the record.
(1) The defendant is a persistent offender whose commitment for an extended term is necessary for protection of the public.
The Court shall not make such a finding unless the defendant is over
tventy-one years of age and has previously been convicted of two felonies
or of one felony and two misdemeanors committed at different times when
he was over (insert Juvenile Court age) years of age.
(2) The defendant is a professional criminal whose commitment for an
extended term is necessary for protection of the public.
The Court shall not make such a finding unless the defendant is over the
age of twenty-one and:
(a) the circumstances of the crimes show that the defendant has knowingly devoted himself to criminal activity as a major source of
livelihood; or
(b) the defendant has substantial income or resources not explained to
be derived from a source other than criminal activity.
(3) The defendant is a dangerous, mentally abnormal person whose commitment for an extended term is necessary for protection of the public.
(4) The defendant is a multiple offender whose criminality was so extensive that a sentence of imprisonment for an extended term is warranted.
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the extended imprisonment of habitual misdemeanants, 72 and a section
recommending pre-sentence investigation. 7' Also, the National Council
on Crime and Delinquency, through their Advisory Council of Judges,
has developed a Model Sentencing Act. 74 This Act provides for a presentence investigation, 75 sets forth criteria for sentencing standards, 7 and
provides a requirement that the trial court judge make a brief statement
77
of his basic reasons for the sentence that he imposes.
Prediction Methods
There exists still another source of guidance for the sentencing judge.
By the use of prediction methods, a judge is able to arrive at some estimate
of the defendant's post-correctional conduct. Considering the statistical
experience of the community in sentencing particular classes of defendants
to prison or placement on probation, the judge's intuitive process of predicting the defendant's subsequent behavior can now be developed into a
more rational process of analysis and into more precise, concrete terms. 7s
In the Glueck study79 of five hundred criminals in a Massachusetts reformatory over a period of five years, social factors and behavioral patterns of each offender were analyzed from childhood through parole. Correlation tables were made and validation studies run. The Gluecks came
up with five factors 0 that showed the highest correlation to post-parole
conduct. These were given relative weights and incorporated into a table.
From such a table it is now possible to predict post-release behavior prior
to sentencing.81
The Research Division of the California Department of Correction
§ 7.04.
Id. § 7.07. Few states have adopted the provisions in the sections above.
Some of the more progressive states have enacted similar kinds of provisions,
though none are as extensive as those of the model code. See CAL. PEN. CODE
§ 1203 (West Supp. 1967); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 1-2, 117-1 (Smith-Hurd
1964);
N.Y. PEN. LAW §§ 1.05 & 70.10 (McKinney 1967).
7
7 Id.
1

1ADVISORY COUNCIL OF JUDGES OF TnE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF CRIME AND
DELINQUENCY, MODEL SENTENCING ACT (1963).

art. 2, § 2.
Id. art. 3, § 5.
7"Id. art. 3, § 10.
71 Id.
70

J.

CONRAD,

CRImE AND ITS CORRECTION

191 (1965).

" Glueck, Predictive Devices and the Individualization of Jiustice, 23 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROB. 461, 471-72 (1958).

" Id.at 472. The factors are: (1) seriousness and frequency of pre-reformatory
crime, (2) arrest for crimes preceding the offense for which sentence to the reformatory had been imposed, (3) penal experience preceding reformatory incarceration, (4) economic responsibility preceding sentence to the reformatory, and
(5) mental abnormality.
81Id.

192

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol.47

has developed a system of base expectancies that are applicable to various
correctional populations.82 Equations were developed to differentiate risks
according to similar kinds of demographic attributes, with twelve factors
incorporated into a base expectancy table.3 The judge might then weigh
the risk of recidivism against the hazard of the kind of crime to be expected. "A thirty percent prospect of homicide must be viewed in a different light than an equal prospect of shoplifting. Nothing in sight offers
the judge complete relief from the burden of the risk-laden decision." s4
It is the aim under this new system to cut imprisonment or commitment
to state institutions by twenty-five percent with a savings extended over a
decade of one hundred million dollars, without compromising public safe85

ty.

CONCLUSION
In relation to judicial activation of the rehabilitative ideal through
individualization, sentencing is presently still "the most neglected part of
the most neglected field of the law, criminal law."8s0 Even recognizing a
rehabilitative ideal predominant within the criminal process, only a few
courts have taken any modern, realistic approach in applying the ideal
through the sentencing process. Trial judges must be apprised of the fact
that individualization can be achieved only through systematic analysis
of crucial criteria relevant to each offender. The rehabilitative ideal must
be recognized and supported at the legislative level; but, individualization
2
JJ. CoNRAD, supra note 78, at 185-89.
McGee, Objectivity in Predicting Criminal Behavior, 42 F.R.D. 175, 195
(1966). The factors and their weights are:
12
An arrest-free period of five years or more
9
No history of opiate use
8
Two or less jail commitments
7
The charge is not checks or burglary
6
No family criminal record
6
No alcohol involvement related to offense
5
Not first arrested on auto theft
5
Six or more consecutive months of work for one employer
5
No aliases
5
First imprisonment under this serial number
4
Favorable living arrangements
4
Few prior arrests (zero, one or two)
A score of 53 or higher gives the defendant a
seventy-five percent chance of success.
8'J. CoNRAD, supra note 78.
"' McGee, supra note 83, at 185.
" Barkin, Sentencing Problems, 39 F.R.D. 523, 524 (1965).
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can only be activated by the judiciary through the sentencing process.
Failure here weakens the rehabilitative ideal. The judiciary must recognize its crucial role within the criminal process before this ideal can be
transformed into reality.
DONALD W.

STEPHENS

Evidence-Lay Opinion as to Whether a Person is Under
the Influence of Narcotics
In State v. Cook1, defendants appealed from a conviction of possession of a quantity of barbiturates without a prescription.2 One of the
defendants' objections related to the admission of the testimony of a
police officer that, in his opinion, based on his observation, the defendants were under the influence of narcotics.3 Apparently, the officer was
not qualified as an expert. The court, however, did not feel this necessary. Relying on a long line of North Carolina cases4 allowing a lay
witness to give his opinion when, by reason of better opportunities for
observation, he is in a better position than the jury to make a judgment,
the court stated: "Seeing defendants in their drugged condition and
observing their manner of speech and movement, the witness was better
qualified than the jury to draw inferences and conclusions from what
he saw and heard."' A rule permitting admission of lay opinion regarding people under the influence of narcotics ventures beyond the limits
1273 N.C. 377, 160 S.E.2d 49 (1968).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-113.2(3) (1965).
He testified that defendants were "sleepy . . .had glassy dilated eyes ....
They were "ina stupor . . .mumbling . . .staggering." 273 N.C. at 381, 160
S.E.2d at 52. He also mentioned the fact that there was no odor of alcohol
about them. Id. This last fact implies that his opinion was at least partially
arrived at by the process of elimination (i.e., since they were not drinking, their
conduct could be explained only by drugs). The accuracy of this method, standing alone, seems doubtful.
'Greensboro v. Garrison, 190 N.C. 577, 130 S.E. 203 (1925) ; State v. Brodie,
190 N.C. 554, 130 S.E. 205 (1925); Hill & Brooks v. Louisville & N.R.R. Co.,
186 N.C. 475, 119 S.E. 884 (1923); Sheperd v. Sellers, 182 N.C. 701, 109 S.E.
847 (1921); Marshall v. Interstate Tel. & Tel. Co., 181 N.C. 292, 106 S.E. 818

(1921).

273 N.C. at 381, 160 S.E.2d at 52. It should be noted that the court said:
"Seeing defendants in their drugged condition.... " Id. Whether or not defendants were drugged was one of the factual issues in dispute. The court, by this
language, assumed what was to be proven. It was merely the policeman's opinion
that defendants were in a "drugged condition."
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imposed by courts in other jurisdictions, which require at least some
experience with narcotics addiction before the witness can testify.0
The issue involved can be simply stated: What, if any, experience or
expertise does a witness need before he can give his opinion as to whether
someone was or was not under the influence of narcotics? Although some
courts have been slightly stricter than others, the relatively few decisions
have been generally uniform, even though they dealt not only with criminal law, but also with such diversified fields as wills,' divorce," and
slander.'
The California courts, contrary to most jurisdictions, have addressed
themselves to this question with relative frequency. They have had no
trouble admitting testimony if the witness is a medical expert. Thus, in
People v. Vignoli,' ° the court permitted a doctor to draw an inference
that the defendant had been under the influence of narcotics some five
hours before the medical examination. But California decisions have
not restricted the giving of opinions to such medical experts. In People
v. Mack," the court expressly rejected the notion that "the subject of
narcotic addiction is a medical matter which should only be testified to
by medical men, and that the use of non-medical persons to give their
opinion is erroneous and prejudicial.' 2 California courts consistently
have allowed police officials, with experience in narcotics, to give their
opinion.' 3 However, where the witness is inexperienced with narcotics,
'The court did rely on two precedents from other states, Commonwealth v.
Johnson, 27 Pa. D. & C.2d 301, 182 A.2d 541 (1962), aff'd, 198 Pa. Super. 51
(1962), and Miller v. Hamilton Brown Shoe Co., 89 S.C. 530, 72 S.E. 397
(1911), to support its decision. The cases are distinguishable, however, and
were misconstrued insofar as the court attempted to have them support its opinion.
See notes 25-29 infra and accompanying text. Thus, the court cited no precedent
for its rule. Nor has a search of the cases disclosed another, with the possible
exception of Ellis v. Ellis, 160 Miss. 345, 134 So. 150 (1931). See note 30 infra
and accompanying text.
'Tucker v. Houston, 216 Ala. 43, 112 So. 360 (1927).

' Burt v. Burt, 168 Mass. 204, 46 N.E. 622 (1897).

' Miller v. Hamilton Brown Shoe Co., 89 S.C. 530, 72 S.E. 397 (1911).
10213 Cal. App. 2d 855, 29 Cal. Rptr. 260 (1963).
11 169 Cal. App. 2d 825, 338 P.2d 25 (1959).
" Id.at 830, 338 P.2d at 29.
" People v. Gurrola, 218 Cal. App. 2d 349, 32 Cal. Rptr. 368 (1963) (not an
abuse of discretion to allow officer with four years experience, during which
time he had examined many narcotic addicts under all stages of influence, to give
his opinion that defendant was under the influence of narcotics); People v.
Hernandez, 188 Cal. App. 2d 248, 10 Cal. Reptr. 267 (1961) (officer with
twenty hours of narcotics schooling who had lived two months with addicts
permitted to testify); People v. Holland, 148 Cal. App. 2d 933, 307 P.2d 703
(1957) (officer experienced with narcotics had probable cause for arrest when
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California courts have been strict in not permitting opinion evidence.
The argument against allowing inexperienced opinion reached its logical extreme in People v. McLean,'4 where the court held it was error
to permit a sixteen year old girl to testify that a cigarette given to her
by the defendant contained marijuana. She had had no previous experience with marijuana and had based her opinion on her own reactions
to the cigarette compared with what she had read and seen and with
the effects of marijuana as described to her by other people.15 It follows
that an inexperienced bystander observing someone else would not be
permitted to give his opinion either.
Other jurisdictions are in accord with California. In one early case,",
the plaintiff attempted to obtain a divorce on the grounds of "gross and
confirmed drunkenness caused by the voluntary and excessive use of
opium or other drugs." The court permitted persons "who had been
with [the alleged addict] for a long period of time and were familiar
with her habits as to the use of morphine" 7 to testify that at various
times she was under the influence of that drug. The court carefully restricted this exception to the opinion rule to situations where "a person
has seen many times a certain condition resulting from the use of a certain
drug ... ."s In Tucker v. Houston,'" the Alabama Supreme Court refused to allow an inexperienced person to testify that the testatrix was
under the influence of morphine just before her will was made.
Federal courts have also had occasion to pass on this problem in
deciding whether defendants were competent to stand trial. The United
States Supreme Court noted in a recent decision that "whether or not
he observed defendants under the influence of narcotics). See also note 24 infra
and accompanying text.
1,56 Cal. 2d 660, 365 P.2d 403, 16 Cal. Rptr. 347 (1961), cert denied, 370
U.S. 958 (1962).
15
2d 325, 153 N.E.2d 65 (1958), where
But cf. People v. Robinson, 14 Ill.
the witnesses' testimony that they received heroin from the defendant was held
admissible, but where, in contrast to McLean, the witnesses had used narcotics
on many previous occasions. The court stated:
[C]ourts have recognized that lay or inexpert witnesses may have, by
use, observation, or experience, sufficient knowledge of the appearance,
odor, taste, characteristics and effect of intoxicating liquor or drugs to
enable them to identify and distinguish them. By analogy, we think it
feasible that a narcotics addict would, as the People's expert testified,
come to know a narcotics drug by its reaction upon him.
Id. at 332, 153 N.E.2d at 69.
"' Burt v. Burt, 168 Mass. 204, 46 N.E. 623 (1897).
17
Id.at 206, 46 N.E. at 623.
Id.
'o 216 Ala. 43, 112 So. 360 (1927).
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petitioner was under the influence of narcotics would not necessarily have
been apparent to the Trial Judge," and thus held that he did not possess
the expertise to decide whether defendant was able to stand trial.2" Likewise, a court of appeals in a 1966 decision 21 judicially noticed that the
effects of narcotics are "idiosyncratic"'' and added that "the symptoms
and effects. . . produced by narcotics will often not be apparent to a lay
observer, even a judge, but only to an expert."' '
The North Carolina Supreme Court in the principal case cited three
precedents dealing with this issue. It was admitted that one of the cases
cited-People v. Moore2 4-- was contrary to its holding. In that case, a
policeman testified as to both alcoholic and narcotic insobriety. The California court distinguished between alcohol and drugs, declaring that no
expertise was needed for alcohol, but that the witness had to qualify as
an expert before he could testify that someone was under the influence
of narcotics. However, the court cited two other cases-Commonwealth
v. Johnson25 and Miller v. Hamilton Brown Shoe Co.2 - - as supporting

its opinion that no expertise is needed before one can testify as to
whether someone is under the influence of drugs. On close analysis,
these two cases do not support the court's holding. In Johnson, the
policeman testifying was on special assignment to the Narcotics Unit
of the Philadelphia Police Department and had had four years experience with addicts, having observed over one hundred persons under the
influence of narcotics. In fact, the Johnson court expressly noted: "It
must be pointed out that the arrest was made by a police officer experienced in, and familiar with, the narcotic problem and not by a casual
citizen or a generally-trained police officer."'2 7 Likewise, in Miller, every
witness who testified that the plaintiff-2 was under the influence of narcotics testified that they had previously seen persons under the influence
of narcotics. The language of the Miller court is clear:
That the opinion of a witness as to whether a person under his observation was drunk or sober is admissible will hardly be doubted.
Sanders v.United States, 373 U.S. 1, 20 (1963).
v.United States, 365 F.2d 920 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
"Hansford
22
Id. at 923.
23Id. at 924.
2'70 Cal. App. 2d 158, 160 P.2d 857 (1945).
2027 Pa. D. & C.2d 301, 182 A.2d 541 (1962), aff'd, 198 Pa. Super. 51 (1962).
2.89 S.C. 530, 72 S.E. 397 (1911).
727 Pa. D. & C.2d at 304, 182 A.2d at 543.
21 Plaintiff was suing for slander, charging that the defendant had falsely
said that plaintiff used narcotics. The witnesses were attempting to justify the
defendant's accusation.
20
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On the same principle a witness who has observed some of the numerous victims of the drug habit may express his conclusion, based on
observation, that the condition of a certain person was due to the
influence of a drug.2 9
While the standard of expertise may have been relatively low in Miller,
some degree of expertise was necessary before the witness could express
his opinion. Thus, both Miller and Johnson appear contrary to the
court's opinion in the principal case.
The only other case the court might have cited (though it did not)
as supporting its opinion is Ellis v. Ellis,30 where a lay person with no
experience was permitted to give an opinion that the testator was not
under the influence of drugs at the time he made his will. But this case
is distinguishable in several respects: (1) Bromedia and liminol amytol
(forms of sleeping pills) were the drugs involved; (2) the question was
the mental capacity of the testator to make a will-not whether testator
was under the influence of narcotics per se; (3) the witness testified that
testator was not under the influence, an opinion which obviously would
require less expertise than pinpointing the cause of a person's abnormal
demeanor, that is, testifying that testator was under the influence of
narcotics.
The court in the principal case placed great stress on the many North
Carolina cases"1 reflecting the generally held rule that a non-expert may
give his opinion as to whether someone was under the influence of intoxicating liquors.3 2 The rationale for this rule is well stated" by the New
2 89 S.C. at 534-35 72 S.E. at 399 (emphasis
added).
fo 160 Miss. 345, 134 So. 150 (1931).
s'There are many other cases besides the ones cited by the court: State v.
Mills, 268 N.C. 142, 150 S.E.2d 13 (1966) (drunk driving); State v. Willard,
241 N.C. 259, 264, 84 S.E.2d 899, 902 (1954) (drunk driving); State v Warren,
236 N.C. 358, 359, 72 S.E.2d 763, 764 (1952) (drunk driving); State v. Dawson,
228 N.C. 85, 44 S.E.2d 527 (1947) (involuntary manslaughter); State v. Harris,
213 N.C. 648, 197 S.E. 142 (1938) (drunk driving); State v. Dills, 204 N.C.
33, 167 S.E. 459 (1933) (involuntary manslaughter); State v. Holland, 193 N.C.
713, 138 S.E. 8 (1927) (self defense); Moore v. Jefferson Stand. Life Ins. Co.,
192 N.C. 580, 135 S.E. 456 (1926) (automobile accident insurance); Taylor v.
Security Life & Annuity Co., 145 N.C. 383, 59 S.E. 139 (1907) (opinion regarding habits of temperance admissible).
2The court summarized the rule in State v. Dawson, 228 N.C. 85, 88, 44
S.E.2d 527, 529 (1947):
A lay witness is competent to testify whether or not in his opinion a
person was drunk or sober on a given occasion on which he observed him.
The conditions under which the witness observed the person, and the opportunity to observe him, go to the weight, not the admissibility of the testimony.
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York court in what is considered to be the leading case :88 "A child six
years old may answer whether a man (whom it has seen) was drunk or
sober; it does not require science or opinion to answer the question, but
observation merely. .

. .""

The implicit assumption in this rationale is

that even a six year old child probably has been exposed to enough drunks
to know one when he sees one. 5 But it is doubtful that any lay personsix years old or sixty years old-has had enough contacts with dope addicts to easily recognize when one is under the influence of narcotics.
Perhaps if the use of narcotics, legally or illegally, continues to become
more commonplace, the day may come when the ordinary layman will
have as much exposure to addicts as to drunks. But it is still safe to
say that the ordinary layman has had little or no exposure to narcotic
addiction and that therefore this exposure should be proven (by way of
establishing expertise) and not be assumed as it is in the case of drunkenness.
It should be noted that it is no answer to this problem to argue, as
the court did, that "the witness was better qualified than the jury to draw
inferences and conclusions from what he saw or heard."'80 A witness,
for instance, to a chemical explosion may have been in a better position
than the jury to draw inferences, but unless the witness had some knowledge of chemistry, he would be no more able than the jury to conclude
that it was some careless act of the chemist rather than an unavoidable
accident which caused the misfortune. Likewise, a person who has no
knowledge or experience of how persons act while under the influence
of narcotics is no more qualified than the jury to opine the cause of the
unusual behavior. The witness would be in a better position than the
jury to state that the persons were acting abnormally, and he should be
allowed to do so; but unless he has knowledge of the symptoms of drugtaking, he should not be allowed to express the conclusion that the drugs
caused the abnormal behavior.
It is questionable whether the North Carolina Supreme Court actually
intended to pronounce a rule contrary to almost all precedent from other
jurisdictions. Even if the admission of this non-expert testimony had
been held to have been error, it probably would have been non-prejudical
" People v. Eastwood, 14 N.Y. 562 (1856). See also Ackerman v. Kogut,
117 Vt. 40. 44, 84 A.2d 131, 134 (1951).
14 N.Y. at 566.
Query whether it could be argued that the presumption inherent in this
rule is rebutable if the witness, because of age or lack of contacts with society,
had never been in contact with intoxicated persons.
"'273 N.C. at 381, 160 S.E.2d at 52.
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error in view of the great amount of circumstantial evidence supporting
the conviction.37 For this reason the court may not have given much
thought to the question. If this case had turned on the opinion evidence,
and if the court had not misconstrued two cases it thought to be good
precedent, it is possible that the court would have reached a contrary
result. But until the issue is reconsidered in a future case, what remains
is the rule that in North Carolina an ordinary layman is qualified to give
his opinion as to whether a person is under the influence of narcotics
just as he has always been able to do with regard to alcohol.
RICHARD

J.

BRYAN

Labor Law-Expulsion From a Union as an Unfair Labor Practice
The question whether a labor union has the power to expel a member
for filing an unfair labor practice charge with the National Labor Relations Board, without first exhausting internal union processes, was considered in NLRB v. Industrial Union of Marine & Shipbuilding Workers.1 The United States Supreme Court, in effect, said that expulsion
of a member for filing a charge with the Board, even where his job
status was not affected by the expulsion, may be itself an unfair labor
practice. Such conduct by a union, because it is considered to restrain
and coerce union members, is prohibited by section 8(b) (1) (A) of the
National Labor Relations Act, which provides:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its
agents-(1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of
rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title: Provided, That this
paragraph shall not impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of
membership therein....2
Although the Act generally permits a union to control its internal matters,
the Court concluded that "where a union penalizes a member for filing
an unfair labor practice charge with the Board, other considerations of
"' Circumstantial evidence has been held in many cases to support a charge
of possession of narcotics. See Carroll v. State, 90 Ariz. 411, 368 P.2d 649 (1962) ;
People v. Anitista, 129 Cal. App. 2d 47, 276 P.2d 177 (1954); People v. Robinson,
14 Ill. 2d 325, 153 N.E.2d 65 (1958) ; State v. Worley, 375 S.W.2d 44 (Mo. 1964).
1391 U.S. 418 (1968).
229 TI.S.C. § 158(b) (1) (A) (1964).
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public policy come into play."' By filing a charge with the Board, a
4
member steps beyond internal union affairs into the public domain.
The Court also reasoned that the language of section 101 (a) (4) of the
Landrum-Griffin Act 5 does not grant unions the authority to police more
firmly their own membership. Rather it is a mere statement of policy
that the public tribunals whose aid is invoked, at their discretion, may
refuse to hear a case until the four month period has elapsed, and thus
require a member to seek his remedy within the union." In this decision
the Court continues recent trends encouraging resort to the Board by
individual union members with legitimate grievances against their union.
The facts of the case are straightforward. Edwin Holder, a member of Local 22 of the International Union of Marine and Shipbuilding
Workers of America, AFL-CIO, lodged a complaint with Local 22 that
its president had violated the constitution of the international. The local
decided against Holder, and he did not pursue the internal union appeals
procedure available to him. Instead, he filed an unfair labor practice
charge with the Board based on the same alleged violations by the president he had presented to the local. Section 5 of the constitution of the
international requires that any member "aggrieved by any action of...
a local . . . shall exhaust all remedies and appeals within the Union,

provided by this Constitution, before he shall resort to any court or
other tribunal outside of the Union." Consequently, while Holder's
charge was pending before the Board, Local 22 brought proceedings
against Holder alleging that he had violated this section of the international's constitution. After a hearing before Local 22, Holder was
expelled from the union. The general executive board of the international upheld the local's action. Holder then filed a second charge with
the Board claiming that his expulsion for filing the first charge was a
violation of section 8(b) (1) (A). The Board ordered the union to reinstate Holder without any loss of status.' Reversing the court of
3391 U.S. at 424.
' Roberts v. NLRB, 350 F.2d 427, 429 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
'No labor organization shall limit the right of any member thereof to
institute an action in any court, or in a proceeding before any administrative agency . . . Provided, That any such member may be required to
exhaust reasonable hearing procedures (but not to exceed a four-month
lapse of time) within such organization, before instituting legal or administrative proceedings. ...
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 § 101 (a) (4), 29 U.S.C.
§ 411(a) (4) (1964).
6 391 U.S. at 428.
'Local 22, Marine & Shipbldg. Workers, 159 N.L.R.B. 1065 (1966).
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appeals 8 and reinstating the Board's order, the Supreme Court ruled
that certain issues "within the public domain" demand unimpeded access
to the Board.'
Significantly, the Court applied the same restrictions to unions that
hinder access to the Board as had previously been applied solely to employers, and stated that interpreting Congressional intent requires that
attention be given to the overall scheme rather than the literal terms of
a statute.10 Though section 8 (a) (4) of the Act makes it an unfair labor
practice for an employer "to discharge or otherwise discriminate against
an employee because he has filed charges or given testimony under this
act," a similar paragraph restricting unions was deleted from the Act
in conference." However, the restrictions placed on unions have been
compared to those placed on employers.
Just as an employer violates the Act by resorting to restraint and
coercion to restrict the rights of an employee to file a charge, so too,
does a labor organization infringe the rights of employees under this
law .by resorting to unlawful means to prevent or restrict employees
from filing charges. As such conduct by an employer violates Section
use of restraint or coercion
8(a) (1),12 so does a labor organization's
13
violate Section 8(b) (1) (A).
Furthermore, the Court has stated that it was "the intent of Congress
to impose upon unions the same restrictions which the Wagner Act (the
predecessor of the NLRA) imposed on employers with respect to violations of employee rights."' 4 Because similar wording and legislative
history indicated that sections 8(b)(1) (A) and 8(a)(1) are parallel
provisions, 5 the Court construed 8(b) (1) (A) to prohibit a union from
' Industrial Union of Marine & Shipbldg. Workers v. NLRB, 379 F.2d 702
(3d'391
Cir. 1967).
U.S. at 424.
10 See NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175 (1967).
1The deleted paragraph would have made it an unfair labor practice for a
union:
to fine or discriminate against any member, or to subject him to any ...
penalty on account of his having ... made charges or instituted proceedings against the organization or any of its officers. ...
H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947). For a general discussion of the legislative history of the Act, see NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175
(1967).
" "(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an ernployer-(I) to interfere
with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in
section 157... ." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1) (1964) (footnote added).
"Local 138, Operating Eng'rs, 148 N.L.R.B. 679, 681-82 (1964).
1"366 U.S. 738 (1961).
" International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. NLRB, 280 F.2d 616,
620-21 & n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
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disciplining a member for filing a charge with the Board. One observer
has stated that "[a]n individual worker gains no human rights by substituting an autocratic union officialdom for tyranny of the boss."'
The Board has interpreted this legislation and decided which actions
constitute coercion. First, it is well settled that a fine is coercive, 17 and
"the imposition of a fine by a labor organization upon a member who
files charges with the Board does restrain and coerce that member in
the exercise of his right to file charges."' 8 Moreover, the Board has
found coercion and a violation of section 8(b) (1) (A) when a union
official merely warned a member that he could be fined if he complained
to the Board.'" If a fine is coercive, so is expulsion :20
The ultimate penalty associated with the imposition of a fine is loss of
membership in the union which may be avoided by payment of the
fine. Explusion from membership leaves no room for grace. The
ultimate penalty, with the loss of benefits inherent in union membership including a voice in the democratic decisions of the organization
materially affecting the welfare of members, is immediate and final.21
Nor is the coercive nature of union expulsion limited to job retention.
Even though a member may keep his job when expelled, his explusion
causes him to suffer a detriment the apprehension of which would no
doubt have a coercive effect on the membership. First of all, it is not
clear what his rights would be if he quit his job to seek another....
Also, he has a financial stake in the strike fund, perhaps a pension
fund, and other funds to which he has contributed. Further, he is
denied the right to participate in the union "government." Although
the union is required by law to represent him impartially .

.

. he has

no voice in how that representation is to be conducted. In addition,
there are frequently social ramifications for
a non-member working
22
among members that cannot be overlooked.
Though fines and expulsion had been ruled coercive, a union was
still considered protected by the proviso since these actions were believed
to be matters confined to internal union affairs,2 unless the member's
status as an employee was affected:
" Cox, The Role in Preserving Union Democracy, 72 HAiV. L. Rzv. 609,

610 (1959).
'.Local 113, International Ass'n of Machinists, 111 N.L.R.B. 853, 857 (1955).
"Local 138, Operating Eng'rs, 148 N.L.R.B. 679, 682 (1964).

"9
1510,
Millwright
& Mach.
Erectors,843,
152 845
N.L.R.B.
"' Local
Cannery
Workers
Union,
159 N.L.R.B.
(1966). 1374, 1377 (1965).
"Local 22, Marine & Shipbldg. Workers, 159 N.L.R.B. 1065, 1069 (1966).
"' Mitchell v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 196 Cal. App. 2d 796, 799, 16
Cal. Rptr. 813, 815 (Dist. Ct. App. 1961).
2 Local 113, International Ass'n of Machinists, 111 N.L.R.B. 853, 857 (1955).
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The Act specifically provides that a labor organization may prescribe
its own rules with respect to the acquisition and retention of membership. This limitation on members means, according to the courts
and legislative history, that labor organizations may enforce their internal policies upon their membership as they see fit. It is only to the
extent that a labor organization seeks to impair a member's status as
it may not enforce its internal rules governing meman employee that
24
bership status.
In Local 283, UAW (Wisconsin Motors),2" the union was held protected by the proviso when the imposition and collection of a fine did
not affect the employment status of the member. However, Local 138,
International Union of Operating Engineers (Charles S. Skura)26 held
that a union would violate section 8(b) (1) (A) by disciplining a member for violation of a union rule, even when the union does not interfere
with the member's status as an employee. The Skura decision is considered an exception to the general rule." The Holder case was also
found to be within this exception, which denied unions the protection
'2
of the proviso in view of "the overriding public interest involved," ,
but required that the member not be engaged in any activities that "attack
'
such as filing a decertification petition
the very existence of the union,"29
with the Board.
The Court also ruled in Holder that the "exhaustion of remedies"
provision of section 101 (a) (4) of the Landrum-Griffin Act does not
protect a union that expels a member for filing charges with the Board.
30
Two possible interpretations of this section had been offered earlier.
The first was that this provision permits a union to force compliance
with provisions in its constitution that require a member to exhaust

"NATIONAL

LABOR RELATIONS BoARD, TWENTY-NINTH ANNUAL REPORT

84-

85 (1964) (emphasis added).
"5145 N.L.R.B. 1097 (1964). See Note, Judicial Enforcement of Labor Union
Fines in State Courts, 46 N.C.L. REv. 441 (1968).
2 148 N.L.R.B. 679 (1964). See Comment, Union Fining As an Unfair Labor
Practice Under Section 8(b)(1)(A), 1966 DUxE L.J. 717; 65 COLUm. L. REv.
1108 (1965).
" Local 4028, United Steelworkers, 154 N.L.R.B. 692, 696 (1965); Tawas
Tube Prod., Inc., 151 N.L.R.B. 46, 47 (1965). For other cases considered to
be within the exception, see Local 307, Philadelphia Moving Picture Mach.
Operator's Union, 159 N.L.R.B. 1614 (1966); Local 585, Painters, Decorators &
Paperhangers, 159 N.L.R.B. 1362 (1966); Local 22, Marine & Shipbldg. Workers,
159 N.L.R.B. 1065 (1966); Cannery Workers Union, 159 N.L.R.B. 843 (1966);
Local 925, Operating Eng'rs, 148 N.L.R.B. 674 (1964).
" Cannery Workers, 159 N.L.R.B. 843, 847 (1966).
" Tawas Tube Prod., Inc., 151 N.L.R.B. 46, 48 (1965).
" Cox, Internal Affairs of Labor Unions Under the Labor Reform Act
of 1959, 58 MicH. L. REv. 819, 839 (1960).
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all internal channels before seeking outside help. This was considered
to be against public policy. The second interpretation was that courts
and administrative agencies have the power to wait until the labor organization has had an opportunity to remedy any injustice that may have
occurred within its own system."1 However, in Holder the Court stated
that there is no "justification to make the public process wait until the
member exhausts internal procedures plainly inadequate."8 Furthermore,
only a disinterested tribunal, such as the Board, can properly balance
the adequacy of the union procedures against the public interest. "If the
member becomes exhausted, instead of the remedies, the issues of public
policy are never reached and the airing of the grievance never had. ' 'm
The impact of the Holder decision extends beyond technical modification in the construction of statutory terms. It represents a shift in
the judiciary's attitude toward labor policy. Earlier concepts of unionism
were often overly restrictive. For instance, the contract theory of union
membership, widely held when section 8(b) (1) (A) was enacted,8 4 views
membership in a union as a contract between the individual member and
the union. The judiciary, always reluctant to interfere with a contractual
relationship absent a breach, often refused to consider intra-union matters for this reason. Similarly, courts have hesitated to interfere in the
internal affairs of voluntary associations, a reluctance stemming from
the frustrating judicial experience of trying to settle disputes within religious and fraternal organizations.85 While this traditional attitude may
remain, labor unions today hardly resemble the voluntary associations
of the past. They enjoy exclusive powers granted by government and
a high degree of internal organization. Thus with Holder there is a
further erosion of the traditional philosophy of non-intervention in internal union affairs.
Furthermore, the elimination of an apparently required four month
waiting period 6 and the decision that a union cannot restrict access to
3

1Id.at 839.

32391 U.S. at 425.
3 id.

at 425.

,NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 182-83 (1967).
Summers, Legal Limitations on Union Discipline, 64 HARV. L. Rv. 1049,

1050-51 (1951).
3" Benjamin Aaron, Acting Director of the Institute of Industrial Relations

at the University of California, stated less than a year after the passage of the

Landrum-Griffin Act:
Section 101 (a) (4) thus wisely includes a proviso requiring a union mem-
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the Board by the expulsion of a member expand the jurisdiction and
power of the Board and encourage resort to its aid. The extent of
jurisdiction, obviously, often controls the scope of the agency's influence,
and thus its effectiveness. The broader the Board's jurisdiction, the
easier it can effect its policies; the narrower, the more difficult. In Holder,
the Court upheld the Board's expansion of jurisdiction, thus accomplishing a principal objective of labor policy-prompt access to administrative
37
agencies.
Because of the expected increase in traffic, resulting from the expansion of jurisdiction, the Board may be able to more firmly regulate those
practices of the unions tending to repress the individual rights of the
members. This decision should promote a modernization of the internal
union proceedures, for if the union machinery is cumbersome and slow
to react to the needs of the members, they will by-pass the union and seek
a remedy with the Board. To off-set this trend, the unions will have to
streamline their internal systems so that there will be no need to resort
to the Board.
A third effect may be found in the attitudes of the individual union
members. Possibly greater democratization of unions themselves might
follow, as open disagreement with union officials without fear of expulsion leads to greater member participation in union decisions on all levels.
The Court's decision in this case is one step closer to the attainment of
union democracy.
ALEXANDER P. SANDS

Real Property-Disposition of Diffused Surface Waters
in North Carolina'
INTRODUCTION

Water that is derived from falling rain or melting snow or that rises
in springs and is diffused over the surface of the ground is denominated
ber to exhaust his internal union remedies before seeking relief in court

or before an administrative body.
Aaron, The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 IARv.
L. Rzv. 851, 869 (1960).
"' Section 10(b) of the NLRA forbids issuance of a complaint based on conduct occurring more than six months earlier. 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1959).
1 The courts have generally referred to this distinct class of water as "surface
water." It is more correctly identified as "diffused surface water" since technically
all water on the face of the earth is surface water. 1 R. CLARK, WATERS AND
WATER RIGHTS § 52.1, at 302 (1967). In keeping with the terminology employed

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol, 47

surface water. It is distinguished from water flowing in a natural watercourse or collected into and forming a definite and identifiable body,
such as a lake or a pond.2 An owner may either use or dispose of the
surface water which comes upon his land. These alternatives-use or disposition-pose different problems and, consequently, are governed by different laws.3 Of the two, the disposition problem has been the more
troublesome. 4 The purpose of this note is to examine what a landowner
in North Carolina can and cannot do to rid himself of too much surface
water.'
Three basic doctrines relative to the disposition of surface water have
been developed by the courts in the various states: the civil-law rule, the
common enemy rule, and the reasonable use rule.
The civil-law rule is usually expressed in specific terms :7
[T]he owner of the upper or dominant estate has a legal and natural
easement or servitude in the lower or servient estate for the drainage
of surface water, flowing in its natural course and manner; and such
natural flow or passage of the waters cannot be interrupted or prevented by the servient owner to the detriment or injury of the estate of
the dominant proprietor, unless the
right to do so has been acquired
8
by contract, grant or prescription.
The rule appeals to a sense of natural justice by requiring the continuation of the drainage conditions imposed by nature; it avoids any compeby the North Carolina Supreme Court, the term "surface water" will be used in

this note.
56 Am. JuR. Waters § 65 (1947).
8 The use of surface water is discussed in Aycock, Introduction to North Carolina Water Use Law, 46 N.C.L. REv. 1, 20-21 (1967).
'J. CRIBBET, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 304 (1962).
The law of disposition of surface water is almost exclusively the product of
judicial decision. One exception of minor importance will be considered later. See
p. 211 & note 34 infra. In the broader area of water development, there has been
considerable legislative activity with concern centered on the problems of groups
or communities. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 156-54 to -138 (1964), as amended, (Supp.

1967) (drainage districts); N.C.

GEN. STAT.

§ 139 (1964), as amended, (Supp.

1967) (soil and water conservation districts and flood plain management). Further consideration of these statutes is beyond the scope of this note.
'Kenyon & McClure, Interferenwes with Surface Waters, 24 MINN. L. Rnv.
891, 893 (1940) [hereinafter cited as Kenyon & McClure].
"At least one writer has urged a general definition: "In substance, the civil-law
rule of surface waters is that a person who interferes with the natural flow of
surface waters so as to cause an invasion of another's interests in the use and enjoyment
of his land is subject to liability to the other." Id.
8
56AM JuR. Waters § 68, at 550-51 (1947). In the acquisition of rights to drain
surface water across the lands of another by grant, license, easement, or prescription, the general principles of property law apply. For North Carolina cases on the
subject see Perry v. White, 185 N.C. 79, 116 S.E. 84 (1923) (attempted easement
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tition of "might" in disposing of surface waters, and it makes easy the
prediction of rights among landowners. On the other hand, it has a
pronounced tendency to inhibit any development or improvement of lands
since any alteration of the natural contours is certain to interfere with
natural drainage."
Under the common enemy rule 0 a proprietor may lawfully obstruct
or hinder the natural flow of surface water. He may turn it back upon
upper lands or onto the lands of other proprietors and not be subject to
liability for such obstruction or diversion." The effect of the rule is to

allow one to use his property in any way he chooses, regardless of the
effect on his neighbor. Historically, it has served to encourage the development and improvement of land in unsettled country. At the same time
it has often provoked contests of "might" between owners as to which
2
could build the highest and strongest embankment to protect his land.'

In their original, pure forms the civil-law rule and the common enemy
rule were diametrically opposed. Each was rigid and inflexible, embodying strict property law principles. As it became necessary to apply them
to new and varied circumstances, the courts began modifying the basic
rules, bringing them into step with the needs and conditions of society.

Such modification involved the application of the tort principles of reasonableness and negligence to determine liability.'"
Four states' 4 have carried this trend to its logical conclusion and
have adopted a reasonable use rule, which differs markedly from both the
civil-law rule and the common enemy rule. It neither allows an owner to
deal with surface water as he pleases nor prohibits him absolutely from
interfering with the natural flow. Rather, it permits him to make reasonable use of his property even though the natural flow is thereby altered.
For an act to give rise to a cause of action, there must be an unreasonable
alteration which causes harm to another.' 5
by prescription); Hair v. Downing, 96 N.C. 172, 2 S.E. 520 (1877) (by grant);
Shaw v. Etheridge, 52 N.C. 225 (1859) (easement by implication).
Annot., 59 A.L.R.2d 421 (1958).
"0It is frequently referred to as the "common law rule." However, several
writers maintain that England did not follow this rule. Kenyon & McClure 899.
Because it was first adopted in Massachusetts, the rule would be more appropriately referred to as the "common enemy or Massachusetts rule." See Miller v. Letzerich, 121 Tex. 248, 49 S.W.2d 404 (1932).
" 56 Am. JUR. Waters § 69, at 553-54 (1947).
" Annot., 59 A.L.R.2d 421, 423 (1958).
18

Id.

14

Alaska, Minnesota, New Hampshire, and New Jersey. The reasonable use
TORTS § 833, comment b (1939).
Kenyon & McClure 904. The adoption of the reasonable use rule makes it

rule 5is also advocated by the RESTATEMENT OF
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THE BASIC CIVIL-LAW RULE

As early as 1854 the North Carolina Supreme Court indicated that it
favored the natural flow of surface water, 6 which is the basic ingredient of
the civil-law rule. Nevertheless, twenty-two years later in 1876, the court
in effect applied the common enemy rule without reference to the earlier
case.17 The contradiction can no doubt be explained by the state of confusion which existed in the courts during the early development of the
two rules. More often than not one rule would emerge into general usage
in a given jurisdiction without a rejection or even an acknowledgement
of the other.'
In Porterv. Durham,'9 decided later in the 1876 term, the court ended
the confusion in North Carolina and adopted the civil-law rule. In this
case defendants were enjoined from digging canals which would have diverted water from its natural flow onto plaintiff's lands. In affirming the
judgment the court stated:
It has been held that an owner of lower land is obliged to receive upon
it the surface-water which falls on adjoining higher land, and which
naturally flows on the lower land. Of course, when the water reaches
his land the lower owner can collect it in a ditch and carry it off to a
proper outlet so that it will not damage him. He cannot, however,
raise any dyke or barrier by which it will be intercepted and thrown
back on the land of the higher owner. While the higher owner is entitled to this service, he cannot artificially increase the natural quantity
of water or change its natural manner of flow by collecting it in a ditch
and discharging it upon the servient land at20 a different place or in a
different manner from its natural discharge.
In an unusual case in 1963,21 defendant State Highway Commission
argued that ocean waters coming over the dune line during a storm were
flood waters and as such were not subject to the laws applicable to surface
waters. Defendant urged that the court apply the common enemy doctrine to flood waters. Thus the court was presented with the opportunity
possible for "all invasions of a possessor's interest in the use and enjoyment of his
land [to be] treated as different phases of a single problem involving the application of the same fundamental principles, irrespective of the medium through which
the invasions are caused.... ." Id, at 892.
" Overton v. Sawyer, 46 N.C. 308 (1854). At this time only two other states,
Louisiana (1812) and Pennsylvania (1848), had adopted the rule. Kenyon &
McClure 895 nn.11 & 12.
Raleigh & A.A.L.R.R. v. Wicker, 74 N.C. 220 (1876).
1' Kenyon & McClure 895, 902.
1974

20Id.

N.C. 767 (1876).

at 779-80.
"1 Midgett v. Highway Comm'n, 260 N.C. 241, 132 S.E.2d 599 (1963), noted
in 42 N.C.L. Rnv. 711 (1964).
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to limit the application of the civil-law rule.22 The court, discussing both
rules in detail, specifically rejected the common enemy rule and reaffirmed
the civil-law rule. 3
The civil-law rule recognizes the burden that nature has placed on the
lower land. Under a strict interpretation of the civil-law rule, anything
that renders the natural24 effect of drainage more burdensome is improper. Any act by an upper owner that causes water from one watershed to
flow into another or which alters the direction of the natural flow by artificial means is a diversion 5 and therefore unlawful since it increases the burden. A lower owner can ease the natural burden by collecting water in a
ditch and discharging it into a proper outlet. It seems reasonably clear
that, historically, "proper outlet" meant a natural watercourse running
through the lower owner's land.2 0 The right to drain into a natural watercourse passing through one's own land was apparently a part of the basic
If the right was "exercised in good
civil-law rule in North Carolina.2
faith, and in a reasonable manner, for the better adaptation of the land
to lawful and proper uses, no damage [could] be recovered if the lands
of a lower proprietor [were] injured."2
" Brief for Defendant at 3-4, Midgett v. Highway Comm'n, 260 N.C. 241, 132
S.E.2d 599 (1963).
" Midgett v. Highway Comm'n, 260 N.C. 241, 132 S.E.2d 599 (1963).
2

The word natural when used in this context

has reference to that course which would be taken by such waters falling
(or, in the case of springs, rising) on the land of the upper proprietor, or
carried thereto from still higher land and flowing or running therefrom onto
the lands of the lower proprietor undiverted and unaccelerated by any interference therewith by the upper proprietor.
56 Am. JUR. Waters § 67, at 550 (1947).
" For the various meanings the court has given to the word diversion, see
pp. 216-17 infra.
" Jenkins v. Wilmington & W.R.R., 110 N.C. 438, 15 S.E. 193 (1892).
"1 Porter v. Durham, 74 N.C. 767 (1876).
' 8 Jenkins v. Wilmington & W.R.R., 110 N.C. 438, 443, 15 S.E. 193, 194
(1892). Ostensibly, a railroad was like any other citizen in its right to drain surface water. Incident to the acquisition of a right of way, a railroad clearly obtained
the right to gather surface water which collected thereon and to conduct it to its
proper outlet, or to an outlet capable of receiving it. Id. at 442-45, 15 S.E. at 194.
There is some dispute as to the standard of care required of the railroad. The
basic civil-law rule would require that no water be diverted to the injury of the
lower owner. There is authority to the effect that the railroad is held only to a
standard of reasonableness. Parks v. Southern Ry., 143 N.C. 289, 297, 55 S.E. 701,
704 (1906). There is also some confusion as to whether a railroad has a duty to
collect and dispose of surface water which occurs naturally upon its right of way
or whether it may, as any private owner, let it pass on to lower land. Compare
Greenwood v. Southern Ry., 144 N.C. 446, 57 S.E. 157 (1907), with Davenport
v. Norfolk S.R.R., 148 N.C. 287, 62 S.E. 431 (1908).
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MODIFICATION OF THE CIVIL-LAW RULE

A rule that required the preservation of natural drainage may have
been adequate, or even beneficial, in a undeveloped frontier environment,
but it was not suited to an urban, industrialized society. The North Carolina Supreme Court early recognized that a strict application of the civillaw rule would prohibit any alteration of natural drainage and consequently discourage the improvement and effective use of land.
The court expressed its awareness of the dangers of an inflexible rule
and demonstrated its intention to deal with the problem in Mizzell v. McGowan,2 9 a case which was to come before the court three times in four
years. Defendant had dug ditches and canals upon his land in order to
drain water from a swamp into a natural watercourse. Plaintiff alleged
that the drainage had increased and accelerated the watercourse to the
point that it had overflowed and flooded his lands. The court said:
The upper owner can not divert and throw water on his neighbor, nor
the latter back water on the other with impunity. Sic utere tuo, ut
alieum non laedas. This rule, however, can not be enforced in its strict
letter, without impeding rightful progress and without hindering industrial enterprise. Minor individual interest must sometimes yield to
the paramount good. Otherwise the benefits of discovery and progress
in all enterprises of life would be withheld from activity in life's affairs. 'The rough outline of natural right or liberty must submit to
the chisel of the mason that it may enter symmetrically into the social
structure.' Under this principle the defendants are permitted not to
divert, but to drain their lands, having due regard for their neighbor,
provided they do not more than concentrate the water and cause it to
flow more rapidly and in greater volume down the natural streams
through or by the lands of plaintiff. This license must be conceded
with caution and prudence.
* * * Porter v. Durham . . . was a case solely for diverting water

from its natural course and throwing it on the plaintiff. That question
was reserved by the court and is not before us ....

0

court3 l

was inconclusive. On
Mizzell's second appearance before the
2
the third appeal, however, the Mizzell rule was further defined and explained. The right to accelerate and increase was not limited to the size
or capacity of the watercourse. The water to be drained, however, must
come from within the natural boundaries of the watershed.8" Finally,
the court reaffirmed the narrow scope of the rule:
"9120 N.C. 134, 26 S.E. 783 (1897).
" Id. at 138, 26 S.E. at 784 (emphasis added).

" Mizzell v. McGowan, 125 N.C. 439, 34 S.E. 538 (1899).
" Mizzell v. McGowan, 129 N.C. 93, 39 S.E. 729 (1901).
Id. at 95, 39 S.E. at 729.
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A man can dig ditches wherever he pleases upon his own land, provided he runs them into a natural watercourse before leaving his land,
subject only to the limitation against diversion. But if he cannot reach
a natural watercourse without going into the lands of another, he must
proceed under . . .the Code.3"
Beyond the obvious facilitation of the drainage and reclamation of
swamp lands, the significance of the Mizzell rule-that one may increase
and accelerate but not divert-is two-fold. First, though it modified the
substantive civil-law rule very little (one could already drain into a natural watercourse), it gave rise to the phrase "increase and accelerate but
not divert," which the court was later to make the touchstone of the law of
surface water. Second, it demonstrated the court's commitment to a
flexible application of the civil-law rule.
Mizzell deals with the right to increase and accelerate the flow in a
naturalwatercourse as a by-product of drainage. The rule is not so broad
as to encompass the increase and acceleration of the natural flow of surface water onto lower lands incident to grading, paving, or building upon
the upper land. Initially, this distinction was recognized, 5 but it soon
became blurred 6 and was subsequently mentioned in some cases37 and
ignored in others.33 Ultimately, the court explicitly stated that the Mizsell rule-that one may increase and accelerate but not divert-governed
the drainage of surface water onto the lands of another.
The first application of this modified civil-law rule is found in Parker
v. Norfolk & CarolinaRailroad,39 decided between the first and second
Mizzell cases. In Parker,defendant had allegedly diverted water from its
natural flow onto plaintiff's lands. In upholding the finding of diversion
the court said:

" Id. at 96, 39 S.E. at 730 (emphasis added). The statute to which the court
refers was originally enacted in 1795 and is still in effect today. N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 156-1 to -36 (1964). If a landowner has swamp lands which have no
natural outlet and which cannot be drained into a natural watercourse, the statute
enables him to drain through the lands of a lower proprietor. References to this
procedure by the court in the late nineteenth century indicate that it may have had
some vitality at that time. There is no indication that it is used today.
" Mizzell v. McGowan, 120 N.C. 134, 26 S.E. 783 (1897).
" Parker v. Norfolk & C.R.R., 123 N.C. 71, 31 S.E. 381 (1898).
" Barcliff v. Norfolk S.R.R., 168 N.C. 268, 269-70, 84 S.E. 290, 291 (1915);
Briscoe v. Parker, 145 N.C. 14, 17, 58 S.E. 443, 444 (1907); Rice v. Norfolk &
S.R.R., 130 N.C. 375, 378, 41 S.E. 1031, 1032 (1902); Mizzell v. McGowan, 129
N.C. 93, 96, 39 S.E. 729, 730 (1901).
" Davis v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 227 N.C. 561, 42 S.E.2d 905 (1947);
Roberts v. Baldwin, 151 N.C. 407, 66 S.E. 346 (1909); Parker v. Norfolk &
C.R.R., 123 N.C. 71, 31 S.E. 381 (1898).
123 N.C. 71, 31 S.E. 381 (1898).
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It was held in [Mizzell] that the dominant tenant had the right to
carry off his surface water by cutting ditches, by which the flow of
water, naturally flowing therein, is increased and accelerated, and discharged on the land of the servient tenant.... It has been previously
held that neither a railroad nor an individual could divert water from
its natural course and throw it upon abutting lands and cause damage.... It may now be stated that the upper holder may increase and
accelerate the flow of the water in its natural course,
but cannot divert
40
other waters to the damage of the lower lands.
Nowhere in Mizzell does there appear language that would allow such
a discharge. In fact, there is clear language to the contrary.4 1 The second and third Mizzell cases came after Parkerand would apparently overrule it, yet the court continued to quote the rule in cases involving drainage of surface water onto lower lands. 2 It is perhaps significant that the
issue in each of these later cases 43 was diversion, and not increase and
acceleration. Since diversion resulting in injury to the lower proprietor
is not permitted under the basic civil-law rule, it would have been sufficient for the court to state only that principle. However, the Mizzell rule
offered a convenient phraseology which embodied the basic principle prohibiting diversion, so the court seized upon it and used it. In doing so,
by association, it applied the remainder of the rule (permitting increase
and acceleration) to drainage onto the lands of another. Thus the court
significantly liberalized the civil-law rule in North Carolina.
RULE
A mere statement of the liberalized civil-law rule offers broad guidelines to landowners, but it does little to tell them specifically what they
may and may not do. An examination of the cases demonstrates the application of the broad principles. For convenience, the rights and duties
of upper and lower owners are discussed separately. Practically speaking,
nearly all tracts are both dominant and servient-dominant over those
below and servient to those above. In some instances, as where a railroad
or highway right of way passes through a tract of land, the owner of the
land assumes the rights and obligations of upper and lower owner in
44
relation to the holder of the right of way.
APPLICATION OF THE CIVIL-LAW

Id. at 73, 31 S.E. at 381-82 (emphasis added).
,1See p. 210 & note 30 supra.
"Davis v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 227 N.C. 561, 42 S.E.2d 905 (1947);
Sykes v. Sykes, 197 N.C. 37, 147 S.E. 621 (1929) ; Barcliff v. Norfolk S.R.R., 168
N.C. 268, 84 S.E. 290 (1915); Roberts v. Baldwin, 151 N.C. 407, 66 S.E. 346
(1909); Briscoe v. Parker, 145 N.C. 14, 58 S.E. 443 (1907).
"Cases cited note 42 supra.
"Greenwood v. Southern Ry., 144 N.C. 446, 57 S.E. 157 (1907).
40
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The Upper Owner
The upper owner is possessor of an easement or servitude in the lower

land. This easement is imposed by nature and recognized by law. The
easement, according to North Carolina law, includes the right to accelerate and increase the natural flow, but does not include the right to divert. In at least two cases, the issue of acceleration and increase was
squarely presented to the court. In one of these the court held that defendant could fill in a roadside ditch, thereby increasing and accelerating
the flow of surface water onto the lower land, as long as the ditch was
on his property. If the road in question was public, and the ditch on the
right of way, then defendant had no such right. 5
The other, Davis v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad,46 presented the court
with an unusual opportunity to examine, in a single case, nearly every
situation in which an upper owner could be held liable for interference
with natural flow. Plaintiff's lower parking lot was periodically flooded
after upper defendant shipbuilding company had leveled and paved its
parking lot. Defendant railroad, whose tracks ran between the two pieces
of property, provided three culverts under its road to pass water from
the upper lot to the lower. On the general nature of surface water, the
trial judge correctly stated the rule of law:
[U]nder the law when one owns or occupies lower lands, he must
receive waters from higher lands when they flow naturally therefrom.
There is a principle of law to the effect that where two tracts of land
join each other, one being lower than the other, that the lower tract
is burdened with an easement to receive waters from the upper tract,
which naturally flow therefrom.
I charge you further that the owner or one in charge of the higher
lands or premises, may increase the natural flow of water, and may
accelerate it, but cannot divert the water and cause it to flow upon the
lands of the lower proprietor in a different manner, or in a different
place from which it would naturally go. . .. 4
In applying the foregoing rule the judge, in substance, charged: if the
shipbuilding company did no more than increase and accelerate the natural
Sykes v. Sykes, 197 N.C. 37, 147 S.E. 621 (1929).
"227 N.C. 561, 42 S.E.2d 905 (1947).
Id. at 564, 42 S.E.2d at 908. The last sentence of the quotation contains an
interesting paradox. If an acceleration and increase of the natural flow would not
"cause it to flow upon the lands of the lower proprietor in a different manner,"
then it is not clear what would constitute a "different manner." This seemingly
conflicting language appears in other cases: Barcliff v. Norfolk S.R.R., 168 N.C.
268, 84 S.E. 290 (1915); Brown v. Southern Ry., 165 N.C. 392, 81 S.E. 450

(1914).
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flow of water, it would not be liable; if it diverted water which would
otherwise not have flowed upon plaintiff's land and caused it to flow thereon it would be liable; if there were no natural flow from the higher
premises onto plaintiff's land prior to the grading and paving, and if a
flow was created by such grading and paving, then the flow is artificial
and defendant shipbuilding company would be liable, but if a natural
flow existed prior to the paving and grading and the construction only
accelerated and increased that water, the company is not liable.4 As to
defendant railroad: if the water came down in its natural state and the
railroad did nothing to accelerate the flow under its track, then the railroad would not be liable;4 if it was not a natural flow which came down,
but an artificial one created by the diversion of the shipbuilding company,
and the railroad gathered up the wrongfully diverted flow in pipes and
discharged it upon plaintiff's property in a manner different than it would
have naturally gone and in a way so as to damage plaintiff's property,
then the railroad would be liable; but if the flow were diverted from above
and the railroad put it into pipes to enable it to pass under its tracks
instead of over them and plaintiff was not damaged to any greater extent
than if the water had flowed over the tracks, then the railroad is not
liable. 0
The court, in approving the charge of the trial judge, stated that not
to allow an upper owner to increase and accelerate the flow of water in
improving his land would have the effect of depriving him of the use of
his property.
The two most recent surface water cases, 1 involving the reciprocal
rights of upper and lower owners, give rather complete statements of the
civil-law rule in North Carolina, but no mention is made of the right to
increase and accelerate. In one of these, Phillips v. Chesson,"2 the issue
was the diversion of the natural flow of surface water by an upper owner
as a result of construction of a rock wall and a dirt embankment. After
"Davis v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 227 N.C. 561, 564-65, 42 S.E.2d 905, 908
(1947).
,9Id. at 565, 42 S.E.2d at 908. This is a curious statement. If, as the court
has stated many times, a railroad has the same rights as any other proprietor to
drain surface water, why should it not be able to increase the flow under its tracks?
The instruction is probably incorrect, but it was not challenged on appeal since
defendants won at the trial court level.
"0Davis v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 227 N.C. 561, 565, 42 S.E.2d 905, 908-09
(1947).
" Midgett v. Highway Comm'n, 260 N.C. 241, 132 S.E.2d 599 (1963); Phillips
v. Chesson, 231 N.C. 566, 58 S.E.2d 343 (1950).
52231 N.C. 566, 58 S.E.2d 343 (1950).
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holding that the upper owner could not divert, nor alter the natural flow
with artificial devices, the court stated:
The question whether more water or less water is caused to flow onto
the lower land-which may be a factor bearing on liability-is often
by no means the most important. The manner of its collection and
release, the intermittent increase in volume and destructive force, its
direction to a more vulnerable point of invasion, may often become
important. 3
This dictum might indicate that even the right to increase and accelerate
is subject to limitation. Apparently some standard of reasonableness may
be applied in future cases involving increase and acceleration.
Several jurisdictions that follow the civil-law rule have modified it to
make it more workable in an urban environment. 54 North Carolina has
not yet made such a general modification. It has, however, by special application of the increase and accelerate principle, carved out an exception
to the civil-law rule which has facilitated the grading and paving of streets
by governmental agencies.
In Yowmans v. City of Hendersonville,55 the court recognized that
in most circumstances defendant would be liable if he diverted water onto
plaintiff's land, but stated:
[I]n regard to the flow and disposal of surface water incident to the
grading and pavement of streets, a different rule is recognized, and a
municipality, acting pursuant to legislative authority, is not ordinarily
responsible for the increase in the flow of water upon abutting owners
unless there has been negligence on their part causing the damage complained of .... It is held in this jurisdiction, however, that the right
referred to is not absolute, but is on condition that the same is exercised with proper skill and caution, and if, in a given case, or as it may
affect the property of some abutting owner, there is a breach of duty
in this respect, causing damage, the municipality may be held responsible. 0
Apparently a city is not required as a matter of law to curb and gutter
its streets, but it is subject to the duty to exercise reasonable care in deciding whether or not to construct such drainage facilities.57 Further,
having decided to construct artificial drains, the city is required to exerId. at 569, 58 S.E.2d at 346.
Annot., 59 A.L.R.2d 421, 433 (1958).
175 N.C. 574, 96 S.E. 45 (1918).
"Id. at 577, 96 S.E. at 46. This distinction was first recognized in Brinkley
& Lassiter v. Norfolk S.R.R., 168 N.C. 428, 84 S.E. 700 (1915).
"'Eller v. City of Greensboro, 190 N,C, 715, 130 S,E. 851 (1925).
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construction.58

cise ordinary skill and caution in that
Generally, this is
taken to mean that the artificial drains must be adequate to receive the
amount of surface water which will flow into them under ordinary conditions and in the light of ordinary experience." ° An increase in the level
of water in a city's artificial drain, even to the point of its being completely filled, does not constitute negligence either in paving the streets which
caused the increase or in failing to widen and deepen the drain."0
The paving and grading exception to the civil-law rule is subject to
two limitations: first, a city may not collect and concentrate surface water
into artificial drains and discharge it onto plaintiff's property without
adequately providing for its proper outflow unless compensation is paid ;01
second, it apparently applies only to the grading and paving of existing
2
streets and not to the construction of new ones.
The court has given the word diversion several meanings. First, to
cause water which would naturally have flowed in one watershed to flow
into another is a diversion. 3 Second, to collect surface water in an artificial ditch or canal and discharge it upon the lower land at a different
place64 or in a different manner 5 than usual is a diversion. 0 Third, to
erect artificial barriers that, without collecting the flow, alter the direction
"8Gore v. City of Wilmington, 194 N.C. 450, 140 S.E. 71 (1927).
30Id.
60
Roberson v. City of Kinston, 261 N.C. 135, 134 S.E.2d
193 (1964).
Yowmans v. City of Hendersonville, 175 N.C. 574, 577, 96 S.E. 45, 47
(1918).
2 Braswell v. Highway Comm'n, 250 N.C. 508, 108 S.E.2d 912 (1959) (dicturn). The court gives no explanation for this distinction, nor is there any indication what rule would apply to new streets.
"3Clark v. Norfolk S.R.R., 168 N.C. 415, 84 S.E. 702 (1915); Hooker v. Norfolk S.R.R., 156 N.C. 155, 72 S.E. 210 (1911); Hocutt v. Wilmington & W.R.R.,
124 N.C. 214, 32 S.E. 681 (1899).
61

"'Chappel v. Winslow, 258 N.C. 617, 129 S.E.2d 101 (1963) ; Darr v. Carolina
Alum. Co., 215 N.C. 768, 3 S.E.2d 434 (1939) (no right to drain into artificial

channel); Cardwell v. Norfolk & W.R.R., 171 N.C. 365, 88 S.E. 495 (1916) ; Mullen v. Lake Drummond Canal & Water Co., 130 N.C. 496, 41 S.E. 1027 (1902)
(water in canal brought on premises by artificial means and thus product of diversion); Porter v. Durham, 74 N.C. 767 (1876).
" Sherill v. Highway Comm'n, 264 N.C. 643, 142 S.E.2d 653 (1965). A culvert placed under the highway was not properly aligned with the axis of the ditch;
the increased flow of water from above caused acceleration and a whirlpool, which
washed away the land. The culvert was said to be an artificial device that diverted
the flow.
66 Brown v. Southern Ry., 165 N.C. 392, 81 S.E. 450 (1914).
Some authorities
say any water brought on premises by artificial means cannot be abandoned and
treated as surface water. 3 H. FARNUm, LAW OF WATERS AND WATER RinIGTS §
881 at 2569 (1904). For implication that overflow from ice box and water barrel
is surface water, see Holton v. Northwestern Oil Co., 201 N.C. 744, 161 S.E. 391
(1931). But cf. Mullen v. Lake Drummond Canal & Water Co., 130 N.C. 496, 41
S.E. 1027 (1902).
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and cause the water to flow upon the lower land at a different place than
usual is a diversion.6 7 Fourth, to create an artificial flow where previously no natural flow existed and to direct the artificial flow onto lower land
is a diversion.6 8 If some natural flow did exist, even though small, the
upper owner might increase and accelerate the natural flow and this would
not constitute a diversion. 6
Whether or not water has been diverted is an issue of fact for the
70
jury, while the effect of such diversion is a question of law for the court.
Negligence need not be alleged to state a cause of action for diversion,7 1
but there must be an allegation of injury. Diversion is evidently not unlawful per se; there must be actual damage before the statute of limitations begins to run. Flooding by unlawful diversion is not a continuing
trespass, and therefore all damages incurred within the three years preceding the bringing of the action may be recovered. 3
The Lower Owner
The lower owner as proprietor of the servient estate must receive the
natural flow of surface water upon his land. He may not throw up barriers, dikes, or embankments 74 or in any way obstruct the natural flow
from above. 7 5 As previously discussed, 76 he may collect the natural flow

into artificial channels and ditches once it reaches his land and discharge
it into its natural outlet or into a proper outlet adequate to receive it.
Should a lower owner, or an upper owner for that matter, choose to replace a natural drainway with an artificial conduit, he then becomes liable
to exercise ordinary care to maintain the conduit so that the natural flow
"'Phillips v. Chesson, 231 N.C. 566, 58 S.E.2d 343 (1950) (stone wall); Winchester v. Byers, 196 N.C. 383, 145 S.E. 774 (1928) (pile of dirt).
" Davis v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 227 N.C. 561, 42 S.E.2d 905 (1947) (ar-

tificial flow may not be created by leveling and paving); Rice v. Norfolk & S.R.R.,
130 N.C. 375, 41 S.E. 1031 (1902) (artificial flow may not be created by draining
a natural basin or swamp which had no natural outlet). Such swamps or basins
may be drained into natural watercourses. See pp. 210-11 supra.
42 S.E.2d 905 (1947).
" Davis v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 227 N.C. 561, S.E.
1031, 1032 (1902).
o Rice v. Norfolk & S.R.R., 130 N.C. 375, 376, 41
" Braswell v. Highway Comm'n, 250 N.C. 508, 511, 108 S.E.2d 912, 914
(1959); Yowmans v. City of Hendersonville, 175 N.C. 574, 578, 96 S.E. 45, 47
(1918).
" Barcliff v. Norfolk S.R.R., 168 N.C. 268, 270, 84 S.E. 290, 291 (1915).
Roberts v. Baldwin, 151 N.C. 407, 66 S.E. 346 (1909).
Porter v. Durham, 74 N.C. 767 (1876) (dictum).
Evidently this burden has been well accepted in North Carolina. No case
has been located in which an upper owner has sued a lower for obstructing the
natural flow of surface water. There are cases in which an adjacent owner has
sued another for diversion caused by failure to keep drainage ditches open. See,
e.g., Price v. Norfolk S.R.R., 179 N.C. 279, 102 S.E. 308 (1920).
" See pp. 210-11 supra.
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will not become obstructed." Finally, there is one circumstance in which
the lower owner might obstruct the flow coming onto his land. If the
flow from above is not natural, but the result of diversion by the upper,
then the lower owner may block it and pond it upon the upper land without incurring liability, so long as he does not also obstruct the passage of
8
water that would naturally flow onto his land.7
CONCLUSION

Recently, in comparing the civil-law and common enemy rules, the
North Carolina Supreme Court noted that many jurisdictions have so modified the basic rules that there remained only a very fine line of distinction
between them. 9 Apparently the court was referring to developments in
other jurisdictions, for it appears that North Carolina has not substantially deviated from its original version of the civil-law rule. This is not to
say that the North Carolina version is antiquated. Indeed, an examination of the surface water litigation in the state shows that since 1930
only thirty-eight cases have come before the supreme court, an average
of one case a year. Only three of the recent cases have involved disputes between private individuals.
At the same time, it would be unwise to assume that the law in its
present state is sufficient to deal with all future problems. The current
trend toward industrialization and urbanization will no doubt severely
test the existing law. The court has indicated that it will make modifications when they become necessary. In making these changes it will be
acting in accordance with the philosophy it expressed in the first Mizell
case: "The rough outline of natural right or liberty must submit to the
chisel of the mason that it may enter symmetrically into the social structure."8'
WILLIAM

P. AYCOCK, II

"'Johnson v. City of Winston-Salem, 239 N.C. 697, 81 S.E.2d 153 (1954).
" 56 Am. JUR. Waters § 119 (1947). See Davis v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R.,

227 N.C. 561, 565, 42 S.E.2d 905, 908-09 (1947).
" Midgett v. Highway Comm'n, 260 N.C. 241, 244, 132 S.E.2d 599, 604
" Most of the litigation in North Carolina has arisen from the activities
nicipalities and railroads and other quasi-public corporations. Less than
the total number of surface water cases have involved disputes between
landowners.
" Mizzell v. McGowan, 120 N.C. 134, 138, 26 S.E. 783, 784 (1897).

(1963).
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Religious Societies-Church Property DisputesThe Implied Trust Doctrine
Every religious society has a right to determine for itself the times for
these exercises, and the objects proper for them, according to their
own particulartenets; and this right can never be safer than in their
own hands, where the Constitution has deposited it.
-Thomas Jefferson'
no dogThe law knows no heresy, and is committed to the support of
2
ma, the establishment of no sect.-Justice Samuel F. Miller.
The Christian church has been beset with disagreement and dissent
since its establishment. The differences within the early church' were
only preludes to the bitter disputes that eventually splintered the unified
church into hundreds of denominations and sects. Carl Zollmann, one of
the foremost authorities on American church law, calls these divisions,
or "schisms," within the church "blessings in disguise" and "the process
by which the living church continually adapts itself to the living society
upon which it operates." 4 While these schisms may be beneficial, they
are also painful, often leaving wounds that take centuries to heal and
scars that may never be erased.
Most disputes can be resolved within the church structure and do not
lead to discernable divisions. Only when the differences become irreconcilable do the disputes overflow the confines of the church and become the
concern of society as a whole. Ultimately the problem of who has the right
to use and control the church property arises and must be resolved. The
parties must either turn to the service of an impartial agency of the community or resort to force as a final arbiter. Society's interest in maintaining
settled property titles and social order thus makes the courts the natural
forums for church property disputes.
In a recent dispute within the Presbyterian Church in the United
States, the Supreme Court of Georgia answered the question of property
control in a novel fashion. In Presbyterian Church in the United States
I Quoted in A. STOKES & L. PFEFFER, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED
STATES 88 (1964).
v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 728 (1871).
'"I appeal to you, brethren, by the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, that all of
you agree and that there be no dissensions among you, but that you be united in
the same mind and the same judgment." I Corinthians 1:10 (rev. stand. version).
'C. ZOLLMANN, AMERICAN CIVIL CHURCH LAW 172 (Colum. ed. 1917).
2 Watson
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v. EasternHeights PresbyterianChurch,5 the general organization of the

Presbyterian Church was at odds with two dissident churches in Savannah. Disagreement centered mainly on actions of the General Assembly,'
which had decided, among other things, that women could hold positions
in the church previously reserved for men. The two Savannah churches
also disagreed with the positions of the general church in the recent dispute over required Bible reading in public schools, 7 United States involvement in Vietnam, civil disobedience, predestination, and the general
church's membership in the National Council of Churches of Christ.'
In 1966, both local churches "withdrew" from the general church, claiming that the General Assembly's stand violated the original tenets of faith
of the Presbyterian Church as set down in 1861.' The Presbytery of
Savannah I ° thereafter notified the two Savannah churches that it was
securing ministers for them and would maintain the church buildings for
those who desired to continue their relationship with the general church.
The Savannah churches sought judicial relief in the form of temporary
and permanent injunctions. A predominantly Baptist jury"1 found that
the general church had departed from the original tenets of faith, and
the court, accordingly, granted the requested relief.12 The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision by overruling well-settled
precedent' and rejecting the argument that such a decision concerned
matters of faith, and was, therefore, an area protected from intrusion
by civil courts.' 4 The Georgia court explained that under the "implied
trust" doctrine, church property is impressed with an "implied trust"
for the benefit of the general church. When a local church is dissolved or withdraws from the denomination, 5 the doctrine operates
-224 Ga. 61, 159 S.E.2d 690 (1968), cert. granted sub norn. Presbyterian
Church in the United States v. Mary Eliz. Blue Hull Mem. Presby. Church, 392
U.S. 903 (1968).
'See generally PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH IN THE UNITED STATES, Boox or
CHURCH ORDER § 13-1 (rev. ed. 1964) [hereinafter cited as Boox or CHURCH
ORDER].
'See Hanft, The Prayer Decisions, 42 N.C.L. REv. 567 (1964).
8224 Ga. at -, 159 S.E.2d at 692.
'The year of the formation of the Presbyterian Church of the Confederate

States of America. J. LESLIE, PRESBYTERIAN LAW AND PROCEDURE 24 (1930).
" The Presbytery is the second highest church court. Boox OF CHURCH ORDER

§§ 13-1, 14-5.
"The Washington Post, May 4, 1968, § D, at 11, col. 5.
224 Ga. at , 159 S.E.2d at 692-95.
18 See Mack v. Kime, 129 Ga. 1, 58 S.E. 184 (1907).
14224 Ga. at -,
159 S.E.2d at 695-96.
The Georgia court reasoned that the two local churches were already out of
the general church's jurisdiction and, therefore, did not need to press an appeal
within the church structure to validate that separation. 224 Ga. at -, 159 S.E.2d
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to give the local church property to the general church. However, the
doctrine allows the local church to retain control of the church property
by proving that the general church departed from the original tenets of
faith. The court, in awarding the property to the two local churches,
claimed "virtually unanimous" 1 6 support for the rule's application to the
Savannah church property. 7
The "implied trust" doctrine invoked by the court in Eastern Heights
first appeared in England during the early nineteenth century. 8 The
English courts assumed that property obtained by a local church without
any express limitations as to its use was given with the intention that it
should be used for the promulgation of the church's faith as it existed at
the time of the conveyance. If the grantor of the property, or the donor of
the funds used for its purchase, had not specified these conditions, the
courts would imply them-hence the "implied trust." In case of a schism,
the property would go to the faction adhering to the tenets of faith as
they existed when the property was acquired."9
The English rule made little headway in the United States; in 1871 it
was expressly rejected by the Supreme Court in the landmark decision
of Watson v. Jones.0 Mr. Justice Miller, speaking for the court, recognized that different forms of church government exist in this country.
Some churches operate as independent self-governing congregations, such
as the Congregational and Baptist denominations. These are labeled "congregational" since matters of religious concern are settled by majority
vote of the church membership. Others, like the Presbyterians and Methat 696. Contra, Evangelical Luth. Synod v. First English Luth. Church, 47 F.
Supp. 954, 962 (W.D. Okla. 1942).
224 Ga. at -, 159 S.E.2d at 695.
x The court based its authority on a Georgia statute which appears to refer
only to "express trusts": "Courts are reluctant to interpose in questions affecting
the management of the temporalities of a church; but when property is devoted to
a specific doctrine or purpose, the courts will prevent it from being diverted from
the trust." GA. CODE ANN. § 22-408 (emphasis added). A careful reading of
the court's supporting cases reveals that they do not support the conclusions of the
court, and in many instances demand a contrary holding. See Watson v.
Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871); Saint John's Presbytery v. Central
Presby. Church, 102 So. 2d 714 (Fla. 1958); Presbytery of the Everglades v.
Morgan, 125 So. 2d 762 (Fla. Ct. App. 1961); Sapp v. Callaway, 208 Ga. 805, 69
S.E.2d 734 (1952); Tucker v. Paulk, 148 Ga. 228, 96 S.E. 339 (1918).
"' Craigdallie v. Aikman, 1 Dow 1, 3 Eng. Rep. 601 (H.L. 1813) (Scot.).
"0 Attorney General ex rel. Mander v. Pearson, 3 Mer. 353, 418, 36 Eng. Rep.
135, 157 (Ch. 1817). For a thorough treatment of the history of the "implied
trust" doctrine, see Note, JudicialIntervention in Disputes Over the Use of Church
Property,75 HARv. L. Rlv. 1142, 1149-54 (1962).
2080 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871). A minority faction of the Walnut Street
Presbyterian Church of Louisville sought control of the local church in defiance
of the general church. The dispute centered on the church's stand on slavery.
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odists, are governed by a series of church tribunals arranged in hierarchical order.21 The decisions of these representative bodies are held to
be binding upon every congregation within the denomination.
When disputes arise in churches of the first type, Mr. Justice Miller
explained, the courts must look to the decision of the majority of the
congregation for the determination of matters involving religion. The
court would make no inquiry into the theological dispute. Likewise, in
decisions involving religious matters within a hierarchical church structure, the courts look to the proper church tribunal. The decision of the
church's highest tribunal is held binding upon the courts on matters of
doctrine and faith. 23 Only in cases of an express trust for the support of
a specific religious doctrine would there be an inquiry by the courts into
the religious tenets of the church. This was the only circumstance in
which the Court found justification for making such an intrusion. 4
The Supreme Court further pointed out that the "implied trust" doctrine violates a basic principle of our government, that of the separation
of church and state.2 5 By voluntarily uniting with a church, the member
2
thereby bound himself to the church's rulings on religious matters. , If
the courts interfered by inquiring into doctrine, it would undermine the
governmental structure of the church."
The great majority of American jurisdictions 2s professed allegience
to the Watson rule, 9 but in practical application one modification became
21

CHURCH ORDER §§ 13-1, 14-5.
Wall.) at 725.
80
U.S.
(13
2
Id. at 727. Sometimes determining into which category a church government falls presents difficulty. See, e.g., Ginossi v. Samatos, 3 Ill. App. 2d 514, 123
N.E.2d 104 (1954); Maryland and Va. Eldership of the Churches of God v.
, 241 A.2d 691 (1968).
Church of God,-Md. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 722-23. See, e.g., Chatfield v. Dennington, 206 Ga.
762, 58 S.E.2d 842 (1950).
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 727. For a modern statement of the rule, see Maryland
and Va. Eldership of the Churches of God v. Church of God, - Md. - - 241
A.2d 691, 697 (1968).
2 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 728.
7 Id. at 733.
28
The case was decided before Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938),
and was therefore based on federal common law. Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cath.,
344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952).
2 Goodson v. Northside Bible Church, 261 F. Supp. 99 (S.D. Ala. 1966);
Evangelical Luth. Synod v. First English Luth. Church, 47 F. Supp. 954 (W.D.
Okla. 1942); Barkley v. Hayes, 208 F. 319 (W.D. Mo. 1913); Bouchelle v. Trustees of the Presby. Congreg., 22 Del. Ch. 58, 194 A. 100 (1937); Stewart v. Jarriel, 206 Ga. 855, 59 S.E.2d 368 (1950); Mack v. Kime, 129 Ga. 1, 58 S.E. 184
(1907) (see note 13 supra); First Protest. Ref. Church v. DeWolf, 344 Mich. 624,
75 N.W.2d 19 (1956); Kelly v. McIntire, 123 N.J. Eq. 351, 197 A. 736 (1938);
True Ref. Dutch Church v. Iserman, 64 N.J.L. 506, 45 A. 771 (1900) ; Tubreville
v. Morris, 203 S.C. 287, 26 S.E.2d 821 (1943). Two jurisdictions appear not to
2

2"

2

20

See, e.g., BooK oF
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necessary. It was obvious that the decisions of ecclesiastical authorities
must be legitimate and derived by proper methods of procedure if they
were to be accepted at face value by the courts. An ecclesiastical due process rule evolved which, when added to the original Watson rule, meant
that the decisions of the church would be accepted as final by the courts
provided there was fair play and substantial justice rendered in the process. 80 The resulting rule provided a workable formula for the courts"1
by keeping judicial inquiries into matters of religious doctrine to a minimum, while allowing suitable recourse for parties in the face of mismanagement.3 2
While rendering allegiance to Watson 3 with one hand, however, the
state courts modified portions of the rule with the other. Despite the
Supreme Court's express rejection of the "implied trust" doctrine, 34 it
have accepted the rule. See, e.g., Boyles v. Roberts, 222 Mo. 613, 121 S.W. 805

(1909); Bonham v. Harris, 125 Tenn. 452, 145 S.W. 169 (1911); but see Hayes
v. Manning, 263 Mo. 1, 172 S.W. 897 (1914).

" Mr. Justice Brandeis speaking for the Court: "In the absence of fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness, the decisions of the proper church tribunals on matters
purely ecclesiastical, although affecting civil rights, are accepted in litigation before
the secular courts as conclusive, because the parties in interest made them so by
contract or otherwise." Gonzalez v. Roman Cath. Arch., 280 U.S. 1, 16 (1929).
See, e.g., Brundage v. Deardorf, 55 F. 839 (C.C.N.D. Ohio 1893); Tubreville v.
Morris, 203 S.C. 287, 26 S.E.2d 821 (1943).
" There have been some exceptions. See, e.g., Master v. Second Parish, 124
F.2d 622 (1st Cir. 1941).
"'Asimilar rule is applied to other non-profit corporations such as fraternal
organizations. See, e.g., Johnson v. Prince Hall Grand Lodge, 183 Kan. 141, 325
P.2d 45 (1958).
" Watson may have been given constitutional status by the Supreme
Court in Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cath., 344 U.S. 94 (1952). This decision
strongly implies that the "freedom of religion" concept applies not only to individuals, but also to church organizations. In this case, the Supreme Court struck
down a New York statute that prevented the Soviet-influenced hierarchy of the
Russian Orthodox Church from asserting control over its subordinate bodies within the state. Mr. Justice Reed for the court concluded:
"Ours is a government which by the 'law of its being' allows no statute,
state or national, that prohibits the free exercise of religion. There are occasions when civil courts must draw lines between the responsibilities of
church and state for the disposition or use of property ....

Even in those

cases when the property right follows as an incident from decisions of the
church custom or law on ecclesiastical issues, the church rule controls. ...
This under our Constitution necessarily follows in order that there may be
free exercise of religion."
Id. at 120-21. (Citations omitted) See Goodson v. Northside Bible Church, 261
F. Supp. 99 (S.D. Ala. 1966); Comment, Judicial Intervention in Church Property
Disputes-Some Constitutional Considerations,74 YALE L.J. 1113, 1123-39 (1965).
See generally Duesenberg, Jurisdiction of Civil Courts Over Religious Issues, 20
OHIO ST. L.J. 508 (1959).
c'80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 725.
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re-emerged under the cloak of the "fundamental change" doctrine.8u Its
application, however, was limited to those disputes involving congrega80
tional polities where there was no forum of appeal except the civil courts.
In a split involving a Baptist church, for example, the church property
would be awarded to that faction adhering to the original beliefs of the
church regardless of how many persons took the opposite view. If a
majority did not adhere to those beliefs, they were said to have forced a
"fundamental change" in the use of the church's property in disregard
7
of the wishes of those members who remained loyal to the faith.1 The
result was that of the "implied trust."
After Watson, the use of the term "trust" also emerged in cases involving hierarchical polities. The term, however, was not employed in
the same sense as in the "implied trust" doctrine. 88 Principally, its use
came from the lack of a better word to describe the Watson rule as applied
to disputes in hierarchical polities. It was a label used to denote the particular concept of property ownership that allowed a local church to use
and hold property in its own name-property that would, without exception, revert to the general church's control if the local church withdrew
from the general denomination. The Georgia court in Eastern Heights
apparently took the invasion of the term "trust" into disputes of hierarchical church polities to mean that it should be employed in the same
way that the "implied trust" was applied to congregational polities under
the "fundamental change" doctrine. 9 The decisions, however, reveal a
contrary conclusion, for the only thing that the two procedures have in
" Specific guidelines for the rule have been almost impossible to formulate.
See, e.g., Ragsdall v. Church of Christ, 244 Iowa 474, 55 N.W.2d 539 (1952);
Parker v. Harper, 295 Ky. 686, 175 S.W.2d 361 (1943); Reid v. Johnston, 241
N.C. 201, 85 S.E.2d 114 (1954). Until Eastern Heights, the Georgia courts rejected any form of the "implied trust" doctrine. See, e.g., Sapp v. Callaway, 208
Ga. 805, 69 S.E.2d 734 (1952); Stewart v. Jarriel, 206 Ga. 855, 59 S.E.2d 368
(1950).
"See, e.g., Saint John's Presby. v. Central Presby. Church, 102 So. 2d 714
(Fla. 1958); Tucker v. Paulk, 148 Ga. 228, 96 S.E. 339 (1918); Ragsdall v.
Church of Christ, 244 Iowa 474, 55 N.W.2d 539 (1952); Parker v. Harper, 295
Ky. 686, 175 S.W.2d 361 (1943); Protestant Ref. Church v. Tempelman, 249
Minn. 182, 81 N.W.2d 839 (1957); Reid v. Johnston, 241 N.C. 201, 85 S.E.2d 114
(1954).
",Parker v. Harper, 295 Ky. 686, 175 S.W.2d 361 (1943).
" See, e.g., Presbytery of the Everglades v. Morgan, 125 So. 2d 762 (Fla. Ct.
Ind.
App. 1961) ; Presbytery of Indianapolis v. First United Presby. Church, - , 238 N.E.2d 479 (Ind. Ct. App. 1968); Presbytery of Bismark v. Allen, 74
N.D. 400, 22 N.W.2d 625 (1946) ; Kelly v. McIntire, 123 N.J. Eq. 351, 197 A. 736
(1938). Cf. Protestant Ref. Church v. Tempelman, 249 Minn. 182, 192-93,
81 N.W.2d 839, 847-48 (1957).
"9224 Ga. at -, 159 S.E.2d at 625.
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common is the use of the word "trust." The cases involving hierarchial
polities still cling strongly to the Watson rule.4 °
The Supreme Court will soon review the Eastern Heights decision.41
It is timely, therefore, to examine the practical as well as the legal effect
of applying the "implied trust" doctrine to property disputes within a
hierarchical church.
First, the doctrine hinders the operation of the general church as it
seeks to adapt itself to the times. The general church makes statements
of doctrine and faith at the peril of being declared in error and losing
those churches whose congregations disagree. One or two such
instances would not appreciably affect the operation of the general
By making
church, but a series of differences could be catastrophic.'
innovations so costly, the courts actually impose the status quo upon
hierarchical religious bodies. 3
Second, as in Eastern Heights, any dissatisfied congregation could
claim a departure from the original tenets of faith by its church
hierarchy and by majority vote effectively operate contrary to the directives of the general church. The result is not unlike that system of government in congregational polities. It eliminates the binding nature of
the general church's decisions, a fundamental characteristic of hierarchical church bodies. The use of the "implied trust" doctrine, therefore,
imposes a different form of government upon the general church. Yet
this by no means classifies the church government as "congregational"
since the organization still operates under a representative system. Hierarchical polities are by court decree forced into a type of limbo, suspended
between the congregational form on the one hand, and the hierarchical
form on the other. The process disregards the system of government
agreed upon in the church's constitution.4 4
"' See, e.g., Saint John's Presby. v. Central Presby. Church, 102 So. 2d 714
(Fla. 1958); Knight v. Presbytery of Western New York, 26 App. Div. 2d 19,
270 N.Y.2d 218 (1966).
"'See note 5 supra.
"An unusual situation occurred in Scotland. In 1900, two major Presbyterian
denominations, the Free Church of Scotland and the United Presbyterian Church
of Scotland, merged to form the United Free Church of Scotland. A very small minority of the former Free Church, represented by 24 out of a total of approximately 1100 ministers, contended that the merger violated the basic tenets of faith. They
were awarded the entire property holdings of the former Free Church. General
Ass. of Free Church of Scotland v. Overtoun, [1904] A.C. 515 (Scot.). Parliament could not accept such a result and ordered the property divided equitably between the dissident faction and the United Free Church. Churches (Scot.) Act,
5 Edw. 7, c. 12 (1905).
"ISee Casad, The Establishment Clause and the Ecumenical Movement, 62
MicH. L. Rzv. 419, 452 (1964).
" See Goodson v. Northside Bible Church, 261 F. Supp. 99 (S.D. Ala. 1966),
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Finally, the courts, as arms of the state, are forced to intrude into
the religious affairs of the church. 45 The "implied trust" doctrine removes disputes over theological matters from ecclesiastical authorities
and forces them into secular courts. This result has questionable constitutional validity 46 and was one of the primary reasons for the doctrine's
rejection in Watson.47 The doctrine removes decisions on ecclesiastical
matters from the agencies 48 of the church that are most qualified to handle
such cases,49 thereby requiring judges and juries to delve into the "theological thicket." 50 The courts are not trained for such a function. It is
absurd that a jury of laymen be given the task of deciding whether the
highest constituted church court of a major religious denomination is in
error on matters of doctrine and faith."1
The inevitable conclusion is that the "implied trust" doctrine demands
a most undesirable result. But does the Watson rule present a suitable
solution to the problem? The answer lies in the determination of how
hierarchical church bodies actually hold property.
Most local churches are incorporated bodies and hold their property
through trustees. But holding formal title does not give the congregation
or the trustees absolute control. The Watson rule necessarily gives the
general church the power to define those persons belonging to its member
congregations. If certain members of the congregation deny the authority
of the general church, excluding this dissident faction from membership
in the congregation effectively eliminates the threat to the general church's
aff'd 387 F.2d 534 (5th Cir. 1967); Presbytery of Indianapolis v. First United
Presby. Church, - Ind.-, 238 N.E.2d 479 (Ind. Ct. App. 1968) ;BooK

OF CHURCH

§ 6-3. Cf. Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cath., 344 U.S. 94 (1952). For criticism
of such a result as a court imposed system of uniform land tenure on churches, see
Comment, Judicial Intervention in Church Property Disputes-Some Constiitutional Considerations,74 YALE L.J. 1113, 1132-33 (1965).
Northside Bible Church v. Goodson, 387 F.2d 534, 537 (5th Cir. 1967).
"Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cath., 344 U.S. 94 (1952). Cf. School District v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1
(1947). See also W. 0.DOUGLAS, THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE 138 (1948). For
a treatment of the complexities of the constitutional question, see ComORDER

ment, JTudicial Intervention in Church Property Disputes-Some Constitutional
Considerations,74 YALE L.J. 1113 (1965).
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 733-34.
8

" The constitution of the Presbyterian Church in the United States actually
refers to these bodies as courts. BooK OF CHURCH ORDER, §§ 13-1, 14-5.
""Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 725 (1871) ; Bouchelle v. Trustees
of the Presby. Congreg., 22 Del. Ch. 58, 64, 194 A. 100, 103 (1937); Sapp v. Cal-

laway, 208 Ga. 805, 811, 69 S.E.2d 734, 739 (1952).
" Maryland and Va. Eldership of the Churches of God v. Church of God,
Md.-, -, 241 A.2d 691, 697 (1968).
" See Bouchelle v.Trustees of the Presby. Congreg., 22 Del. Ch. 58, 194 A. 100
(1937).
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authority.
In Eastern Heights, the Savannah Presbytery attempted to
exercise this prerogative by declaring that those who had disaffiliated
from the church were no longer members, and that those who desired
to maintain their general church connection would be allowed to use the
53
church.
At first glance this would appear to give excessive power to the ecclesiastical tribunals, but it does not appear so in the light of the Watson rule. First, as has been mentioned, the application of the doctrine
demands fairness in procedure. 4 The court may inquire into the process
used and the legitimacy of the source. Second, in hierarchical polities
power is wielded by representative bodies whose authority comes from
the members of the general church as a whole."5 Finally, as Mr. Justice
Miller pointed out, those who join an ecclesiastical organization and derive the benefits of their affiliation must accept the decisions of the proper religious authorities. "[I]t would be a vain consent and would lead
to the total subversion of such religious bodies, if any one aggrieved by
one of their decisions could appeal to the secular courts and have them
reversed.""
If the local congregations of hierarchical church polities do not in fact
have ultimate control of their local property, who does? In the light of
Watson, the property must be said to be controlled by the membership
of the general church as a whole through the system of hierarchical church
courts. This result satisfies the general notions of the proper function of
representative government and is both practical and equitable5 7 Abiding
by the Watson precedent would, therefore, have the desirable effect of
maintaining the representative type of church government in this country,
while honoring the fundamental principles of the separation of church
2"All of which leads one to the ineluctable conclusion that these dissident
lambs at one time happy and contented in the Central Church voluntarily
bounded the theological fold in search of what they thought were greener
ecclesiastical pastures but missed the boat and are now like the children of
Israel grazing in the wilderness of dispair absent a church home which no
human agency except perhaps intercession can restore."
Saint John's Presby. v. Central Presby. Church, 102 So. 2d 714, 719 (Fla. 1958).
Cf. Trustees of Presby. v. Westminister Presby. Church, 222 N.Y. 305, 118 N.E.
800 (1918).
224 Ga. at -, 159 S.E.2d at 693.
g'Gonzalez v. Roman Cath. Arch., 280 U.S. 1, 16 (1929).
Protestant Ref. Church v. Tempelman, 249 Minn. 182, 191, 81 N.W.2d 839,
847 (1957). See, e.g., BooK oF CHURCH ORDER, § 1-4.
"'Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 729 (1871); accord, Barkley v.
Hayes, 208 F. 319, 323 (1913).
" See Presbytery of Bismark v. Allen, 74 N.D. 400, 413, 22 N.W.2d 625, 631
(1946). See generally Comment, Judicial Intervention in Church Property Disputes-Some ConstitutionalConsiderations,74 YALE L.J. 1113, 1134-35 (1965).
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state."8

and
To hold otherwise would effectively destroy the concept of
representative church government in the United States."9
THOMAS B. ANDERSON

Social Welfare-The "Man in the House" Returns to Stay
Under the type of state welfare regulation popularly known as the
"substitute father" rule, children otherwise eligible for benefits under the
Aid to Families with Dependent Children' program are denied assistance
if their natural parent maintains a continuing sexual relationship with
someone of the opposite sex. This person is deemed to be a non-absent
parent within the meaning of the Social Security Act, thus rendering
the family ineligible for AFDC payments. Whether this person is legally
obligated to support the children is irrelevant; whether he does in fact
contribute to their support is also irrelevant; eligibility under such a
rule is determined solely by the relationship between the parent (usually
the mother of the children) and the "substitute" (usually an unrelated
male).
In King v. Smith,2 the Supreme Court unanimously held Alabama's
"substitute father" rule invalid as inconsistent with Title IV of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 601-09 (1964). Declining to reach the
constitutional issue presented, the Court found the Alabama provision
to be violative of the "Flemming Ruling"' and held that it defined
"sCf. Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cath., 344 U.S. 94, 110 (1952); Goodson v.

Northside Bible Church, 261 F. Supp. 99, 103 (S.D. Ala. 1966).
" Barkley v. Hayes, 208 F. 319, 323 (W.D. Mo. 1913).
1

Aid to Families with Dependent Children [hereinafter cited as AFDC] is
one of the major components of the public assistance program established by the
Social Security Act of 1935, 42 U.S.C. § 601-09 (1964). The program grants
aid to dependent, needy children who have been "deprived of parental support
or care by reason of the death, continued absence from the home, or physical or
mental incapacity of a parent," and who live with any of certain enumerated relatives. 42 U.S.C. § 606(a) (1) (1964). For a thorough discussion of AFDC and its
predecessors, see W. BELL, AID TO DEPENDENT CHILDREN (1965).
88 S. Ct. 2128 (1968).
'42 U.S.C. § 604(b) (1964). The ruling, given statutory approval in 1961
in response to a directive issued by the then Secretary of the Department of
Health, Education & Welfare, Arthur Flemming, provides that
A State plan for aid to dependent children may not impose an eligibility
condition that would deny assistance with respect to a needy child on the
basis that the home conditions in which the child lives are unsuitable, while
the child continues to reside in the home. Assistance will therefore be
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"parent" in a broader sense than that intended by the Social Security
Act.4 Although aid can be granted under the Act only if a "parent" is
continually absent from the home, Congress intended the word "parent"
to designate one owing a duty of support to the child imposed by state
law. A state's definition of the word should therefore be no broader;
one who owed no state-imposed duty of support was not a "parent,"

his association with the mother was not parental presence, and it did
not justify severance of AFDC funds. An unrelated male adult in Alabama owed no such legal duty, and therefore the Court found the regulation invalid.
Some nineteen states5 and the District of Columbia have such regulations and have been directly affected by the ruling.0 This note will
attempt to deal with the probable impact of the court's holding upon
the welfare systems in these states and will consider, as an example,
North Carolina's experience with the substitute father rule and the effect
of the decision on this state.
There is a marked scarcity of case law on "man-in-the-house" rules,
as there is on welfare law in general.' Such regulations have generally
continued during the time efforts are being made either to improve the
home conditions or to make arrangements for the child elsewhere.
Bureau of Public Assistance, Social Security Administration, Dep't of Health,
Educ., and Welfare, State Letter No. 452 (Jan. 17, 1961).
'The Alabama regulation called for the termination of aid if the mother
cohabited with the "substitute father," either inside the home or elsewhere; the
mother then bore the burden of proving that the relationship had been discontinued before assistance could be resumed. The substitute's relationship with
the children themselves was immaterial. ALABAMIA STATE DEP'T OF PENSIONS AND
SECURITY, MANUAL FOR ADMIlNISTRATION

OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE, Part I, Ch.

II, § VI(V) (A) (1964). The plaintiff in King found her AFDC payments
terminated because of alleged-and undisputed-weekend visits by one Willie
Williams. Mr. Williams lived 15 miles away with his wife and eight of his
nine children; he was not the father of any of Mrs. Smith's children and was
both unwilling and unable to provide for their support, since he could hardly
support his own family. This determination by the local welfare board left Mrs.
Smith in the position of having to support her family on her cook's salary of 16
dollars a week. 88 S. Ct. at 2131.
'Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina,
Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia. 88 S. Ct. at 2143.
'The decision "beneficially affect[ed] more than 21,000 in Alabama and perhaps as many as 400,000 throughout the country ...

"

N.Y. Times, Aug. 25,

1968, § 6 (Magazine), at 28.
'This is understandable in that most potential plaintiffs have neither the
means of securing legal aid, nor knowledge of their rights, and are usually
placated with administrative review of their case-if even this right is exercised
by them. For example, appeals in one North Carolina County were estimated at no
more than two per month. Interview with Gerald Allen, University of North Carolina School of Social Work, in Chapel Hill, N.C., Sept. 6, 1968. The right to ad-
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withstood attack in the state courts in the few instances in which they
have been challenged.' Recently, however, at least one state has liberalized its rule by administrative review,' and other similar regulations are
being challenged in the federal courts.' 0 In other jurisdictions, recent
administrative decisions have reversed denials of AFDC benefits to children on the grounds that their mother was convicted of welfare fraud,"
and have required a high standard of proof as to the existence of a
"man-in-the-house" before curtailing AFDC payments.'" The decision
in King" marked the first time such a regulation has been challenged
successfully in the federal courts, and perhaps in any appellate court.
Essentially, the Supreme Court held that denial of AFDC payments
to otherwise eligible children must not leave a vacuum in the support
provided the child-there must be either a legally responsible adult as
defined under a state's own support laws, or "other adequate care and
assistance" as required by the statutory implementation of the Flemming
Ruling. 14 The effect of the opinion is to prohibit denial of the funds
solely on the basis of the mother's relationship with a man not legally
obligated to support her children. The significance of the decision is not
so sweeping as it might appear, however. The Court noted that actual
contributions from a "man-in-the-house" could be taken into consideraministrative appeals, however, is carefully pointed out in most generally distributed
welfare literature. See, e.g., N.C. DEPT. OF PUBLIC WELFARE, PUBLIC ASSISTANcE
FOR NEEDY PEOPLE IN NORTi CAROLINA, INFOR. BOOKLET No. 36 (1968).
'See, e.g., People v. Shirley, 55 Cal. 2d 521, 360 P.2d 33, 11 Cal. Rptr. 537
(1961); People v. Ford, 236 Cal. App. 2d 438, 46 Cal. Rptr. 144 (4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1965), appeal dismissed, 384 U.S. 100 (1966); People v. Rozell, 212 Cal.
App. 2d 875, 28 Cal. Rptr. 478 (3d Dist. Ct. App. 1963). All of these decisions
affirmed convictions of "grand theft" of welfare benefits by reason of nondisclosure of an alleged "man-in-the-house." See also County of Kern v. Coley, 229
Cal. App. 2d 172, 40 Cal. Rptr. 53 (5th Dist. Ct. App. 1964), affirming a judgment for the plaintiff county in a suit to recover alleged overpayments of ANC
(California's AFDC) funds because of the unreported income of an unrelated
male living in the house.
' Matter of D, Hearing before N.Y. State Dep't of Social Welfare (1966),
noted in 5 WELFARE L. BULL. 3 (1966).
10 McPherson v. Montgomery, Civ. No. 46759
(N.D. Cal., filed March 25,
1967), noted in 9 WELFARE L. BULL. 9 (1967); Robinson v. Board of Comm'rs.,
No. 3399-66 (D.D.C., filed Dec., 1966), noted in 7 WELFARE L. BULL. 3 (1967).
"Matter of J., Case No. U.C.-1858, N.J. Dep't of Inst. & Agencies (May 25,
1967); Matter of W., Case No. U.C.-808, N.J. Dep't of Inst. & Agencies (May
2, 1967); noted in 9 WELFARE L. BULL. 10 (1967).
1" Matter of C., Case No. C-29-208-0, D.C. Dep't of Public Welfare
(April
20, 1967) ("reasonable and substantial evidence"); Matter of D., Case No. VC1210, N.J. Dep't of Inst. & Agencies (April 20, 1967) ("beyond a reasonable
doubt"), noted in 9 WELFARE L. BULL. 9 (1967).
1 Smith v. King, 277 F. Supp. 31 (M.D. Ala. 1967).
1442 U.S.C. § 604(b) (1964).
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tion in computing need.' 5 Also, states apparently may still terminate
AFDC payments under such a rule, provided the man is one whom the
state has defined as owing a legal duty of support to the child. In
any case, in fact, where an alternative provision is made for the child's
support, King will have little effect. The "substitute father" rule is overturned only in those instances where AFDC funds are completely terminated and the children left without other adequate care.
It is possible that states may attempt to amend their laws to impose
duties of support on stepfathers and common-law husbands. If only
King were controlling, these devices might be successful in decreasing the
AFDC caseload. The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
(HEW), however, has responded to the Court's decision by amending
its regulations to provide that the determination of whether a child has
been deprived of parental support or care "will be made only in relation
to the child's natural or adoptive parent, or in relation to a child's stepparent who is ceremonially married to the child's natural or adoptive
parent and is legally obligated to support the child under state law."16
In another section, the directive specifically excludes reliance by a state
on a "substitute parent" or "man-in-the-house" as a basis for a finding
17
of ineligibility or for assuming availability of income.
Thus, HEW has apparently substituted its own authority for that
of the state in defining "parent," for the Court's decision alone probably
left states free under the Social Security Act to define "parent" as long
as their definition was limited to those owing a duty of support imposed
by state law. Now HEW has further limited the policy by eliminating,
for instance, common-law stepfathers, regardless of the state's support
laws. In addition, the new regulation prohibits a state from assuming
income from a non-parent to be available in the computation of the
family's resources. Rather, the state must assume the burden of proving
"actual contributions.""
" 88 S. Ct. at 2134. In addition, states are free, under the Social Security Act,
to set their own standards of need and the amount of support to be given,
and may take into consideration in determining need any resources a family
might have. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (7) (1964). Any contributions counted, however,
must be "actual" and on a regular basis. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDuC. AND WELFARE,
HANDBOOK

OF PUBLIC AssIsTANCE ADMINISTRATION,

IV,

§ 3131. In fact, states

have been asked since the ruling to encourage contributions from an unrelated
adult living in the home. Letter from Mary E. Switzer, Administrator, Social
and Rehabilitation Service, HEW, to State Administrators, August 8, 1968.
" 33 Fed. Reg. 11290 (1968).
7

2 Id.
"a Id,
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The principal difficulty with HEW's extension of the Ifing holding
is the absence of any real enforcement power, short of complete termination of federal matching funds-hardly a desirable alternative."0 To the
extent that the new regulation exceeds the Court's decision, a more useful
power of enforcement is advisable.20 In any case, there is little likelihood that dilatory or evasive measures will be undertaken by the states
for the time being,'I Congress recently enacted legislation, effective July
1, 1969, "freezing" the amount of federal matching funds that will be
available to the states for their AFDC programs, using as a base period
the first quarter of 1968.22 Ordinarily, then, the proportion of AFDC
children eligible for these grants would be set, and there would be no
incentive on the part of the states to absorb more children into their
caseloads, since the base period has passed. Congress, however, provided
an exception in the Act for children who began to receive aid after
March, 1968, as a result of the judicial decision invalidating a substitute
parent rule or residence test.23 Thus the children readmitted as a result
of King will be added to the total during the base period in order
to determine the proportion to be granted federal matching aid.
In light of the impending "freeze," there is every incentive for a state
to comply fully and immediately with the Court's decree, so as to make
eligible for federal matching grants the greatest possible number of children during the base period.4
1 Though it is not an
unprecedented one. Cf. Gardner v. Alabama, 385 F.2d
804 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 88 S. Ct. 773 (1968) (order terminating
federal
funds for noncompliance with the Civil Rights Act of 1964 upheld).
2
Federalizing the whole AFDC program has been suggested by one noted
author. BELL, snpra note 1, at 186. Bell points out that although the federal
taxpayer in 1960 paid 58.4 per cent of the cost of AFDC, in Southern states
the federal government paid such proportions of the cost as 79.8 per cent in
Alabama, 80.2 per cent in Arkansas, and 77.8 per cent in North Carolina. Id. at
219 n.36.
"Although North Carolina, subsequent to the lower court decision in King,
adopted a welfare regulation conditioning receipt of AFDC upon proof that
instruction in birth control methods had been received by the applicant (or that
she was sterile), the regulation has since been repealed, upon order from HEW.
Resolution of the State Board of Public Welfare of North Carolina, Sept. 25,
1968.2
" Tax Adjustment Act of 1968, H.R. 15414, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 114 CoN.
REc. H4685 (1968).
2
Id. North Carolina's birth-control restriction mentioned above did not come
within this categorical exception; there was, therefore, no incentive for the state
to refrain from applying it.
"4After July 1, 1969, however, restrictive measures by some states designed
to weed out certain classes of recipients from the welfare rolls may occur.
Administrative review of such measures will be needed to insure that the newlywon rights of AFDC mothers and children are not jeopardized by state-imposed
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North Carolina, for example, recently deleted its version of the "substitute father" rule25 in response to an advisory letter from HEW ;26 it
is reasonably safe to assume that the decision will have a similar effect
in other states with such rules. In order to understand the significance
of King in states other than Alabama, it is helpful to examine briefly
the North Carolina rule and its background. The original North Carolina rule was adopted in 1955 and underwent at least two revisions, the
latest of which (May 1, 1968) probably represented an attempt to accomodate the lower court decision in King and its anticipated affirmation
by the Supreme Court.
As revised in 1959, the rule provided simply that a county board of
public welfare could terminate aid to a woman with an illegitimate child
if it found that a "common law relationship" existed between the woman
and a man to whom she was not married. The manual then enumerated
2
several "factors" for determining the existence of such a relationship. "
This rule discriminated against illegitimate children (or children with
illegitimate siblings); in addition, it obviously came within the type of
rule proscribed by King and the HEW directive, in that the sole basis
for determining eligibility was the "common law" relationship between
the woman and her paramour, without regard to the support and needs
of the child.
In 1965, the State Board of Public Welfare received a new chairman,"° who personally revised the regulation, 0 effective May 1, 1968:
No child who is living with one of his or her parents, such parent
not being physically or -mentally incapacitated, shall be deemed derestrictions. It is perhaps regrettable that HEW does not have more power to
insure these rights by administrative sanctions than by recourse to piecemeal
litigation in the federal courts.
OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE, N.C. STATE BD. OF PUBLIC WELFARE,
§ 440 (1968) [hereinafter cited as PUBLIC AssisTANCE MANUAL].
"0Resolution of the State Board of Public Welfare of North Carolina, Sept. 25,
"DIVISION

PUBLIC ASSISTANCE MANUAL

1968.
' PUBLIC ASSISTANCE MANUAL § 440 (1959).
"These included frequent association with one another, "evidence of pregnancy, evidence that the man provides food or makes regular contributions toward
support of the mother and children, or that he shows an interest in the mother
and children that would be expected of a husband and father." Id.
" Governor Moore appointed Robert C. Howison, Jr., a Raleigh attorney, to
succeed Howard E. Manning as Chairman, effective April 1, 1965. N.C. STATE
BD. OF PUBLIC WELFARE, BIENNIAL REPORT, JULY 1, 1964-JUNE 30, 1966, 15

(1966).

" Interview with Robert H. Ward, Assistant Commissioner, N.C. Dep't of
Public Welfare, in Raleigh, N.C., Sept. 6, 1968.
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prived of parental support or care, for the purpose of determining
eligibility for aid to families with dependent children, if some person
of the opposite sex from such parent is acting in loco parentis to the
child. A person shall be deemed acting in loco parentis to the child
if such person acts as a parent to the child and treats the child as
31
his own.
Several significant changes are to be noted: the rule referred to "no
child," reflecting the intent of the Board not to restrict the rule to mothers
of illegitimates ;32 in addition, the language was made mandatory instead
of being in the discretion of the local welfare boards; finally, "in loco
parentis" terminology was substituted for the "common law" relationship previously required. Apparently this subtle modification was designed to circumvent semantically the effect of the lower court ruling in
King, that decision having censured restrictions on eligibility based on the
mother's relationship with a man, but having said nothing explicit about
the child's relationship with his "substitute parent." The distinction,
however, was insignificant; for, as stated later by the Supreme Court,
"the actual financial situation of the family [was] irrelevant in determining the existence of a substitute father."83 The criteria of King had
not been met: there was still no state-imposed duty of support, no "other
adequate care and assistance" provided for the child. The rule also fell
squarely within HEW's prohibition of eligibility conditions based on
persons other than "parents," as HEW defined the term. The regulation
could not survive.
The King decision is a salutary one, for "substitute parent"-type
rules have little to recommend them. A variety of persons familiar with
the problems of social welfare have attacked them;3 the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders has recommended their total abolition;35 and at least some state welfare administrators, trained in social
" PUBLIC AssIsTANcE MANUAL § 440 (1968).
"Interview with Clifton M. Craig, Commissioner, N.C. Dep't of Public Welfare, in Raleigh, N.C., Sept. 6, 1968. Bell notes a similar instance in Mississippi
where, after federal attorneys pointed out the discrimination of such a rule, it
was changed to exclude all children. BELL, supra note 1, at 98.
"88 S. Ct. at 2135.
See People v. Shirley, 55 Cal. 2d 521, 360 P.2d 33, 11 Cal. Rptr. 537 (1961)
(Peters, J., dissenting). See generally BELL, supra note 1; Reich, Individual
Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245 (1965);
tenBroek, The Impact of Welfare Law upon Family Law, 42 CALIF. L. REV.
458 (1954); Wickenden, Poverty, Civil Liberties, and Civil Rights: A Symposium, 41 N.Y.U.L. REv. 328, 333 (1966); Symposium, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 319
(1966).
"5REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY
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work, have reservations as to their merits.
Such restrictions permit discrimination by biased local officials; they
hold the AFDC mother to an uncommonly strict code of personal conduct ;37 they may be self-defeating in purpose-for if all but the most
casual contact with a man is suspect, how is an AFDC mother ever to
gain a husband? The "substitute parent" rule is arguably incorrect in its
basic assumptions-the presence of a "man-in-the-house," far from rendering a home "unsuitable," may be beneficial to the psychological growth
of the children ;'8 he may develop a relationship with them warmer than
that of many "natural" parents, particularly the type whose support is
sought to be enforced by abandonment proceedings. Further, the backbone of such laws-the "worthy poor" concept, which confined poor
relief to the "morally fit" indigent-is scarcely consistent with modem
notions of social welfare.39
King v. Smith very likely signifies a new role for the Supreme Court
in protecting the rights of welfare recipients, though it is of but small
significance compared with the work yet to be done. The entire, complex
system of social welfare needs to be reformed--"legalized"-by insuring
recipients of their basic rights in a modern welfare state40 and by guaranteeing them the procedural safeguards needed to assert those rights.
Ideally, the reform should come from within, by administrative decision
coupled with realistic welfare legislation and funding by Congress and
the states. It is more likely, however, that in the interim it will fall to
the courts to insure these rights-even though, as in King, their decisions may only implement already-existing administrative regulations.
" Interview with Clifton M. Craig, supra note 29; interview with Robert H.
Ward, supra note 27.
"'See BELL, supra note 1; Commissioner King, defendant in the King case,
has another view: "[T]he mother has a choice in this situation to give up her
pleasures or act like a woman ought to act and continue to receive aid. .. .
King v. Smith, 88 S. Ct. 2128, Append. Vol. I, 103 (1968).
" Brief for appellants at 32, King v. Smith, 88 S. Ct. 2128 (1968).
" For an extended discussion of the origins of poor relief and the evolution
of the "worthy poor" concept, see BELL, supra note 1. There is another reason,
perhaps more compelling to welfare administrators, for rejecting any "suitable
home" provision: a rule allowing very much local discretion may well run afoul
of the federal requirement that the state plan be uniformly administered by a
single state agency whose rules, regulations, and standards are mandatory on
local administrative authorities. See 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (1), (3) (1964).
"'While we would question any tendency to accept welfare dependency as
a permanent condition of any group, it is both humane and necessary for
the nation to take thought now for the 15 per cent of its citizens who
would be reached by welfare reform.
The Christian Science Monitor, Sept. 4, 1968, at 16, col. 1.
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Perhaps this reformation will come with an opinion as significant in
the area of poverty law as Brown v. Board of Education4 1 was in civil
rights. King v. Smith is far from being that case. What is called for is
something on the order of a decision insuring, as a right, a minimum
42
standard of material comfort.
C. FRANK GOLDSMITH, JR.

Torts-Recent Extensions in Builder-Vendor's Liability for Defects
For the buyer of a home who suffers injury or loss due to defective
construction,1 the traditional obstacle in a suit against the builder-vendor
has been the ancient rule of caveat emptor,2 that unless the vendee has
a claim of fraud or of breach of expressed warranty, he takes the risk
himself of quality and condition.2 Today that rule is subject to broad
and growing exceptions, 4 which threaten to replace it with implied warranty and a general duty of due care.
Some of these expanding areas are touched upon by a recent South
Carolina case. In Rogers v. Scyphers,5 'the wife of the vendee of a new
house sued the subdeveloper' for negligent construction and for negligent
"347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Or one implementing Professor Reich's "theory of entitlement" to welfare
benefits; Professor Reich would elevate the receipt of public assistance, long
regarded as a privilege, to the status of a legal right. Reich, supra note 34, at

1252.

' Construction is described as "defective" if it is faulty, or lacking something
essential to its completeness, or not reasonably safe for its anticipated use. Galloway v. City of Winchester, 299 Ky. 87, 92, 184 S.W.2d 890, 893 (1944) ; Schipper
v. Levitt & Sons, 44 NJ. 70, 92, 207 A.2d 314, 326 (1965) ; BLACK'S LAW DicTIONARY 506 (4th ed. 1951).

'See, e.g., Smith v. Tucker, 151 Tenn. 347, 270 S.W. 66 (1925), overruled
by Belote v. Memphis Dev. Co. 208 Tenn. 434, 346 S.W.2d 441 (1961). See
generally 55 Amf. JtnR. Vendor and Purchaser § 57 (1946); 7 S. WILLISTON, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW oF CONTRAcTS § 926A (3d ed. 1963).
'See, e.g., State ex. rel. Jones Store Co. v. Shain, 352 Mo. 630, 634, 179 S.W.2d
19, 20 (1944), overrded by Morrow v. Caloric Appl. Corp., 372 S.W.2d 41 (Mo.
1963). See Note, Right of Purchaser in Sale of Defective House, 4 WEST. REs.
L. REv. 357 (1953) for a survey of vendee's limitations fifteen years ago.
'See notes 8, 24, 25, 41 & 43 infra. See generally Bearman, Caveat Emptor in
Sales of Realty-Recent Assaults upon the Rule, 14 VAND. L. REv. 541 (1961)

[hereinafter cited as Bearman].
- S.C. -,

161 S.E.2d 81 (1968).

'Mrs. Rogers sued the Industrial Life Insurance Company, which actually
built the house, and Scyphers, who was president and principal stockholder in
the company and was supervisor of the construction. The company conveyed the
house to Scyphers, who sold it to Rogers. The court does not distinguish one
defendant from the other. Id.
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failure to disclose a latent danger. The complaint alleged that
attic stairway had been attached by merely hanging it in the
without any bolts or other secure fastenings. Mrs. Rogers used
way and was injured when it collapsed.
In affirming the sufficiency of the complaint, the Supreme
South Carolina held:

237
a fold-up
molding,
the stairCourt of

[T]here was a duty on the defendants as builders to use reasonable
care in the construction of the home to avoid unreasonable risk and
danger to those who would normally be expected to occupy it, and a
duty to disclose to the purchaser any dangerous condition of which
they knew or should have known, in the exercise of reasonable care.7
The leading authority for the decision is a growing body of negligence
law' reflected by 2 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 353 (1965), which
subjects to liability a vendor who fails to disclose an unreasonably risky
condition of which he knows or has reason to know.9
The most significant language of the court's opinion deals with the
degree of knowledge of the defect that the vendor must have before liability will attach. The present Restatement's phrase that vendor "know
or have reason to know" 1 of the defect is a distinct shift" from the first
S.C. at --, 161 S.E.2d at 84 (emphasis added).
'Bray v. Cross, 98 Ga. App. 612, 106 S.E.2d 315 (1958), criticized in Whiten
v. Orr Constr. Co., 109 Ga. App. 267, 136 S.E.2d 136 (1964); Derby v. Public
Serv. Co., 100 N.H. 53, 119 A.2d 335 (1955); McCabe v. Cohen, 268 App. Div.
1064, 52 N.Y.S.2d 903, aff'd per curiamn, 294 N.Y. 522, 63 N.E.2d 88 (1945);
7

Waggoner v. Midwestern Dev. Co., -

S.D. -, 154 N.W.2d 803 (1967); Fisher

v. Simon, 15 Wis. 2d 207, 112 N.W.2d 705 (1961); see note 11 infra. Cf. Farragher v. City of New York, 26 App. Div. 2d 494, 275 N.Y.S.2d 542 (1966); 2
[hereinafter cited as REOF TORTS § 353(2) (1965)
RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
STATEMENT 2D]. See generally Annot., 8 A.L.R.2d 218 (1949).
S.C.
'RESTATEMENT
2D §353(1), quoted in full in Rogers v. Scyphers, -,-,

161 S.E.2d 81, 83 (1968), states:

A vendor of land who conceals or fails to disclose to his vendee any
condition, whether natural or artificial, which involves unreasonable risk
to persons on the land, is subject to liability to the vendee and others upon
the land with the consent of the vendee or his subvendee for physical harm
caused by the condition after the vendee has taken possession, if
(a) the vendee does not know or have reason to know of the condition
or risk involved, and
(b) the vendor knows or has reason to know of the condition, and realizes or should realize the risk involved, and has reason to believe that
the vendee will not discover the condition or realize the risk.
" RESTATEMENT 2D § 353 (1) (b).
" See Caporaletti v. A-F Corp., 137 F. Supp. 14 (D.D.C. 1956), commented
on in Bearman at 568; Belote v. Memphis Dev. Co., 208 Tenn. 434, 346 S.W.2d
441 (1961), noted in Note, Liability of Vendor of Real Property, 29 TENN. L.
REV. 588 (1962). These cases, both of which cite 2 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS
§ 353(1) (1934), best demonstrate the change in judicial thinking that resulted
in the "know or have reason to know" standard.
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Restatement, which required actual knowledge. 2 Rogers took one further step and held that the vendor must disclose defects of which he
"knew or should have known." This is not a meaningless change in
words.'" Although it is not clear whether the court recognized the importance of the phrase, the court clearly adopted a broader standard of
negligence. "To have reason to know" means that the vendor possesses
certain information that would lead a reasonable man to infer that the
defect exists. That the vendor should disclose defects of which he knew
or "should have known" implies that he is under a legal duty to use ordinary care to warn of any defect that a reasonable man would have perceived.' 4 The threshold problem of vendor's knowledge is avoided, and
defendant builder-vendor's conduct will be judged entirely by the reasonable man standard.' In practical terms, if the plaintiff's attorney cannot
prove the defendant did have actual knowledge, he may rely on the jury's
decision whether a reasonable man would have known of (or taken steps
to discover) the defective condition.
This problem of the degree of knowledge vendor must have is analogous to the divergence of authority on the comparable point in the law
of landlord and tenant.'" Irrespective of any lease provisions about a duty
to repair, the landlord will be responsible for any injury due to a latent
122 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 353(1) (1934). The early basis for holding a
vendor liable for hidden defects was fraud. A vendor owed a duty to reveal facts
of which he knew or had notice. See, e.g., Herzog v. Capital Co., 27 Cal. 2d 349,
164 P.2d 8 (1945); Weikel v. Stearns, 142 Ky. 513, 134 S.W. 908 (1911);
Mincy v. Crisler, 132 Miss. 223, 96 So. 162 (1923); Brooks v. Ervin Constr. Co.,
253 N.C. 214, 116 S.E.2d 454 (1960).
The only authority for § 353 of the first RESTATEMENT was dicta in Kilmer
v. White, 254 N.Y. 64, 171 N.E. 908 (1930) and in Palmore v. Morris, Tasker
& Co., 182 Pa. 82, 90, 37 A. 995, 999 (1897), according to W. PROSSER & Y.
SMITH, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS

540 n.3 (4th ed. 1967); however, Kilmer

was itself based on the tentative draft of § 353, first RESTATEMENT.
1 Cf., e.g., State ex. rel. Bohen v. Feldstein, 207 Md. 20, 113 A.2d 100 (1955).
The court sustained with leave to amend a demurrer to a complaint that alleged
the lessor knew or should have known of the defect. The court said the complaint
must allege that he knew or should have had reason to know.
RESTATEMENT 2D § 12 & comment a. See also id. § 353, comment c.
1
It is not clear whether a vendor would be under a duty to inspect his premises.
A jury could decide that a reasonable man using ordinary care would not inspect
under the circumstances. In a similar field of law, a landowner is under a general
duty to use reasonable care to protect his invitees. Many courts have held that
this means he must inspect in order to discover dangerous conditions. See 2

F. HARPER

&

THE LAw OF

F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 27.12 at 1487 (1956) ; W.
TORTS § 61, at 402-05 (3d ed. 1964).

PRossa,

"oSome courts have criticized the analogy of the vendor's duty to the lessor's duty,
arguing that the lessor and lessee have a continuing relationship, but the relationship between the vendor and the vendee terminates upon completion of the sale.
See Samicandro v. Lake Dev., Inc., 55 N.J. Super. 475, 480, 151 A.2d 48, 51
(App. Div. 1959); Annot., 8 A.L.R.2d 218, 220 (1949).
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defect in the premises at the time of letting, if the landlord in fact knew
of the danger, and if the tenant did not..7 Many courts will go farther,

and impose liability if the landlord had some reason to believe or information to infer that the defect existed.18 To complete the disarray, other
jurisdictions, comparable to South Carolina in Rogers, ask only whether
the landlord should have known of the defect.' 9 Since this inconsistency
in the older field of landlord's liability has not yet been resolved, it may
persist in vendor-vendee law for some time.
The Rogers court did not extend its new standard to all of vendorvendee law. Although the court broadened the scope of liability,20 it
limited that liability to builder-vendors. Because the non-building vendor
is likely to be an ordinary citizen re-selling a used house, courts may be
reluctant to abandon the "reason to know" standard of the Restatement.
In subjecting the builder-vendor to a duty of due care, the South
Carolina court cited another group of cases that hold a building contractor responsible for his negligence. 2 ' MacPherson v. Buick Motor
Co.22 held that a chattel manufacturer may be liable to a third person for
injury caused by the negligent manufacture of his product. Subsequently, courts applied the same rule to a contractor, that is, that he would
be liable if his negligent work caused harm to a third person with whom
he was not in privity, even after the contractee had accepted the work
as satisfactory,2" or had purchased the structure from the contractor.2 "*Hendricks v. Socony Mobil Oil Co., 45 Ill. App. 2d 44, 195 N.E.2d 1 (1963) ;
Taylor v. Geroff, 347 Ill. App. 55, 106 N.E.2d 210 (1952); Janis v. Jost, 412
S.W.2d 498 (Mo. 1967); Earle v. Kuklo, 26 N.J. Super. 471, 98 A.2d 107 (App.
Div. 1953); Corcione v. Ruggieri, 87 R.I. 182, 139 A.2d 388 (1958). Cf. United
States v. Inmon, 205 F.2d 681 (5th Cir. 1953).
8 Brandt

v. Yeager, -

Del. -,

199 A.2d 768 (Super. Ct. 1964); State ex

rel. Bohen v. Feldstein, 207 Md. 20, 113 A.2d 100 (1955); Johnson v. O'Brien,
258 Minn. 502, 105 N.W.2d 244 (1960); Meade v. Montrose, 173 Mo. App. 722,
160 S.W. 11 (1913); RESTATEMENT 2D § 358.
"oDowns v. Powell, 215 Ga. 62, 108 S.E.2d 715 (1959); Harrill v. Sinclair
Ref. Co., 225 N.C. 421, 35 S.E.2d 240 (1945) (dictum).
"Cf. Waggoner v. Midwestern Dev. Co.,

-

S.D.

,

,

154 N.W.2d 803,

806 (1967) (dictum), which suggests that the standard be liability for defects of
which a reasonable man (builder-vendor) would have known.
__ S. C. at -, 161 S.E.2d at 83.
22217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916). See RESTATEMENT 2D § 395.
28
Hanna v. Fletcher, 231 F.2d 469 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 989

(1956); Dow v. Holly Mfg. Co., 49 Cal. 2d 720, 321 P.2d 736 (1958); Inman v.
Binghamton Housing Auth., 1 App. Div. 2d 559, 152 N.Y.S.2d 79 (1956), rev'd
on other grounds, 3 N.Y.2d 137, 143 N.E.2d 895, 164 N.Y.S.2d 699 (1957);
Strakos v. Gehring, 360 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. 1962); RESTATEMENT 2D § 385. Cf.
Stewart v. Cox, 55 Cal. 2d 857, 362 P.2d 345, 13 Cal. Rptr. 521 (1961). Contra,
Clyde v. Sumerel, 233 S.C. 228, 104 S.E.2d 392 (1958).
' Hale v. Depaoli, 33 Cal. 2d 228, 201 P.2d 1 (1948); Leigh v. Wadsworth,

361 P.2d 849 (Okla. 1961).
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If caveat emptor would be no defense in an action by an injured third
party against a builder-vendor, then neither should it be an obstacle to
the contractee-vendee. Like other cases before it,2" Rogers held that the
builder-vendor" owed the same duty to his vendee that he would owe
to a foreseeable third party. The court thus places liability upon the subdeveloper in his role both as a vendor and as a builder.
One serious limitation to recovery, which is reiterated in Rogers,2 7
is that liability will arise only for those defects that are latent or concealed. The rule that a producer is under no duty to safeguard against
an obvious danger is widely applied in the field of negligent manufacture
of chattel,2 and has been carried over into cases of lessor's2" or vendor's80
failure to disclose defects.
Problems appear with the latent defect rule when a court fails to distinguish between an obvious defective physical condition and the risks
inherent in that condition." The lack of a safety cab atop an earthmover
is certainly obvious, but how obvious is the risk that the uplifted shovel
will fall backwards and crush the operator?2 Trial courts limit the jury
2 Sabella v. Wisler, 59 Cal. 2d 21, 377 P.2d 889, 27 Cal. Rptr. 689 (1963);
Fisher v. Simon, 15 Wis. 2d 207, 112 N.W.2d 705 (1961). See also Brown,
Building Contractor'sLiability After Completion and Acceptance, 16 CLEV.-MAR.
L. REv. 193 (1967).
" Cf. Connor v. Conejo Valley Dev. Co., 253 Cal. App. 2d -, 61 Cal. Rptr.
333 (Dist. Ct. App. 1967), which held that the financier (a savings and loan association) of the subdeveloper owed a duty of due care to the ultimate home purchaser. He could be found to have breached that duty by negligently backing an
inexperienced subdeveloper.

" - S. C. at -, 161 S.E.2d at 85.
Messina v. Clark Equip. Co., 263 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1959) ; Standard Conveyor Co. v. Scott, 221 F.2d 460 (8th Cir. 1955); Dempsey v. Virginia Dare
Stores, 239 Mo. App. 355, 186 S.W.2d 217 (1945); Douglas v. W.C. Mallison &
Son, 265 N.C. 362, 144 S.E.2d 138 (1965); Tyson v. Long Mfg. Co., 249 N.C.
557, 107 S.E.2d 170 (1959); Campo v. Scofield, 301 N.Y. 468, 95 N.E.2d 802
(1950); Parker v. Heasler Plumb. & Heat. Co., 388 P.2d 516 (Wyo. 1964).
2 Kearns v. Smith, 55 Cal. App. 2d 535, 131 P.2d 36 (Dist. Ct. App. 1942);
2

Brandt v. Yeager,

-

Del. -, 199 A.2d 768, (Super. Ct. 1964); Downs v. Powell,

215 Ga. 62, 108 S.E.2d 715 (1959); Janis v. Jost, 412 S.W.2d 498 (Mo. 1967);
Harrill v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 225 N.C. 421, 35 S.E.2d 240 (1945). Cf. United
States v. Inmon, 205 F.2d 681 (5th Cir. 1953).
"oFisher v. Simon, 15 Wis. 2d 207, 213, 112 N.W.2d 705, 709 (1961) (dictum);
cf. Inman v. Binghamton Housing Auth., 3 N.Y.2d 137, 143 N.E.2d 895, 164
N.Y.S.2d
699 (1957) (building contractor).
1

" See, e.g., Meade v. Montrose, 173 Mo. App. 722, 160 S.W. 11 (1913) (roof

poles too weak to support the roof were an obvious defect); Harrill v. Sinclair
Ref. Co., 225 N.C. 421, 35 S.E.2d 240 (1945)(The difficulty in raising an overhead door was obvious, even if the faulty construction, which would cause the
door to fall, was not.).
"2Messina v. Clark Equip. Co., 263 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1959) (held an obvious
danger), criticized in Noel, Manufacturer's Negligence of Design or Directions
for Use of a Product, 71 YALE L.J. 816, 837-39 (1962).
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function by citing a lack of evidence of a latent defect33 and then dismissing the case on the ground that the defendant owed the plaintiff no duty.34
A new approach to the latent defect rule has been taken in the case of
Totten v. Gruzen,35 in which the minor son of a tenant sued the builder
of the apartment for negligently exposing a steam pipe. The infant became entangled with the pipe in his own bedroom and was severely
burned. The court refused to follow a strict latency rule, holding instead
that the obviousness of a defect is only one factor in the jury's determination of the defendant's negligence, and not an insurmountable barrier to recovery. The defendant's creation of a highly visible defect may
still create an unreasonable risk.3 This recent decision assuages the
harsher aspects of the latency requirement, and restores to the jury its
freedom to judge the defendant's conduct by a reasonable man standard.
Yet if Totten signals an abandonment of "latent defect," tort liability will not have advanced far. 7 A vendee injured by an obvious
danger will likely be faced with the defenses of contributory negligence
or assumption of the risk.' If a vendor warns his vendee of an otherwise
latent defect, but an unwarned third person is nonetheless injured, the
patency created by the warning may not permit the judge to dismiss because of the absence of a duty, but the warning will perhaps cause the
jury to find the vendor not to be negligent. 9
The law of negligence has not been the only field in which the buildervendor's liability has grown. Recent years have featured widespread
imposition of strict liability upon manufacturers for injuries to the ultimate consumer caused by defective products. The courts imply a war"See, e.g., Dempsey v. Virginia Dare Stores, 239 Mo. App. 355, 186 S.W.2d
217 (1945). In affirming a non-suit, the court held that any reasonable person
would have realized the unusually high risk of flammability of a "Fuzzy Wuzzy"
lounging robe.
" If the case should get to the jury, the defendant would of course have the
advantage of the defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of risk. It
is suggested that the hesitancy of juries to reach a defendant's verdict based on
one of these defenses is a strong influence in the retention of the latency rule.
Noel, Manufacturer's Negligence of Design or Directions for Use of a Product,
71 YALE L.J. 816, 837 (1962). Some courts compromise the problem by submitting
to the jury the issue of whether there was latent defect. See, e.g., Couch v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 80 Cal. App. 2d 857, 183 P.2d 91 (Dist. Ct. App. 1947).
52 N.J. 202, 245 A.2d 1 (1968).
This holding was suggested in Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, 44 N.J. 70, 87,
207 A.2d 314, 323 (1965).
",RESTATEMENT 2D does not speak in terms of latent defect, but still manages
adequately to define liability. See §§ 351-56, 358, 402A.
'8 See note 34 supra.
"See generally W. PROSSER, TiE LAW OF TORTS § 33, at 179-81 (3d ed. 1964).
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ranty that the product is safe for its intended use.40 Schipper v. Levitt
& Sons 41 moved the law into the home construction industry.42 It broke
through the traditional distinction between realty and chattel, and asserted that mass production of housing should be treated like mass production of personal products. The buyer of a home may rely on an implied
warranty that his house was built in a workmanlike manner and is suitable for habitation. 43 The South Carolina court in Rogers recognizes
that implied warranty is the modern trend and (as dictum) cites favorably the leading cases. 4
Implied warranty theory transcends problems of the vendor's knowledge of a defect. Liability is imposed without fault and without regard
to a judgment upon the defendant's conduct. It is, nevertheless, the contrast between the inexperience of the typical home buyer and the knowledge and training of the builder-vendor that allows the former to rely
on the latter by way of implied warranty. 45 Liability does not pivot on
whether the builder-vendor should have known of a defect, but rather
upon the vendee's reliance on the builder-vendor's skill to build a house
fit for habitation.
In order to recover on strict liability, the plaintiff must still prove a
defective condition. 46 The home buyer may feel that his new purchase
°Henningsen v. Bloomfield Mtrs., Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960);
cf. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 697 (1963); RESTATEMENT 2D §402A. See generally Prosser, The Fall of
the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINx. L. REv. 791 (1966).
' 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965), noted in Note, Implied Warranty in Real
Estate-PrivityRequirement, 44 N.C.L. REv. 236 (1965).

"'Implied warranty already had a foothold. Several courts had held there to
be an implied warranty of fitness when the purchaser bought his house while the
builder-vendor was in the process of erecting it, but not after the house was completed. Vanderschrier v. Aaron, 103 Ohio App. 340, 140 N.E.2d 819 (1957);
Jones v. Gatewood, 381 P.2d 158 (Okla. 1963); Hoye v. Century Bldrs., Inc., 52
Wash. 2d 830, 329 P.2d 474 (1958) ; Perry v. Sharon Dev. Co., [1937] 4 All E.R.
390 (C.A.). But see Carpenter v. Donohoe, 154 Colo. 78, 83, 388 P.2d 399, 402
(1964), which refutes this distinction as unreasonable.
"Accord, Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 415 P.2d 698 (1966) ; Waggoner
v. Midwestern Dev. Co.,

-

S.D. -, 154 N.W.2d 803 (1967); Humber v. Morton,

426 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1968).
"'-

S.C. at -,

161 S.E.2d at 83.

"'Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 62, 415 P.2d 698, 705 (1966); Schipper
v. Levitt & Sons, 44 N.J. 70, 91, 207 A.2d 314, 325 (1965); Waggoner v. Midwestern Dev. Co., - S.D. -, -, 154 N.W.2d 803, 807 (1967).

Cf. Bearman 574.

" Markwell v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 367 F.2d 748 (7th Cir. 1966);
Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr.
697 (1963); Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, 44 N.J. 70, 92, 207 A.2d 314, 326 (1965);
Levy v. C. Young Constr. Co., 26 N.J. 330, 139 A.2d 738 (1958); Annot., 13
A.L.R.3d 1057, 1078-79 (1967). But cf. Crane v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 218 Cal.
App. 2d 855, 858, 32 Cal. Rptr. 754, 757 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
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is generally unsatisfactory, 47 but he may only win damages for harm
caused by workmanship unfit for the anticipated use. The defendant will
be held to the standard of normal, safe construction, not to the standard
of perfection. 4 s
Strict liability based upon implied warranty has not yet been extended beyond the builder-vendor. The vendor who resells an old house
(and who may be liable under Restatement § 353) stands usually on the
same level as the vendee himself and cannot be analogized to the manufacturer. Courts may be hesitant also to impose strict liability upon the
ordinary building contractor, because he is selling his services but not
selling any goods.49
Although the law of builder-vendor's liability is now in a fluid state,
its broad direction is evident. Special protections for the defendant are
being replaced by obligations comparable to those of a supplier of chattel
or of a negligent building contractor. For the individual who is injured
by defective construction, the field of builder-vendor's liability offers new
potential for recovery.
RICHARD

F.

MITCHELL

Trade Regulations-Robinson-Patman Act Section 2(d)Promotional Allowances
The Robinson-Patman Act1 has been labeled a "masterpiece of obscurity," "prolix and perplexing," and a "hodgepodge of confusion and
inconsistency."'2 As predicted,3 the Federal Trade Commission and the
" One wag stated, "Today's buyers do not understand that when you buy a

house, you just can't expect gold doorknobs." Bearman 573 n.143.
$10,000
Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, 44 N.J. 70, 92, 207 A.2d 314, 326 (1965) ; Wag48

goner v. Midwestern Dev. Co., - S.D. -, -, 154 N.W.2d 803, 809 (1967).
" RESTATEMENT 2D § 402A & comment f; cf. Koenig v. Milwaukee Blood Center, 23 Wis. 2d 324, 127 N.W.2d 50 (1964). But see Totten v. Gruzen, 52 N.J.
202, -, 245 A.2d 1, 5 (1968), which refused to deny that strict liability would be
applied to building contractors.
115 U.S.C. §§ 13, 13a-c, 21a (1964).
1F. ROWE, PRICE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 19,
535 & n.4 (1962, Supp. 1964) [hereinafter cited as RowE]. "In the end, the
political process of pressure, counterpressure and compromise created a cryptic
and sloppy legislative enactment, whose ineptitudes and solecisms opened up more
legal questions than they closed." Id. at 535.
' Representative Celler, during debate of the proposed Act in the House of
Representatives, predicted: "[T]he courts will have the devil's own job to unravel
the tangle. .
CONG.

.

. You will have the herculean task to make it yield sense."

REc. 9419 (1936).
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courts have had a "herculean task" in attempting to make the Act yield
sense.4 In FTC v. Fred Meyer, Inc.' the Supreme Court clarified a key
provision of the Act by defining the scope of the term "customer" in
section 2(d).' It is the purpose of this note to examine the history of
the case, to point out the difficulties suppliers will face in complying
with the Court's decision, and to speculate as to the effect of the decision
on other sections of the Robinson-Patman Act.
Fred Meyer, Inc. is the operator of a chain of thirteen supermarkets
in the Portland, Oregon area. One of Meyer's principal sales promotional
activities has been an annual four-week promotional campaign based on
the distribution of coupon books in the Meyer stores. The coupon books
consists of approximately seventy-two pages or coupons with each page
featuring a product which, upon surrender of the appropriate couponpage, is sold at a reduced price by the Meyer store. The public can obtain
coupon books for ten cents each and can realize savings of up to one-third
on each featured item. In addition to the nominal sum paid by the public
to obtain the coupon books, Meyer finances the promotional campaign by
charging the suppliers (from whom Meyer buys directly) of each featured product at least 350 dollars per coupon-page of advertising. Moreover, some of the suppliers contribute further to the financing of the
campaign by replacing at no cost a percentage of the goods sold by
Meyer during the campaign or by redeeming coupons in cash at an
agreed rate.
The FTC found that Meyer's promotional campaign, as conducted
in the years 1956 through 1958, violated section 2(d) of the RobinsonPatman Act because the 350 dollars paid by four of the participating
suppliers for advertising in Meyer's coupon books represented promotional allowances which were not made available on proportionally equal
terms to competing customers of Meyer. 7 However, section 2(d) applies
'See, e.g., RowE at 20.
5390
U.S. 341 (1968).
615 U.S.C.

§ 13(d) (1964) provides:
That it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce to pay or
contract for the payment of anything of value to or for the benefit of a
customer of such person in the course of such commerce as compensation
or in consideration for any services or facilities furnished by or through
such customer in connection with the processing, handling, sale, or offering for sale of any products or commodities manufactured, sold, or offered
for sale by such person, unless such payment or consideration is available
on proportionally equal terms to all other customers competing in the distribution of such products or commodities.
'The FTC also found that section 2(a) of the Act was violated in that the
free replacement of goods and coupon redemptions by some of the participating
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only to sellers and in order to charge Meyer with a violation the Commission had to resort to section 5 (a)' of the Federal Trade Commission
Act, which makes unfair methods of competition in commerce illegal
and empowers the FTC to prevent the use of such unfair methods of
competition.' The Commission thus found that Meyer had violated section 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act by knowingly inducing
its suppliers to grant promotional allowances prohibited by section 2(d)
of the Robinson-Patman Act. 10
In finding a violation of section 2(d), the FTC held that the participating suppliers, having chosen to grant promotional allowances to Meyer
who bought from them directly, should have made promotional allowances available on proportionally equal terms to those wholesalers who
sell to retailers in competition with the Meyer stores." Meyer argued,
on the other hand, that wholesalers were not entitled to promotional
allowances on proportionally equal terms because they were not "competing" with the Meyer stores within the meaning of section 2(d).
Meyer argued further that retailers buying through wholesalers were
not entitled to promotional allowances on proportionally equal terms,
regardless of their competition with the Meyer stores, because they were
not "customers" of the suppliers within the meaning of section 2(d).
Following this line of reasoning, only those retailers who buy directly
from the suppliers and are also in competition with the Meyer stores
are entitled to promotional allowances on proportionally equal terms.
The Commission found this conclusion "startling" and in total conflict
with the objectives of the Robinson-Patman Act to protect independent
retailers from the "chains' " ability to exact discriminatory concessions
from suppliers.'
suppliers constituted price discrimination prohibited by that section. The Commission, therefore, found Meyer to be in violation of section 2(f) of the Act which
prohibits any person from knowingly inducing a price discrimination forbidden
by section 2(a). [1961-1963 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 16,368 at 21,206
(FTC 1963). It is beyond the scope of this note to examine the violation of
section 2(a) and thus the violation of section 2(f).
'15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1964).
0 See Grand Union Co. v. FTC, 300 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1962), where it was
first held that a buyer's participation in transactions prohibited by section 2(d)
of the Robinson-Patman Act is reachable under section 5 (a) of the Federal
Trade Commission Act.
"0[1961-1963 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 16,368 at 21,206 (FTC
1963).
Id.at 21,216-17.
12Id. at 21,214-16. The
Commission observed:
Thus, in a geographical market served by, say, two direct-buying "chains,"
and one wholesaler with 100 retailer-customers, a supplier who gave a
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The FTC was still confronted with the contention that those wholesalers who sold to Meyer's retail competitors were not in fact competing
with Meyer and thus not entitled to promotional allowances on proportionally equal terms. The Commission answered this contention by pointing to the language of the statute. "[T] he statute speaks of competition
in the 'distribution' of the products, not merely of competition in their
'resale.' These wholesalers, through their numerous retailer-customers,
are seeking exactly the same consumer dollars that respondents are
after."' 3 The Commission thus believed that the independent retailer
could best be protected by requiring suppliers to make promotional allowances available to wholesalers who would presumably pass them on to
4
their retailer customers or use them for the benefit of those customers.1
On appeal the court of appeals agreed with Meyer's interpretation
of "customers competing" in section 2(d) and reversed the Commission. " ;
The Supreme Court in granting the Commission's petition for
certiorari limited its review to the question "[w] hether a supplier's granting to a retailer who buys directly from it promotional allowances that
are not made available to a wholesaler who sells to retailers competing
with the direct buying retailer violates Section 2(d) of the RobinsonPatman Act."' 6 The court agreed with the Commission in holding that
the interpretation of "customers competing" in section 2(d) urged by
Meyer was wholly untenable,' 7 but it concluded that Meyer's retail
competitors, rather than the wholesalers who sell to the retailers,
were competing customers within the meaning of section 2(d) and thus
promotional allowance to Chain A would not be required by Section 2(d)
to give it to either the wholesaler or the 100 independent retailers who
buy from it, but would have to give it to Chain B. This would mean,
of course, that the protection of Section 2(d) is accorded to those who
presumably have the market power to take care of themselves (competing
"chains"), but denied to those who . . . need its protection very badly

indeed.
Id. 13
at 21,214.
Id. at 21,215.
"Id. Commissioner Elman, while agreeing that Meyer's promotional activities
constituted violations of the Robinson-Patman Act, disagreed with respect to
what made the practice illegal. He took the position that the suppliers should
have made promotional allowances available directly to Meyer's retail competitors.
Requiring the allowances to be made available to wholesalers whose customers
compete with Meyer, he reasoned, would in no way insure that Meyer's retail
competitors will receive the protection that the Act intended them to have. Id.
at 21,231-32.
15359 F.2d 351, 362-63 (9th Cir. 1966).
"386 U.S. 907 (1967).
17

390 U.S. at 349.
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entitled to promotional allowances on proportionally equal terms."8 Starting with the proposition that "the Robinson-Patman Act was enacted in
1936 to curb and prohibit all devices by which large buyers gained discriminatory preferences over smaller ones by virtue of their greater purchasing power,"' the Court undertook a review of the legislative history
surrounding the enactment of section 2(d). The Court concluded that
section 2(d) was aimed at a form of indirect price discrimination which
resulted from the "chains" being able to command large promotional
allowances from their suppliers while the small independent competitors
of these "chains" were in no position to command such allowances.
These allowances enabled the "chains" to shift part of their advertising
20
costs to their suppliers while the smaller competitors could not.
While recognizing that legislative history is inconclusive with respect
to the meaning of "customer" in section 2(d), the Court found that
its definition of customer "to include retailers who purchase through
wholesalers and compete with direct buyers" was necessary to prevent
anomalous results. "If we were to read 'customer' as excluding retailers who buy through wholesalers and compete with direct buyers, we
would frustrate the purpose of 2(d). We effectuate it by holding that
the section includes such competing retailers within the protected class."'2'
In rejecting the Commission's findings that wholesalers who sold
to retail competitors of Meyer are competing customers within the meaning of section 2(d), the Court held that the Commission's definition
of competition was too broad. Once again the Court found legislative
history to be inconclusive, but concluded that it does "strongly suggest
that the competition with which Congress was concerned in 2(d) was
that between buyers who competed in resales of the supplier's products." 22 Moreover, the Court pointed to section 2(a) of the Robinson18
Id.at 352.
"Id. at 349, quoting FTC v. Henry Broch & Co., 363 U.S. 166, 168 (1960).
"0390 U.S. at 350-51.
,"lId. at 352.
On the one hand, direct-buying retailers like Meyer, who resell large quantities of their suppliers' products and therefore find it feasible to undertake
the traditional wholesaling functions for themselves, would be protected....
On the other hand, smaller retailers whose only access to suppliers is
through independent wholesalers would not be entitled to this protection.
Such a result would be diametrically opposed to Congress' clearly stated
intent...
Id.
2 Id. at 355-56. "While it cannot be doubted that Congress reasonably could
have employed such a broad concept of competition in § 2(d), we do not believe
that the use of the word 'distribution' rather than 'resake' isa clear jndivatiori
that it did, , , ." Id, at 356,
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Patman Act and its broad definition of competition 23 as evidence that
Congress did not intend competition in section 2(d) to have such a
broad scope. "When Congress wished to expand the meaning of competition to include more than resellers operating on the same functional
level, it knew how to do so in unmistakable terms. 2 4
As indicated above the Fred Meyer decision answers important questions concerning section 2(d) of the Robinson-Patman Act. It is well
known that the Robinson-Patman Act grew out of a fear, widespread
during the 1930's, that the independent retailer was about to be swallowed
up by the large "chain" stores.25 An investigation ordered by Congress
revealed that the "chains" by virtue of their greater purchasing power
could exact concessions from their suppliers which the independent retailers could not obtain. 6 Among these concessions were large allowances for advertising and other sales promotional activities. 27 The
investigation also revealed that these concessions were wholly beyond
the reach of existing antitrust laws.28 Congress attacked this type of
discrimination by providing in sections 2(d) and 2(e)2 9 of the Robin-

son-Patman Act that any services or facilities3 ° or payment in considerSection 2(a) prohibits price discrimination that may "injure, destroy, or
prevent competition with any person who either grants or knowingly receives
the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of them."
2'390 U.S. at 356-57.
"See, e.g., ROwE at 3-14. Appearing before the House Judiciary Committee,
Representative Patman stated:
I believe it is the opinion of everyone who has studied this subject, that
the day of the independent merchant is gone unless something is done and
done quickly. He cannot possibly survive. . . . So we have reached the
crossroads; we must either turn the food and grocery business of this
country . . . over to a few corporate chains, or we have got to pass
laws that will give the people, who built this country in time of peace and
saved it in time of war, an opportunity to exist....
Hearings on H.R. 8442, 4495, 5062 Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
74th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6 (1935).
"FTC, FINAL REPORT ON THE CHAIN STORE INVESTIGATION, S. Doc. No. 4,
74th Cong., Ist Sess. 57-65 (1935).
2
Id.at 44-46, 61.
'8 Id.at 63-65.
2915 U.S.C. § 13(e) (1964) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person to discriminate in favor of one purchaser against another purchaser or purchasers of a commodity bought
for resale, with or without processing, by contracting to furnish or furnishing, or by contributing to the furnishing of, any services or facilities
connected with the processing, handling, sale, or offering for sale of such
commodity so purchased upon terms not accorded to all purchasers on
proportionally equal terms.
,oSee FTC Guides for Advertising Allowances and Other Merchandising Payments and Services, 16 C.F.R. § 240.5 (1968), for examples of services and
facilities covered by sections 2(d) and 2(e).
2
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ation of such services or facilities cannot be granted to one customer or
purchaser unless made available to all competing customers or purchasers
on proportionally equal terms. 31
Section 2(d) applies to the situation where payments are made to a
customer and the customer himself furnishes the services or facilities in
connection with the distribution of the supplier's products. Section 2 (e)
applies to the situation where services or facilities are furnished directly
to the customer. 2 The application of these two sections is relatively
simple when a supplier is dealing with customers on the same functional
level. However, complex problems arise when a supplier deals with customers on different functional levels, such as direct-buying retailers and
wholesalers. As the Supreme Court pointed out in Meyer, the RobinsonPatman Act was intended to prevent a supplier from granting discriminatory promotional allowances such as those granted to Meyer. 33 However, prior to the Meyer decision the language of section 2(d),
specifically the phrase "customers competing," presented an obstacle to
the FTC and to the courts in barring such allowances when the supplier was dealing with customers on different functional levels.
One device that might have been used to combat the discriminatory
granting of promotional allowances to direct-buying retailers by suppliers
dealing on different functional levels was the "indirect purchaser doctrine," whereby a retailer buying the supplier's product through a
wholesaler is nevertheless treated as the supplier's customer.3 4 In
"Although there are several semantic disparities in sections 2(d) and 2(e),

the courts have generally interpreted the two sections as being two sides of the
same coin. See, e.g., Exquisite Form Bra., Inc. v. FTC, 301 F.2d 499, 502
(D.C. Cir. 1961).
" See ROWE at 373-76 for examples of typical arrangements subject to sections
2(d) and 2(e).
390 U.S. at 352.
" For a discussion of the doctrine see RowE at 57-59, 398-99.
Formulated by
the FTC, the indirect purchaser doctrine "treats as the supplier's own customers,
in contemplation of the law, the accounts of his [the supplier's] distributors
whose autonomy he has supplanted by his own activities." Id. at 57. But see Klein
v. Lionel Corp., 237 F.2d 13, 15 (3d Cir. 1956), where the validity of the
doctrine has been questioned, at least with respect to treble-damage actions. The
doctrine has evidently not been used in the situation where a supplier, dealing
on different functional levels, grants discriminatory promotional allowances to
a direct-buying retailer. However, its applicability in such a situation was recognized in Tri-Valley Packing Ass'n v. FTC, 329 F.2d 694, 709-10 (9th Cir. 1964).
The indirect purchaser doctrine has normally been used in connection with section
2(d) when a supplier, whose products are distributed exclusively by wholesalers,
grants promotional allowances to certain of its indirect-buying retailers while
not making such allowances available to the indirect-buying competitors of the
favored retailers. If the doctrine is applicable, then all indirect-buying retailers
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order for this doctrine to be applicable there must be some kind of
direct-dealing between the supplier and the indirect purchaser. 8 In the
Meyer case, for example, the court of appeals found no evidence of
direct-dealing between the suppliers participating in Meyer's promotional
scheme and those of Meyer's competitors who bought the suppliers'
products through wholesalers. Finding the "indirect purchaser doctrine"
inapplicable, the court held there was no violation of section 2(d)."°
Another device available to the Commission was to include in appropriate
cease and desist orders a ban on the granting of discriminatory promotional allowances to direct-buying retailers by suppliers dealing on
different functional levels.37 When confronted with a case in which discriminatory promotional allowances were granted to a direct-buying retailer, the FTC wavered as to the proper application of section 2(d). In the
Atalanta Trading Corp. case,.8 the Commission held that promotional
payments to a direct-buying retail "chain" did not require that similar payments be made available to wholesalers whose retail customers competed
with the "chain." In the later Liggett & Myers decision, 9 the FTC was
divided on the question. Although a majority of the Commission refused to decide the issue because they felt there was insufficient evidence
to raise it,4" the dissenting opinion, following the reasoning of a district
are "customers" within the meaning of section 2(d) and thus entitled to the
protection of that section. See American News Co. v. FTC, 300 F.2d 104, 109
(2d Cir. 1962). The Fred Meyer decision would seem to obviate the need to
resort to the doctrine in this situaion.
" E.g., American News Co. v. FTC, 300 F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 1962). The
doctrine was invoked where the supplier controlled retail prices and negotiated
directly with the indirect-buying retailers.
359 F.2d at 362-63.
'*See
FTC v. Elizabeth Arden, 39 F.T.C. 288 (1944), aff'd, 156 F.2d 132
(2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 806 (1947), a case involving section 2(e),
where the FTC issued a cease and desist order directing Arden to restrain from
discriminating among competing purchasers of its product by furnishing cosmetic
demonstrators "to any retailer purchasing their products when such services are
not accorded on proportionally equal terms to . . . other retail purchasers who
in fact resell such products in competition with retailers who receive such services." 39 F.T.C. at 305. Some commentators interpreted the Elizabeth Ardcs
decision as meaning that "purchaser" in section 2(e) includes not only those
purchasers buying directly from the supplier but also those purchasers who buy
the supplier's products through independent wholesalers. This view was adopted
by Commissioner Elman in his Fred Meyer dissenting opinion. [1961-1963 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.
16,368 at 21,231 (FTC 1963). Other commentators and courts interpreted the decision as merely a recognition by the
court of the "indirect purchaser doctrine" since Arden was dealing directly with
the retailers involved.
- 53 F.T.C. 565, 566, 573 (1956) (by implication).
- 56 F.T.C. 215 (1959).
,0 Id. at 250-52.
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4

court decision, stated that where promotional payments are made to a
direct-buying retail "chain," comparable payments must be made available
42
to wholesalers whose customers compete with the direct-buying "chain.Y
The Liggett & Myers dissenting opinion became the view of the Commission in Fred Meyer.
Numerous difficulties confront the supplier in complying with the
dictates of the Meyer decision. If a supplier desires to undertake the
financing of a retailer-oriented promotional plan, he has the responsibility of making the plan available to all competing customers, both
direct-buying and indirect-buying (buying through wholesalers) customers, on proportionally equal terms. This responsibility involves a
duty to inform all competing customers of the existence of the plan,
its terms, and the availability of any alternative plans.13 Informing
those retailers to whom he sells directly presents no problem to the
supplier. However, informing those retailers who buy through wholesalers presents a formidable problem. The supplier may be able to utilize
his wholesalers to inform the indirect-buying retailers. However, the
Court in Fred Meyer made it clear that the responsibility remains on the
supplier to see that all competing customers are informed of the availability of the plan. 4 Thus the supplier may be unable to utilize his
wholesalers to discharge his duty to inform because he knows them to be
unreliable. The supplier himself might undertake to inform the indirectbuying retailers of the availability of the plan, but such an undertaking
would also require reliable, cooperative wholesalers to identify those
retailers who buy the supplier's products. If the supplier is unable to
obtain the co-operation of his wholesalers, then he must inform the indirect-buying retailers by some other means. The FTC's Proposed
Guides suggest that the supplier might publicize his promotional plan in
trade publications or in advertising brochures. 45 However, the supplier
cannot be certain that all retailers entitled to be informed of the plan
will have access to such publications and brochures. Another suggested
"Krug v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 142 F. Supp. 230, 236 (D.N.J.
1956).
,2 56 F.T.C. at 253-57.
" See Vanity Fair Paper Mills, Inc. v. FTC, 311 F.2d 480, 485 (2d Cir. 1962);
FTC Guides for Advertising Allowances and Other Merchandising Payments
and Services, 16 C.F.R. 240.8 (1968); proposed amendments to FTC Guides for
Advertising Allowances and Other Merchandising Payments and Services, 33
Fed. Reg. 10615, 10617-18 (1968).
"390 U.S. at 358.
See proposed amendments to FTC Guides for Advertising Allowances and
Other Merchandising Payments and Services, 33 Fed. Reg. 10615, 10618 (1968).
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means of informing indirect-buying retailers of the availability of a
promotional plan is to print the offer on shipping containers or to pack
"fliers" describing the plan in the containers, 4 and this appears to be
the best means for the supplier to be assured that its duty to inform
has been discharged.

47

Another problem confronting the supplier is the task of formulating
a flexible promotional plan so that all competing customers can participate. A plan designed to suit the needs and capabilities of certain retailers may be unsuitable to the needs and capabilities of others. Providing a flexible plan in which all competing customers can participate has
always been a requirement of section 2(d) 4 s but the task now involves
a greater burden since the competing customers entitled to participate
under Fred Meyer are likely to be more multifarious than before-from
the nation-wide "chain" store to the neighborhood grocery store, from
the large discount department store to the small town novelty store.
The Meyer decision also complicates the supplier's obligation under
section 2(d) to make promotional payments in consideration for services
or facilities available on proportionally equal terms. This requirement
that payments be made on proportionally equal terms is often satisfied
by proportioning payments according to the number of units of supplier's products purchased by each customer over a certain period of time
or according to the dollar volume representing each customer's purchases.
Therefore, in order to use the number of units sold or dollar volume
as a basis for proportioning payments among indirect-buying retailers, the supplier must have access to his wholesalers' records. Thus,
once again the supplier is placed at the mercy of his wholesalers. 40
In light of these difficult problems, the supplier may desire to turn
over a large portion of the administration of his retail-oriented promotional plans to his wholesalers and compensate them to administer
the plan with respect to the indirect-buying retailers entitled to participate.5" Once again, the supplier remains ultimately responsible for
8

1d.
I

However, many suppliers believe that informing indirect-buying retailers of
the availability of promotional plans by these means is impractical. Most promotional plans are short term, and since the supplier has no way of controlling
the distribution of the cases containing information of the plan, retailers will
be receiving the cases long before the promotion and long after the promotion.
4 See FTC Guides for Advertising Allowances and
Other Merchandising
Payments and Services, 16 C.F.R. § 240.9 (1968).
9
' See BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REPORT No. 357 at B-3 (May 14, 1968).
The Court specifically stated in Fred Meyer that a supplier may utilize its
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seeing that the plan is properly administered and "[s]ome manufacturers consider their independent wholesalers much too apathetic about
retailer-advertising assistance to be counted on for a vital role in administration of a cooperative-advertising program."" With so many problems confronting him in complying with the Fred Meyer decision, the
supplier may choose to discontinue entirely retailer-oriented promotional
activities and to concentrate, instead, on conducting such activities exclusively on a regional or nation-wide basis.
While the Supreme Court's Fred Meyer decision deals only with section 2(d) of the Robinson-Patman Act, the repercussions of the decision
may very well affect other sections of the Act. The decision's most
direct effect will be on section 2(e) where the term "purchaser" will
almost certainly be interpreted coextensively with the Court's interpretation of "customer" in section 2(d) .52
Another more far-reaching consequence of the Meyer decision may
its
effect on section 2(a) 53 of the Robinson-Patman Act. In cases
be
involving the Act there is a great deal of language indicating that the
terms "customer" and "purchaser" in sections 2(a), (d), and (e) should
be interpreted to have the same meaning.54 Thus, it is arguable that
"purchaser" in section 2(a) should now be interpreted to include not
only those purchasers who buy directly from the supplier but also those
purchasers who obtain the supplier's products from a direct-buying purchaser. If this interpretation is accepted, then the scope of section 2(a)
wholesalers "to distribute payments or administer a promotional program." 390
U.S. at 358.
" BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REPORT No. 357 at B-3 (May 14, 1968).
Furthermore, Mr. Justice Harlan, dissenting in Fred Meyer, states that "the
supplier could deal through his wholesalers, imposing restrictions on them to
guarantee that an 'allowance' is actually passed through to retailers, only by
running afoul of the Sherman Act." 390 U.S. at 361.
"2 See proposed amendments to FTC Guides for Advertising and Other Merchandising Payments and Services, 33 Fed. Reg. 10615, 10616 (1968); note 31

supra.

" 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1964) provides in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of
such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price be-

tween different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality . ..
where the effect of such discrimination may be . . . to injure, destroy,
or prevent competition with any person who either grants or knowingly
receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either
of them....
"E.g., "The term 'customer' in § 2(d) should be given the same meaning as
'purchaser' in § 2(a) and (e) in order to harmonize parallel sections of a
statute aimed at a common purpose." American News Co. v. FTC, 300 F.2d 104,
109 (2d Cir. 1962).
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is greatly expanded. For example, in one typical situation the supplier
sells both to wholesalers who in turn sell to retailers and to direct-buying
retailers. Employing a functional discount schedule, the supplier charges
the same price to both his wholesalers and his direct-buying retailer
customers. The result of this distribution system is that the direct-buying
retailer is able to sell the supplier's products at lower prices than his
retail competitor who buys the supplier's products through wholesalers,
resulting in competitive injury within the meaning of section 2(a).
However, it has been held that there is no violation of section 2(a)
because there is but one price and that price is paid by all purchasers.
Thus, there is no discrimination in price between different purchasers-

those purchasers being the wholesaler and the direct-buying retailer.'
But if retailers buying through wholesalers are "customers" for the
purpose of section 2(d), it can be argued that they are "purchasers"
for the purposes of section 2(a). Therefore, in addition to competitive
injury within the meaning of section 2(a), there are two prices, the
price paid by the direct-buying retailer to the supplier and the inevitably
higher price paid by the indirect-buying retailer to the wholesaler, resulting in discrimination between different purchasers-those purchasers being the direct-buying retailer and the indirect-buying retailer. If such an
application of section 2(a) is correct, it seems likely that suppliers will
discontinue their use of functional discounts and will begin to employ
quantity discounts exclusively, effectuating this policy by refusing to sell
in small lots. Under this type of discount schedule it would be possible
for retailers buying through wholesalers to obtain a supplier's products
at lower prices than their retailer competitors who buy directly from the
supplier.
Because it would so greatly expand the scope of section 2(a), the

above application of the Fred Meyer decision may not be accepted. However, the decision has another potential effect on section 2(a). It is
possible that in complying with the Meyer decision a supplier's collaboration with his wholesalers or indirect-buying retailers to insure that promotional allowances are made available to all competing customers on
proportionally equal terms might reach such a point that under the "indirect purchaser doctrine" the indirect-buying retailers would be con" Sano Petroleum Corp. v. American Oil Co., 187 F. Supp. 345, 353-54
(E.D.N.Y. 1960); Klein v. Lionel Corp., 138 F. Supp. 560, 565-66 (D. Del.
1956); Bird & Son, 25 F.T.C. 548, 553 (1937). Cf. FTC. v. Morton Salt Co.,
334 U.S. 37, 55 (1948); Guyott Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 261 F. Supp. 942, 950-51
(D. Conn. 1966).
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sidered the supplier's own customers. In that case the indirect-buying
retailers would be entitled, under section 2 (a), to purchase the supplier's
products at the same price as their direct-buying retail competitors.
The Fred Meyer result is sound in light of the legislative history of
the Robinson-Patman Act. It is at least arguable however that the
benefit that will be realized by the small retailer buying suppliers' products
through wholesalers is at most minimal and does not justify the predicament in which suppliers now find themselves. If suppliers decide to continue retail-oriented promotional plans, the cost of administering such
plans is likely to be substantially increased because of the new requirements imposed by the Meyer decision. Furthermore, the suppliers' higher
cost will then be passed on in the form of higher product prices which
will ultimately be borne by the consumer. In addition, a number of
suppliers believe that many small indirect-buying retailers who buy in
one or two case lots will not take advantage of the promotional allowances made available to them, because of the red tape they will encounter
in collecting the small payments to which they are entitled. However,
if small indirect-buying retailers band together and act jointly to collect
the payments to which they are entitled, then the potential benefit to
these retailers may be substantial.
To be extricated from the precarious position in which they now find
themselves, suppliers will have to turn to Congress for relief in the form
of amendments to the Robinson-Patman Act. Realistically, however, it
is doubtful that the Meyer decision will precipitate congressional action.
Therefore, suppliers can only hope that the FTC will issue a definitive
set of guidelines to aid them in complying with the Meyer decision.
No set of guidelines can possibly be expected to cover every situation and, consequently, an increased reliance on FTC advisory opinions is likely. Further complicating the suppliers' dilemma is the FTC's
relative inactivity recently in the Robinson-Patman area.5 7 "Therefore,
it may be that the most substantial immediate hazard for suppliers who
stray from the narrow path of proportional equality is treble-damage
'58
liability in private civil actions."

MICHAEL R. ABEL

See note 34 supra.
"'During the period from May 1967 to May 1968 the FTC filed only three
complaints under the Robinson-Patman Act. BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE REG.
REPORT No. 357 at B-4 (May 14, 1968).
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Uniform Commercial Code-Estoppel-Forged Indorsements
1
In a recent New Jersey decision, Gast v. American Casualty Co.,
the court had to decide the extent to which the estoppel provisions of
the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE' precluded recovery of a check paid
over a forged indorsement. Under a standard clause in a real estate contract, the buyer, Hanna, was required to carry fire insurance. Upon
loss, the moneys jointly receivable by seller and buyer were to be put
in escrow by the seller's attorney; the buyer was to order the necessary
repairs; and the seller's attorney was to pay for them out of the escrow
funds.' In settlement of a fire claim, the insurance company drew a draft
upon itself,4 jointly payable to the seller, Gast, the buyer, Hanna, and
the public adjuster involved.5 Having obtained the adjuster's indorsement, the seller's attorney mailed the draft to the buyer's attorney with
instructions to obtain the buyer's indorsement, then return it for deposit
in the escrow account." Apparently the buyers, upon gaining possession
of the draft, forged the indorsement of the sellers, cashed the check,
and absconded. Shortly thereafter the sellers were advised by the buyer's
attorney that he had not heard from his clients and no longer considered
himself representing them. 7 The sellers, however, waited for more than
a month" to notify the insurance company of this irregularity and to
199 N.J. Super. 538, 240 A.2d 682 (Super. Ct. 1968).
2
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-406 [hereinafter cited as U.C.C.].

'Exhibit DA-8, Brief for Respondent at 12a, Gast v. American Cas. Co., 99
N.J. Super. 538, 240 A.2d 682 (Super Ct. 1968).
'The draft stated that it was "payable through the Berks County Trust Co.,
Reading Pa., upon acceptance by American Casualty Company," making the
insurance company both drawer and drawee. The bank involved was merely a
collecting bank. That the bank was not a drawee is made clear by U.C.C.
§ 3-120, which provides:
An instrument which states that it is "payable through" a bank or the
like designates that bank as a collecting bank to make presentment but
does not of itself authorize the bank to pay the instrument.
The draft was made payable to three persons, thus requiring multiple indorsement, to insure discharge of multiple claims. It is somewhat inconsistent, therefore, for the insurance company to later assert payment of plaintiff's claim by
reason of draft made out to multiple payees, for had the draft been made out
only to the Gasts, the forgery would probably never have occurred.
'Brief for Respondent, note 3 supra, at Exhibit DA-8.
' Brief for Respondent, note 3 supra, Exhibit DA-7 at 12.
' Had plaintiff been a merchant fully cognizant of the provisions of the T.C.C.,
his delay in notification of the insurance company would have had more serious
consequences than were levied by the court. See U.C.C. §§ 2-602(1), 1-204(2),

(3).
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request cancellation of the draft.' The notice was too late, for the insurance company had already accepted the draft and paid it. In a
contract action by the sellers on the fire insurance policy,'" the court
held the insurance company liable for conversion of the draft," and the
sellers free from any negligence within the meaning of the New Jersey
-2
Statute.
Negligence is usually not a defense to a contract action; one either
performs a contract or not, and the method itself makes no difference
The defense has been allowed, however,
to the fact of performance.'
when the negligence is offensive to a rational sense of justice and fair
play. The U.C.C. seems to adopt this position, providing:
Any person who by his negligence substantially contributes to a material alteration of the instrument or to the making of an unauthorized
signature is precluded from asserting the alteration or lack of authority
against a holder in due course or against a drawee or other payor
who pays the instrument in good faith and in accordance with the
14
reasonable commercial standards of the drawee's or payor's business.
Yet neither the U.C.C. nor most of the courts that have considered
this problem'" provide a clear definition of the phrase "substantially contributes." 6 The court in Gast attempted to resolve the problem by adopting a definition offered by the Oregon court in Gresham State Bank v.
0 & K Construction Co. :17
' Brief for Respondent, note 3 supra, Exhibit DA-5 at 8a. This delay from
May 10 to June 21 is the basis of defendant's charge of negligence.
10 The contract action was against the insurance company on the policy rather
than one against the bank because:
(a) If action is brought first against the bank, plaintiff will probably lose his
rights against the insurance company.
(b) Bringing action against the bank would increase discovery problems.
(c) If action is brought first against the bank, the bank might lose some of
its defenses, which it could have asserted against the insurance company. For a
discussion of this problem, see Stone & Webster Eng'r Corp. v. First Nat'l
Bank
1 & Trust, 345 Mass. 1, 184 N.E.2d 358 (1962).
N.J. REv. STAT. § 12A: 3-419 (1962). In effect this section imposes absolute
liability for conversion, subject only to certain U.C.C. defenses.
22 N.J. REv. STAT. § 12A: 3-406 (1962).
1
1A possible exception is the contract doctrine of substantial performance,
where the method of performance may bear upon the decision.
"IU.C.C. § 3-406.
"0See, e.g., Park State Bank v. Arena Auto Auction, Inc., 59 Ill. App. 2d
235, 207 N.E.2d 158 (1965); Jackson v. First Natl Bank, 55 Tenn. App. 545,
4031 S.W.2d 109 (1966).
1REPORT OF THE NEW YoRK LAW REV. COMM'N FOR 1955: STUDY OF THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, 247 (1955) [hereinafter cited as 1955 REPORT].
17231 Ore. 106, 370 P.2d 726 (1962).
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[T]he requirement that the negligence 'substantially contributes' to
the making of the unauthorized signature is necessary to satisfy the
test of factual causation; it is the equivalent of the 'substantial factor'
test applied in the law of negligence generally.'
If the above definition is used in conjunction with the statute, a twofold
method of determining whether the defense of estoppel is available
emerges.' 9 The one against whom the estoppel is sought must have:
(1) been negligent and (2) that negligence must have been a "substantial
factor" in contributing to the forgery.2"
The statute omits the usual third step of proximate cause analysis-a
policy limitation on liability determined by the court. The omission raises
at least two implications: that proximate cause analysis is to be assumed
and used if necessary, or that proximate cause analysis is not necessary
in the cases that will foreseeably arise under Section 3-406. The latter
seems more logical, although it does not appear to be supported by any
declared statement of intent by the draftsmen of the U.C.C., nor specifically recognized by any court considering the question.2 '
As a general rule, for conduct to be negligent it has to be foreseeable
that the conduct involved will create an "unreasonable risk of causing
damage to others."' In addition, the risk involved has to be one to the
particular class or individual injured, not merely one to the community
generally.2- The question of foreseeability on a proximate cause level, in
contrast to that on the negligence level, "means a foreseeability much
more closely identified with the particular plaintiff or the class of which he
is a member and the interest of the plaintiff which is actually invaded. '24
To a large extent, therefore, foreseeability analysis on a proximate
cause level is a refinement of that conducted on the negligence level.
Yet, in the restricted situation usually encountered with Section 3-406,
is such a policy limitation on liability needed at all? For instance, in the
Gresham case, where a principal gave his agent the appearance of author8
Id.
19

at 120, 370 P.2d at 732.
The test has an additional step; the party seeking to use the estoppel
must have paid the instrument "in good faith and in accordance with the reasonable commercial standards" of its business. U.C.C. § 3-406.
so Id.
2" Only five courts appear to have considered the question in any depth, and
of these, only two have defined the term.
2 W. PROSSER, LAW OF ToRTS § 31, at 149 (3d ed. 1964).
2
For the initial analysis of "negligence in the air," see Palsgraf v. Long
Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 334, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
2 Campbell, Duty, Fault, and Legal Cause, 1938 Wis. L. R1v. 402, 408-09.
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ity2l to cash checks, when actually no such authority existed,2 the risk
was clearly that the agent would convert the checks to his own use. The
only way to accomplish the conversion is by a forged indorsement, and
the checks must be paid or purchased by some party convinced of the
agent's authority. In other words, the possible methods of accomplishing the conversion are extremely limited. If those methods are inherent
in the act and can be clearly ascertained by the two-step negligence analysis, of what use is a proximate cause step?
Even though the statute may simplify the analytical steps needed to
reach a conclusion of negligence and estoppel, the problem remains, for
what type of negligence will the actor be liable? The Official Comment
to Section 3-4067 points out that the statute "adopts the doctrine of
Young v. Grote, 4 Bing 253 (1827), which held that a drawer who so
negligently draws an instrument as to facilitate its material alteration is
'2 8
liable to the drawee who pays the altered instrument in good faith.
In Young, a businessman, leaving London on a trip, left five signed
drafts, drawn on his bank, with his wife, who knew nothing about his
business. Her instructions were to use the drafts as was necessary. In
the course of business it became necessary to use a draft and the wife
instructed her husband's agent to fill in the proper sum on the draft.
The agent did so, but left obvious spaces where alterations could be
made. The agent showed the draft to the wife, who apparently approved
it. The agent then altered the draft, cashed it, and absconded.2 9 The
arbitrator charged Young with "gross negligence" 30 for giving the agent
the opportunity to alter the draft."1 The majority of the court on appeal
agreed with the judgment of the arbitrator, one of the justices calling
the negligence of Young "great." 2 The inference of Young and Comment One,33 therefore, is that simple or ordinary negligence will not raise
the defense of estoppel under Section 3-406.
In both Gresham and Gast, however, the court took a softer line than
The negligence of the principal consisted of giving his agent the appearance
of the authority in spite of the absence of it.
20 231 Ore. at 109, 370 P.2d at 728.
1,U.C.C. § 3-406, Comment 1.
25

28 Id.

"Young v. Grote, 4 Bing 253, 254, 255 (1827).
Id.at 256.
" Note here the application of the negligence-estoppel concept to contract law.
" 4 Bing at 260.
2

83U.C.C.

§ 3-406, Comment 1 further states: "It should be noted that the

rule as stated in this section requires that the negligence 'substantially' contribute
to the alteration."

260

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol.47

did Young or the Official Comment, by adopting the "substantial factor"
formula propounded in Anderson v. Minneapolis, Saint Paul & Sou Saint
Marie Railroad34 by the Minnesota court. The formula, as Prosser notes,
is closely related to the old "but for" rule, while being "clearly an improvement"3 5 over it. Even granting the improvement, in the majority
of cases the rule means little more than "the defendant's conduct is not
0
a cause of the event, if the event would have occurred without it.""
The language of the formula indicates that the conduct necessary to
qualify as a cause of an event does not have to be the dominant cause,
it must merely be a cause without which the event would not have
happened.
It appears that the reasoning of the Gast and Gresham courts is in
conflict with that of the statute. The language of the statute and the
Official Comment would not qualify all negligent conduct as estoppable
under the statute, but only conduct that was more than simply negligent
and that was a major cause of the event.8 7 The language adopted by the
two courts in question seems to let the statutory estoppel fall on any
negligent conduct that was an actual cause of the result complained of.
Although the court in Gast varies from the Comment and Young, the
more practical method of determining the cause in fact issue seems to
be the substantial factor test. To decide whether one cause contributed
more to an event than another results in the loss of the objectivity that
should necessarily be present in the determination of the cause in fact
issue.3 8 The same applies in determining whether one sort of negligence
is of a higher degree than another.3 Moreover, in a study of the U.C.C.
and its possible effect on New York law, the New York Law Revision
Commission approved the comment that "[T]he Code Section [3-406]
" 146 Minn. 430, 179 N.W. 45 (1920). The rule is that "defendant's conduct
is a cause of the event if it was a material element and a substantial factor in
bringing it about"
" W. PROssER, LAW OF TORTS § 41, at 244 (3d ed. 1964).
" Id. at 242. The quoted material explains the "sine qua non" or "but for"
rule, which Prosser indicates tended to break down in certain limited fact situations. The "substantial factor" test was adopted by the Minnesota court to cover
one of these. Except for these particular cases, the operation of the "substantial
factor" formula is basically the same as the "but for" test.
' This conclusion is drawn from the language of Young and U.C.C. § 3-406,
Comment 1.
" See generally Green, The Causal Relation Issue in Negligence Law, 60
MicH. L. REv. 543 (1962).
" For an example of the confusion that can occur in trying to determine
degrees of negligence, note the problems the courts have run into in trying to
apply degrees of negligence to the guest passenger area. See W. PROSSER, LAW OF
ToRTs § 34, at 186 (3d ed. 1964).

19681

FORGED INDORSEMENTS

would substitute a principle of complete estoppel by negligence.... The
negligent person is made fully liable and can only pursue the wrongdoer."40 This statement may represent a change in the original position of
the writers of the U.C.C. If so, the position of the court in Gast is not
only judicially sound, but is in line with the "intent" of the framers
of the statute.
Section 3-406 thus presents a two-fold problem of statutory interpretation in deciding whether the section cuts off proximate cause analysis and in interpreting the meaning of "substantially contributes"-is it
a test of factual causation, or does it modify "negligence" and call for
"substantial" and not "simple" negligence for estoppel. The court did
not reach the proximate cause issue, but it was not faced with a set of
facts that called for its resolution. The negligence issue was properly
solved and further analysis, which would have contributed little to the
decision of the case, was suspended. In addition the court seems to have
correctly resolved the "substantial-simple" negligence conflict, in favor of
the substantial factor test.

H. IRwiN COFFIELD, III
,o 1955 REPORT at 248.

